Applied Cultural Linguistics
Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research

Over the past decades, linguists have taken a broader view of language and are borrowing methods and findings from other disciplines such as cognition and computer sciences, neurology, biology, sociology, psychology, and anthropology. This development has enriched our knowledge of language and communication, but at the same time it has made it difficult for researchers in a particular field of language studies to be aware of how their findings might relate to those in other (sub-)disciplines.

celcr seeks to address this problem by taking a cross-disciplinary approach to the study of language and communication. The books in the series focus on a specific linguistic topic and offer studies pertaining to this topic from different disciplinary angles, thus taking converging evidence in language and communication research as its basic methodology.

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Applied Cultural Linguistics
Implications for second language learning and intercultural communication
Edited by Farzad Sharifian and Gary B. Palmer
Applied Cultural Linguistics
Implications for second language learning and intercultural communication

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CHAPTER 1

Applied cultural linguistics

An emerging paradigm

Gary B. Palmer and Farzad Sharifian

1. Introduction

The chapters in this volume explore implications of research carried out within the general area of cultural linguistics for the learning of second languages and intercultural communication. Cultural linguistics draws on, but is not limited to, the theoretical notions and analytical tools of cognitive anthropology and cognitive linguistics. Through these, it explores the relationship between language, culture, and conceptualisation (Palmer 1996; Sharifian 2003, forthcoming).

Cognitive linguist Ronald Langacker (1999: 16) has described language as “an essential instrument and component of culture, whose reflection in linguistic structure is pervasive and quite significant”. Similarly, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999: 69) have argued that cultural knowledge in the form of conventional images feeds into idioms based on metaphors. Moreover, complex categories are structured by experiential domains, which may be culture-specific (Lakoff 1987: 95). These statements by influential cognitive linguistic theorists suggest that language is embedded in culture. Similarly, cognitive anthropologists have emphasized the cultural grounding of language and thought (e.g., Holland and Quinn 1987).

Language is a cultural activity and, at the same time, an instrument for organizing other cultural domains. Speakers take account of discourse situations, which are structured by culture. Paul Friedrich (1989) referred to this nexus of language and culture as linguaculture and Michael Agar (1994) called it languaculture. Language is shaped not only by special and general innate potentials, but also by physical and sociocultural experiences. It is the concurrence of language-as-culture and language-governed-by-culture that warrants an approach called cultural linguistics (Palmer 1996).

Cognitive grammar views grammar primarily as reflecting attentional processes, such as the perception of relations between figure and ground, profile and base, and the dynamics of movement and force (Langacker 1987; Talmy 1988).
Secondly, it sees grammar as reflecting conventional construals of scenes and participants in terms of specificity, scope, and perspective (including subjectivity) (Langacker 1987). Thirdly, cultural and semantic categories are seen to build on a foundation of embodied or “emergent” categories (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). But semantic categories and grammatical forms are cultural as much as physical. The cultural component of semantics constitutes the bulk of what linguists refer to as “world knowledge” or “encyclopaedic knowledge”.

In grammar, it is largely convention that determines what will be figure and what will be ground, what profile and what base, what actor and what patient. The variety of grammatical constructions across the world's languages is huge, and convincing universals are scarce. In English, we find actors as prototypical semantic figures, while in Tagalog (Austronesian) it is undergoers that are most often given grammatical focus. In Yuman languages of North America, morphological switch reference markers direct attention to new subjects, whereas some Australian and Amerindian languages provide switch reference markers for both subjects and objects, and the markers are different for each (Payne 1997: 324). Grammar consists of the entrenched commonalities in the structure of conventional utterances. These utterances are composed of symbolic verbal responses to recurrent discourse situations. Discourse, in turn, is embedded in sociocultural institutions. Put in the form of a syllogism, grammar is conventional (but not static); convention is culture; therefore, grammar itself belongs to culture.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Johnson (1987) and other cognitive linguists have stressed the importance of embodied categories such as “up” and “down”, which are thought to emerge from basic physical experiences. But even embodied categories are framed by cultural knowledge and practice. The vast majority of physical experiences that motivate embodied categories are structured by routines such as sleep, work, travel, subsistence, mating and play, and by artifacts such as architecture, tools, clothing and other products, all of which are largely cultural experiences or constructions. Linguists who highlight the priority of emergent categories must concede that virtually all physical activities and artifacts have culture-specific designs.

How can we see cultural patterning in grammar? During the past three decades, cultural and cognitive linguists have discovered important links between grammar and cultural schemas. We will mention just a few studies here. Friedrich (1979) reported that spatial suffixes of the Tarascan language of Mexico evoke schemas of body-images. The schemas are metaphorically extended to a variety of cultural domains, such as the shape of a house. Witherspoon (1980) showed that verbal morphology in Navajo (Athabascan) takes into account a hierarchy of animacy that is not universal, but is rather a specifically Navajo ordering of calling and talking beings according to their mental and physical powers. Martin (1988) reported that Tagalog grammar reflects an awareness of social interdependence,
evident in such forms as the desiderative prefix *ki*-, and in lexical constructions marking reciprocity. Lakoff (1987) showed that the scope of noun-classifiers in Dyirbal makes sense only in terms of the roles of central category members in the origin belief system of the speakers (see also Mylne 1995). Similarly Shona (Bantu) classifiers reflect belief systems and domestic routines (Palmer 2007; Palmer and Woodman 1999). Polynesian spatial language reflects community spatial arrangements (Shore 1996). Various features of Australian Aboriginal English involve elements that conventionally evoke conceptual bases embedded in Aboriginal cultural beliefs and experiences (Sharifian 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007; Malcolm and Sharifian 2002). Zapotec infants learn container schemas that differ from those of Danish children. They learn them prior to learning the words that name the schemas (Sinha and de López 2000). A class of metaphors in Isnag (Austronesian) derives from rituals intended to safeguard the rice harvest (Barlaan 2003). Political metaphors in American English reflect the ideology of the family (Lakoff 1996). Given these findings in such disparate languacultures, it seems clear that language is grounded in cultural conceptualisations at every level. It follows that research on language requires concurrent ethnographic research, and applications must take culture into account.

2. Applying cultural linguistics

How can cultural linguistics research be applied; that is, what implications does it have for domains such as intercultural communication, bidialectal education, translation, first- and second-language teaching, and conversing with computers? Applications will be most effective if they highlight the cultural basis of language (see, e.g., Hinkel 1999; Kramsch 1993). In the area of teaching a second language or dialect, this may require explicating cultural conceptualisations that are traditionally associated with various features of the language to be learned. Teachers may choose to introduce and highlight cultural models and take account of culture-specific models of learning itself (Strauss 1992; D’Andrade 1995). The models may be any of several types. *Concrete models* represent basic experiences that are culturally prototypical and provide source concepts for extension by metaphor and metonymy. *Multimodal models* offer experiences via a variety of senses and channels. They reinforce a semantic domain by providing multiple points of entry. *Domain-specific models* are representations of how to talk about particular topics. *Discursive models* locate speakers in culturally appropriate social contexts. Mastery of discourse conventions should be a high priority in second-language teaching, as discourse reinforces other learning. *Cultural developmental models* take a learner through the same steps taken by a native speaker. *Analytic develop-
mental models are theory-based. For example, Kurtyka (2001) described a progression from teaching prototype usages to teaching extensions based on abstractions and metaphors. Thematic models are very general cultural models that subsume multiple domains. In American English, an emerging cultural theme is covered by the term “extreme”. We have “extreme sports”, “extreme programming”, and even “extreme networking protocols” (Apple’s Airport Extreme™).

As Kurtyka (2001) pointed out, probably none of this is radically new to language teachers. Many teachers focus on culture as an important component of their instruction. It is just that others have not put it all together within a theory of languaculture. Human minds are neuro-chemical networks governed by attentional and emotional processes. They are intentional and intersubjective. Language and gesture are highly coordinated symbolic actions of minds constrained by society, culture and history as well as neurophysiology. This is the holistic framework for cultural linguistics. Projects in applied cognitive linguistics commonly refer to the theory of attention and categorization, by focusing, for example, on cognitive constraints on schemas, basic concepts, prototypes, metaphors and complex categories. Projects in applied cultural linguistics focus on cultural constraints on the same metasemantic field.


As a point of reference for applied cultural linguistics, we begin with a review of some previous work. For the sake of brevity we will, however, limit this review to the chapters in Pütz, Niemeier and Dirven’s (2001) collection titled Applied Cognitive Linguistics II: Language Pedagogy. Pütz, Niemeier and Dirven see a major advantage in the cognitive linguistic approach to language pedagogy, because it:

…enables us to point out the motivation behind every aspect of language. Language thus becomes explainable, and once learners see the way or ways a language works, they may start constructing and reconstructing their own hypotheses about the language they are learning. (2001: xv)

Thus, we are given a picture of learners who, once made aware of schemas, will go looking for them. Teach a man how to fish and he will feed himself for the rest of his life. Pütz, Niemeier and Dirven’s chapter, and a subsequent paper by Dirven (2001), described unpublished work by Rudzka-Ostyn and derivative work by Kurtyka, who applied a variety of cognitive linguistic concepts to teach phrasal verbs such as run across, sit across from, and come across. The concepts included “trajectory” and “landmark”, metaphorical extensions from prototypes, radial networks, and a
continuum from literal to figurative expressions. In the same volume, Kurtyka (2001: 49) spoke of “the exploitation of image schemata and cognitive models, diagrams to accompany language presentation, reference to metaphor and metonymy”. From the standpoint of traditional classroom language instruction, their program seems well-focused and systematic, but from the perspective of cultural linguistics, it is constrained by the classroom format. Learners in these cognitive linguistic classrooms acquire prerequisite cultural knowledge mainly through the media of language and diagrams, so they catch only glimpses of cultural skeletons. The richer cultural world happens mostly outside the classroom. The available discourse model is necessarily classroom oriented; activation of schemas and cultural models is weak; mapping is impaired. The approach systematically applies category theory, but lacks vivid cultural experience. But that is the nature of traditional classrooms, and no fault of Rudzka-Ostyn’s or Kurtyka’s.

Other contributions to the Pütz, Niemeier and Dirven volume followed essentially the same approach. Panther and Thornburg (2001) examined the semantic structure of the English nominalizer -er, which had previously been characterized as “an erratic if not ‘chaotic’ category” (150). They analyzed -er as a radial category with a central prototype meaning. Panther and Thornburg’s most general conclusions have been supported by a similar analysis of a nominalizing prefix in Tagalog (Palmer, Rader and Clarito 2004; Palmer n.d.). Panther and Thornburg (2001: 150) felt justified in concluding “to the degree we can reduce chaos, our findings will have relevance to the teaching and learning of this extremely productive derivational pattern in English”.

Queller (2001) also argued that making schemas evident will lead to better instructional materials, and he included interesting example pages. Similarly, Kövecses (2001: 87) asked “how can we teach idioms in the classroom?” He wrote that cognitive linguistics assumes “motivated meaning” and “the assumption concerning the potential usefulness of cognitive linguistics is predicated on the commonsensical belief that motivation always facilitates learning”. He then applied the idea to the design of a dictionary for teaching idioms, showing why a useful arrangement would classify them by metaphorical sources and targets and clarify their ontological and epistemic mappings (connotations). He reported a classroom experiment that provided evidence that teaching the strategy of metaphorical thinking, as opposed to teaching particular conceptual metaphors, fostered a higher rate of learning of idioms. He suggested that “people need to be made aware of the metaphor approach before they can put it to use” (Kövecses 2001: 109). Teach a person to fish...

Barcelona’s (2001: 129) suggestions for the teaching of emotion metaphors were more specific. He wrote, “Beginning Spanish-speaking learners of English must be systematically exposed to examples that suggest that the basic verbs to be
used for the expression of caused change (especially emotional change) are *make*, *turn*, or *get* followed by (emotional) state adjectives like *angry*, *sad*, etc.* [emphasis original]. He added, “They should be systematically exposed to expressions of the composite metaphor (with states treated as containers, and with change of state treated as a swift locational change)…” English-speaking learners of Spanish, on the other hand, should be taught to avoid these composite metaphors and use *volver(se)* or *poner(se)* instead. He would teach students to observe fine-grained differences between the metaphors of their native language and the target language. The instructional materials would be based on “systematic contrastive analysis” of the most fundamental metaphors in the two languages (Barcelona 2001: 135). The analysis should begin with the most general governing metaphors, such as *change of state is change of location*.

Ungerer (2001) presented a teaching approach based primarily on introducing frequently used basic lexemes as “entry points”, followed by presentation of taxonomic and metonymic superordinates. He searched a six-year course of German textbooks of English for frequently used basic lexemes. He suggested the use of personal names as a means of introducing learners into “participant roles of the target culture,” but omitted reference to how different participant roles and discourse situations might sanction or restrict the use of personal names (Ungerer 2001: 216). To differing degrees, appropriate usage in social contexts is part of the meaning of all lexemes. In fact, Palmer (1996) refers to expressions that highlight discourse schemas and predicate (i.e. “mark, index, point to”) intratextual references as *discursives*. Personal names are loaded with discursive values. Therefore it seems important to introduce them within the framework of culturally specific discourse models, which must first be discovered by means of linguistic ethnography.

All of the above studies in the Pütz, Niemeier and Dirven volume work within the traditional approaches and problems of cognitive linguistics, and find their cultural models within the languages they propose to teach. In their proposed methods of instructing second language learners, they do not, for the most part, appear to explore culture outside the vocabulary of instruction. Thus, their students have the burden of imagining the culture to which they must then map their new vocabulary.

The chapter by Wolf and Bobda (2001) enters more fully into the paradigm of cultural linguistics. Their concern is with the indigenization of African instructional literature as exemplified in the *Secondary English Project for Cameroon*, which contains themes that “reflect the cultural tension between tradition and modernity that is characteristic of African society today” (Wolf and Bobda 2001: 227). These themes are conveyed in reading and comprehension exercises and in pictures. But in widening the scope of study to include the cultural themes, do we lose the systematic presentations of lexico-semantic categories and conceptual
metaphors that cognitive linguists see as essential to progress in instruction? Not necessarily. Wolf and Bobda (2001: 228) attempted to define cultural models that “conform to a large part to Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of ‘metaphor’”. They devoted much of their chapter to defining and illustrating the metaphors or metaphor-like themes that constitute an African model of community, which, though too involved to present here, includes the following: HUMANITY IS IN COMMUNITY WITH GODS AND SPIRITS, NATURE AND ITSELF; LIFE COMES FROM THE GODS; ANCESTORS ARE SPIRITS; AND HEALTH IS HUMANITY IN COMMUNITY WITH THE GODS AND SPIRITS, NATURE, AND ITSELF. How are these themes harnessed to the service of applied cognitive linguistics? There are lexico-pragmatic implications. An indigenized expression such as Good morning, Dad applies to a range of referents beyond the biological father (Wolf and Bobda 2001: 250). Similarly, pronouns are more encompassing: “we, our, and ours may encompass the speaker, although he or she may not be concerned, as in How is our wife/child” (251). Wolf and Bobda concluded that “teachers and authors of textbooks need to be made aware that words acquire new meanings” and that “non-Western cultural models can indeed be realized in English” (251). In general, “Conceptual diversity which is realized lexically enriches the English language and learners of it profit most if indigenous cultural elements occur alongside native-English elements” (251).

The general implication of the Wolf and Bobda study for the teaching of language is that teachers should be aware that students may associate their cultural schemas and categories to the words of the language or the dialect that they are learning.

4. This volume

The chapters in this volume explore the relationship between language and cultural conceptualisations (Sharifian 2003), such as schemas, categories, models, metaphors and scripts, in several languages and contexts. The authors of these chapters highlight the implications of their research in terms of language teaching/learning and intercultural communication. All the chapters contribute to the argument that an explicit understanding of the cultural foundation of language can greatly enhance any form of application that it serves in practical domains.

Occhi’s chapter employs the notion of “cultural schema” in teaching archaeology to Japanese students. Occhi teaches at Miyazaki International College, where instruction in English is integrated with other coursework. Thus she teaches English as part of her classes in archaeology and linguistic anthropology. This gives her excellent opportunities to evaluate her students’ understanding of the subject matter in relation to their understanding of English. Occhi observes that the semantic schema [CONDITION A SUPPORTS CONCLUSION B] which underlies the
English construction “modal+have+past participle” (e.g. Neanderthals may have been handsome) is central to the structure of a Western science such as archaeology. She further observes that this kind of construction, and therefore its underlying schema, rarely appears in Japanese texts on archaeology. She finds that the cultural schemas that her students bring to the study of prehistory do not rely on an inferential component. Thus, in her teaching Occhi first introduces her students to the English existential modal past perfect constructions (e.g., would have been activated) that are commonly found in Western scientific reasoning. She then shows them documentary films and requires them to read film transcripts. Finally, she asks them to construct their own conclusions using the modal past perfect construction. Neanderthal leg bones were short; therefore Neanderthals must have been short. Flowers were found with the bones; therefore Neanderthals may have had funerals. Occhi’s method has at least two merits. First, it uses film to expose students to non-verbal cultural schemas. Second, after verbally teaching the schemas of Western science and exposing students to documentary films, she requires that the verbal schemas be applied to the knowledge gained from the film. Thus, she presents the students with a very condensed languacultural experience.

The chapter by Sharifian explores cultural conceptualisations that speakers of Persian bring to the task of learning and using English as their L2. He uses the word “conceptualisations” to refer, collectively, to cognitive constructs such as “schemas”, “categories”, “metaphors”, and “blends”. He maintains that learners develop culturally-constructed conceptualisations during their L1 learning and are likely to draw on the same conceptualisations when learning and using an L2. By providing examples from Persian speakers of English, Sharifian shows how a mismatch between Persian conceptualisations and those associated with “native” varieties of English can lead to miscommunication or some form of unsmooth communication. He elaborates on several Persian cultural schemas and categories, such as âberu and târof, and discusses how they are an intrinsic part of Persian cultural and historical contexts. Sharifian concludes his chapter with a discussion of the implications of his observations for the notion of “English as an International Language”. He maintains that if English is to be used by people from different cultural backgrounds, then its speakers should develop an open and informed attitude towards conceptual variety. That is, in order to avoid conflict and miscommunication, speakers of English as an International Language need to develop what he calls meta-cultural competence, based on exposure to various cultural conceptualisations.

The chapter by Malcolm provides a general account of the research that Malcolm and his colleagues, including the second author of this chapter, have carried out over a decade. The research applies the framework of cultural linguistics to the case of Australian Aboriginal students learning Standard English as their second dialect. The cultural-conceptual differences that exist between Aboriginal English
and Standard Australian English merit that the situation be treated as a case of second language learning.

In analyzing the situation of Aboriginal students, Malcolm moves beyond the level of grammar and extends the exploration of dialect acquisition from a cognitive-cultural perspective. He observes that Aboriginal English is informed by cultural schemas, categories, metaphors, and images that are largely different from those that underpin the use of Standard Australian English. He argues that educators need to be aware of the observed cultural-conceptual differences to be able to help Aboriginal students achieve their desired levels of literacy and numeracy. Malcolm calls for a two-way bidialectal educational system in Australia and spells out its main principles as (a) awareness raising, (b) easing the transition to the standard dialect, and (c) cultivating alternative ways of approaching experience and knowledge. Bidialectal education in this sense gives recognition and allows room for the development of both the “standard” dialect and students’ native dialect.

Yu’s chapter explores the Chinese conceptualisation of the heart in the context of traditional Chinese medicine and philosophy. He also discusses the implications of his observations for the case of learning Chinese as a second language. Yu maintains that the Chinese cultural model of the heart gives rise to metaphors that profile the heart as a physical entity (e.g., the heart is a container), a part of the body (e.g., the heart is the ruler of the body), and the locus of affective and cognitive activities (e.g., the heart is the house of all emotional and mental processes). He contrasts this conceptualisation with the heart-mind dichotomy, which characterizes Western cultures. Thus, Yu demonstrates that cultural schemas rival bodily schemas as sources of conceptual metaphors.

As for the implications of his observations, Yu draws on the notions of *conceptual fluency* and *metaphorical competence* developed by Danesi (e.g., 1995). The notion of “metaphorical competence” has been proposed as an addition to the more traditional notions of “communicative competence” and “linguistic competence”. The idea is that the metaphorical basis of the language-to-be-learned, which is largely derived from cultural models, should be made explicit to learners to help them achieve fluency at the cultural-conceptual level. In the case of L2 learners of Chinese, Yu maintains that a clear delineation of the Chinese conceptual metaphors, such as those associated with the heart, facilitates their learning and enables them to avoid misunderstanding in intercultural communication.

The chapter by Maalej investigates conceptualisations of “fear” in Tunisian Arabic, arguing for the notion of “cultural embodiment”. Maalej presents linguistic expressions of fear in Tunisian Arabic where a body part is conceptualized as undergoing physiological change as a result of fear (e.g., My guts reeled out of fright). He calls these *physiologically realistic expressions*, as the imagined involvement of the body part is mainly derived from native experience. Another type of concep-
tualisation that Maalej isolates under “cultural embodiment” is what he terms *culturally schematized expressions*, where a particular expression schematizes a body part in a culturally specific way (e.g., *My heart is between my teeth out of fear*). Another type of expression that Maalej classifies under “cultural embodiment” is what he calls *culturally selective expressions*, where the way in which physiology is thought to be affected by fear is culturally profiled (e.g., *My feet were scythed from fear for I was paralyzed with fear*).

Maalej discusses the theoretical implications of “cultural embodiment” for embodiment theory, arguing that embodiment needs to be made bi-directional in terms of directionality of mappings and grounding from culture — in addition to bodily explanations of mappings. He also discusses the implications of cross-linguistic differences and similarities in conceptualisations of certain body parts and emotions for learning/teaching a second language and cross-cultural communication. He notes the differences and similarities in conceptualisations of fear that Tunisian Arabic-speaking learners of English are likely to encounter. Maalej subscribes to the view that teachers can facilitate the task of L2 learning for their students by making explicit the cultural-bodily basis of the language they are teaching, and by learning about the cultural conceptualisations and the worldview that learners bring to the task of L2 learning.

Goddard and Wierzbicka explore the application of the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) in language teaching/learning and intercultural communication. The research program of NSM has been a major attempt to identify a set of basic concepts, or “semantic primes”, in terms of which more complex concepts can be explicated. Building around the notions of “core” and “procedural” vocabulary, they maintain that semantic primes provide a minimum procedural vocabulary for the lexical syllabus of early L2 teaching. They also maintain that these primes already exist in the L1 mental lexicon of learners and should thus be both easy to learn and facilitative in terms of learning other L2 words. Goddard and Wierzbicka therefore encourage curriculum designers to include all or most semantic primes in their early lexical syllabi.

In the context of culturally informed pedagogy, Goddard and Wierzbicka observe that a large number of concepts in any language are culture specific and that such concepts need to be maximally explicated to the learners of the language. They argue that NSM semantic primes would be able to explicate culture-specific vocabulary items without the risk of providing an ethnocentric perspective. Goddard and Wierzbicka also propose that the notion of “cultural script”, which is the use of semantic primes in articulating norms, values and practices, be employed as a medium for intercultural training. They provide several examples of the use of cultural scripts in explicating culture-specific communicative norms in Anglo, Russian, and Korean cultures. Finally, they discuss the role of English as an inter-
national, or a “nuclear”, language and maintain that in this context, NSM English may be adopted as a universal cultural notation for explicating meanings in an auxiliary language.

Polzenhagen and Wolf employ the notions of “conceptual metaphor”, “cultural model”, and “cultural schema” to investigate African English expressions from the domains of political leadership, wealth and corruption. They follow a corpus-based approach to identify dominant cultural conceptualisations that are reflected in two corpora of African English. They first show how the African cultural model of community is an extension of kinship, in the sense that it is dominated by conceptualisations such as community members are kin and leaders are fathers. They also observe that the African models of leadership and wealth are both associated with the metaphorical conceptualisation of eating (e.g., They have given him plenty to eat, which is used in Cameroon when a new government official is appointed). Polzenhagen and Wolf also discuss the African cultural model of corruption, in which a distinction needs to be made between, for example, what is “illegal”, in terms of the law, and what is “illegitimate” in a particular cultural environment. This model, they maintain, finds expression in African English utterances that profile the conceptualisations of corruption as “disease” and “an eater”. The chapter also discusses several other schemas and metaphors from African English.

As for pragmatic applications, Polzenhagen and Wolf maintain that unfamiliarity with the cultural conceptualisations that underpin the use of African English may lead to intercultural miscommunication. For example, one of the authors reports receiving an email message from his Ph.D. student signed “your son”. Had the message been interpreted within the context of Western schemas, it might have led to serious misunderstandings. At a societal level, unfamiliarity with how corruption is conceptualised in African English can have far-reaching implications for international economic and political talks and relationships.

5. Conclusions

Cultural linguistics places a great emphasis on culture as a source of conceptualising experience through cognitive structures such as schemas, categories, metaphors and scripts. In this volume, the authors appeal to cultural conceptualisations to explore implications pertaining to the applied domains of language learning and intercultural communication. It is hoped that the volume as a whole will motivate further research in this direction and in other possible applied domains such as translation, electronic communication, and forensic linguistics.
The basic motivation underpinning the series *Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research* is that the broadening of our view of language and the recruitment of analytical tools and methodologies from other disciplines have enriched our understanding of language while at the same time making it difficult for researchers in various language-related areas to share findings. The series seeks to encourage the development of cross-disciplinary approaches to the study of language and communication to address this problem. The current volume contributes to this goal by bringing together research that employs the analytical tools of cognitive sciences, including cognitive linguistics and cognitive anthropology, to address various issues that relate to the applied domain of language pedagogy and intercultural communication. Overall, the chapters provide "converging evidence" that suggests a deeper understanding of the interrelationship between language, conceptualisation and culture can enhance our understanding of the role of language in practical and applied domains.

References


CHAPTER 2

Using cultural linguistics to teach English language inferential schemas used in archaeology to Japanese university students

Debra J. Occhi

This article describes an archaeology lesson designed, through a cultural linguistic approach, to teach the English modal + have + past participle construction and the basics of archaeological reasoning to Japanese learners. Evidentials are among the most difficult forms for L2 English learners to master. For Japanese learners, a precollege educational format that emphasizes memorization of objective facts further hampers understanding and use of English evidentials. Both English and social science education in Japan are presented under this test-focused approach. Moreover, archaeological reasoning is presented differently in Japanese- and English-speaking contexts. The cultural linguistic approach provides a basis for understanding why this aspect of L2 English is difficult for Japanese learners and supports the development of effective curricula.

1. Introduction

The English modal + have + past participle construction (e.g., ‘Neanderthals may have been handsome,’ often referred to hereafter as MHPP) expresses a semantic schema that is important in Anglo-English scientific reasoning and instructional materials. The underlying schema is [CONDITION A SUPPORTS CONCLUSION B] at varying levels of certainty. It is considered basic to archaeological discourse in English. This and other important cognitive schemata used in English language instruction are embedded in cultural models. Thus, they are simultaneously cognitive and cultural schemas. Since this schema is so central to archaeological reasoning in English classrooms, one might also expect to find it in the classroom discourse of other cultures, including Japanese, but in fact it seldom appears in precollege Japanese texts on archaeology. It is important for EFL stu-
dents to learn not only the grammatical construction, but also its semantic schema and something of the cultural model in which it is embedded. This is where the cultural linguistic approach can be fruitfully used to present a particular schema to second language learners.

This paper describes a case study of how cultural linguistics can be used to enhance content-based EFL instruction. Specifically, it compares cultural models for understanding prehistory in English- and Japanese-speaking educational contexts. It then describes a lesson designed to teach the basics of archaeological inference together with the English modal + have + past participle construction to Japanese university students. This grammatical construction often appears in archaeological writing in English and is used to show conclusions based on evidence. We can understand why Japanese students have problems in using this construction through examining archaeological writing and social science education in Japan and in English-speaking contexts. Archaeologists’ writings reveal strong differences in the ways archaeology is typically conducted in Japanese and English-speaking countries. Precollege social science education also differs based on these respective cultural models. English and Japanese modal expressions in these writings do not correspond neatly between languages. The paper recommends that students’ cultural and educational backgrounds be considered when designing content-based second language instruction. Cultural linguistics provides an approach to identifying language differences that reveal differences in conceptualization pertinent to instruction.

This paper was inspired by a lesson developed in collaboration with my teaching partner, Karen Eberly, for our first-year Introduction to Anthropology course. Our objective was to give the students an overview of the various fields of anthropology in an appropriate English teaching and active learning format. For each topic we covered in the course, we focused on a particular area of English fluency that we felt students should strengthen.

We both agreed that in teaching the archaeology section, we would focus on the modal+have+past participle (e.g., ‘Neanderthals may have been handsome’, referred to hereafter as MHPP). We selected this construction for two reasons. First, the practice of archaeology involves forming conclusions about past human behavior based on physical evidence. This is an important issue of content which is often expressed in English through the MHPP. Also, we were aware from our

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1. I am deeply grateful to Karen Eberly for providing the documentary tape and handouts and for being an excellent collaborator in course design and implementation. Throughout the development of this research, Gary B. Palmer has provided excellent advice. I also thank Margaret B. Lyneis, who encouraged my questions about these cultural differences in her archaeological theory course in 1992.
own teaching experiences that Japanese students tend to find this form problematic. That made it a good topic from the English teaching perspective.

I then began research about why Japanese students have such trouble with these constructions. Data used in this study include Japanese social science instructional materials, popular texts written in Japanese and in English by Japanese, and a survey of literature pertaining to EFL, Japanese archaeology and education. Bourdieu asserts that systems of thought, that is, schematic constituents of culture, are bred within systems of education (1967:343). This investigation clearly shows that cultural practice, exhibited in language structures and enacted in the classroom, is important to consider when teaching a foreign language.

2. Theoretical background

Applied cultural linguistics is a theory which hybridizes linguistic anthropology and cognitive linguistics (Palmer 1996). Under the cognitive linguistics framework, language is “an essential instrument and component of culture, whose reflection in linguistic structure is pervasive and quite significant.” (Langacker 1999:16) Furthermore:

The expression itself – overt linguistic elements and the notions they directly encode – is of course merely the tip of the iceberg. The expression per se is part of a usage event, i.e. an actual instance of language use, comprising the interlocutors’ full contextual understanding of the expression, including their apprehension of its interactive force. The usage event is usually part of a longer discourse, and is one facet of the interlocutors’ overall social interaction. The interaction takes place in a particular situational context, which in turn is embedded in a culture, which develops as a way of coping with the world. (Langacker 2001:14)

Cultural linguistics emphasizes the cultural element of cognition. What are often taken to be purely cognitive schemata are often cultural schemata at the same time. Therefore; cultural linguistics can fruitfully be applied to many previously perplexing issues in the second language teaching classroom. The issue of interest in this paper arises from teaching archaeology in English under a liberal arts framework of critical inquiry to Japanese college students who have grown up in a Japanese educational and cultural environment. This environment fosters specific tendencies for interpreting prehistory in an educational context. They possess a limited command of English. Working with these students presents a different set of challenges than those encountered when teaching native English speakers educated in the U.S. Since the stated purpose of my educational institution is “to develop international citizens conversant in Japanese and foreign cultures and fluent
in English” (MIC, 2003:5), as instructors we are faced with the need to present topics in an appropriate English-based discursive context and to find ways to engage students in our contrived discourse frameworks.

This paper shows one way that cognitive and cultural schemata can be presented to foster understanding of grammatical forms in a second language classroom. We used several resources in our project. First, we presented a video which contained discussion and reenactment of Neanderthal lifestyles. The discussion included several modal + have + past participle forms. Students watched the video multiple times in conjunction with worksheets, extensive discussion, and brainstorming. Students rated this lesson highly for its usefulness in end-of-semester evaluations. Though we did not conduct any objective testing measures of increase in English proficiency, we judged that students improved their grasp of the grammatical form and its corresponding use of inference based on their performance in other tasks throughout the semester.

I am not claiming that we awakened any new thinking powers in the students. Controversy has surrounded research regarding the production of correct counterfactual usage in Chinese as examined by Bloom, Au, and others (Palmer 1996:163–9). My research takes a different approach. Rather than positing an argument about whether thinking for speaking puts constraints on thinking in a first language (L1), I am interested in examining what linguistic and cultural features learned by L1 speakers need to be taken into account when designing appropriate materials for teaching a second language (L2). However, Bourdieu’s 1967 argument should be kept in mind:

What is usually known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is perhaps never so satisfactorily applicable as to intellectual life: words, and especially the figures of speech and figures of thought that are characteristic of a school of thought, mould thought as much as they express it. Linguistic and intellectual patterns are all the more important in determining what individuals take as worthy of being thought and what they think of it in that they operate outside all critical awareness (1967:345–6).

The cultural linguistic differences between English and Japanese that emerge in their respective archaeological discourses support this argument and motivate the lesson plan just described. The next section will discuss pertinent evidence for these differences as follows. First I will compare the linguistic resources for expressing evidentiality in English and in Japanese. Then, samples of popular discourse on archaeology in English will illustrate the cultural model being taught. This discourse will be compared to samples of archaeological discourse written in Japanese and English by Japanese native speakers. These will include samples of educational materials. Next follows a set of statements by practitioners of archaeology in Japan and in (Anglo-American) English speaking countries which fur-
ther point out the different cultural models and the potential for clash between them. After outlining the cultural linguistic situation of Japanese-speaking students and educational practices, and comparing the linguistic resources of interest, I will describe a teaching unit on archaeology in English designed to take these issues into account.

3. Prior research

The particular issue taken up here is that of interpretation of archaeological findings, but more general differences emerge when examining speakers’ tendency of interpreting events. Cultural difference in explanation styles between Japanese and American schoolchildren shows up very early. Watanabe (2001) used four graphic representations as stimuli for elementary students. She found that “Japanese students have a strong tendency to state whole events in chronological order, while American students tend to state the result or effect first and identify causes in their explanations” (2001:346). She states concern that these differences may be construed to represent different levels of ability rather than different styles that reflect cultural background. These styles are apparently cognitively entrenched along with the L1 in which they are used. Research shows that older students of English from various L1 backgrounds including Japanese seem to retain culturally based styles of explanation even when writing in L2 English. Hinkel’s (2002) analysis of prompted writing tasks show that nonnative university-level learners of English including Japanese tend to avoid argumentation in academic writing, focusing on ‘knowledge telling’ through exemplification and recounts of personal experience.

As Japanese students move into middle and high school, the stakes in what McVeigh (2002) has dubbed the “educatio-examination” system rise significantly. The training that students receive at these levels is aimed toward performance on objective exams, which require memorization of well-defined, isolated facts (closed-knowledge) rather than broad, interconnected systems (2002:100). As a result, students approach education with the expectation that the content of the day’s lesson is a packaged set of facts to be absorbed, rather than a situation necessitating analytic skills to make a discovery. Sources of these facts are not discussed. Japanese prehistory -- and much of science for that matter -- is presented in the Japanese educational system as received wisdom, to be memorized piecemeal in preparation for objective examinations (Habu 1989, Habu & Fawcett 1990, McVeigh 2002).

2. The research sample included L1 Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Indonesian, and Arabic students.
Though the focus of this paper is on teaching archaeology in English, a brief counterexample from the Japanese language teaching perspective is also worth mentioning. Maynard compares Japanese discourse principles and strategies to those of English in a way that echoes Watanabe’s findings on style differences in storytelling discussed above. In teaching Japanese discourse styles, Maynard argues that:

when compared with English, the distinction in Japanese genres is less clear and genre-specific discourse principles and strategies are less forcefully practiced...
The conclusion may not be stated until the very end of the essay, only after seemingly unnecessary steps, or the conclusion may be only indirectly suggested. (1998:12–13)

We can see this mixing of genres in Japanese middle school educational discourse, where folklore, prehistory, and history are presented together in a style of learning that emphasizes memorization of discrete items. In an example taken from a third-year middle school social studies worksheet entitled 歴史の流れ “Flow of History” combining manga, text, and charts, we see the mythical ruler Himiko who ‘ruled the Yamato kingdom through magic’ placed in a timeline alongside archaeological finds, historical events and persons. Each of these items should be memorized in preparation for the high school entrance exam which determines the future path a Japanese youth may take. However, Fawcett & Habu remind us that we should not expect Japanese archaeologists (whose work is primarily government-funded) to speak out about this melding of science and folklore:

Archaeologists today merely deny the political role of their work and concentrate on discovering what they believe is the factual ‘truth’ of the prehistoric record. Most Japanese archaeologists, furthermore, are not seriously interested in discussing archaeological education and the textbook problem. They see these issues as ideological and nonscientific and therefore having nothing to do with their studies…When archaeologists take an apolitical stand the interpretation falls on the shoulders of politically dominant groups, for example, government bureaucrats who write textbook guidelines or politicians who dictate educational policy. It is in this sense that the teaching of archaeology is becoming increasingly nationalistic (1990: 227).

English translations of specialist archaeological discourse given in Tadanao Yamamoto’s 日本考古学用語辞典 “Dictionary of Japanese archaeological terms” (2001) show that inferential conclusions are sometimes, but not often, translated into modal + have + past participle constructions. Moreover, conclusions are stat-
ed as a ‘just so story’ without grounds for understanding the process of their derivation, that is, without supporting evidence. Consider these examples:\3:

1. The manufacture of pottery in Japan is thought to have begun about 12,000 years ago (113)
2. We can imagine that the use of animal hides has a very long history in human culture, but as such artifacts do not preserve well, opportunities to deal with them archaeologically are few (145)
3. Horse bones are thought to occur from the Jōmon period, but the appearance of horse trappings dates to about the middle of the Kofun period, so it is thought that the practice of riding horses began only at that time (170)
4. The earrings and necklaces seem to have been used by women, and the belt ornaments by men (172)
5. Stone and pottery versions are known from the Yayoi period, and among them are examples accompanied by spindles (214)
6. However, cave dwellings can be seen to continue from the Paleolithic until the Yayoi period (231)

There is a prevalence of potential and passive forms as well as verbs of thought and sight (e.g., “it can be seen that X”). Passive forms delete the agent; we don’t know whose research findings are being referred to, nor are alternative interpretations of data encouraged. We don’t know what the motivation is for the association of earrings and necklaces with women and belt ornaments with men, as in example 4. Were these items gendered on the basis of having been found in association with identifiable male or female skeletal remains? Might the conclusion be based on ethnographic analogy with groups having a similar adaptation in other respects, or analogy with modern gendered patterns of adornment behavior?

Popular works aimed at children are stated more directly and less analytically than the specialist text cited above, as in this example sponsored by Japan’s national public broadcasting provider NHK: まんがでたどる日本人はるかな旅 “Following NHK’s ‘Long Journey of the Japanese People” Through Manga,” 2001.\4

7. 人類は、チンパンジーやゴリラなどの類人猿と共通の祖先から分かれて進化してきた。その進化の過程を古い順になどると、猿人、旧人、新人の四つに分けられる。

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3. I will refrain from the use of (sic) as the reader can easily see that cases of unnatural English and/or unsupported logic appear. Which of these are due to translation problems and which owe to explanatory style is unclear.

4. Translations of this and the newspaper papers following are mine with relevant parts in bold. I will also refrain from using (sic) as with the prior examples.
Humans came to evolve separately from anthropoid apes such as chimpanzees and gorillas from a common ancestor. To put these evolutionary stages in order from the oldest, they can be separated into ape people, early humans (Homo Erectus), ancient humans (Neandertal), and modern humans (Cro Magnon).

(8) 猿人から新人に進化する過程で、形としてめだつことは、脳が大きくなったことと、歯やあごの骨が退化して小さくなったことだ。猿人は、約五〇〇万年前、アフリカの森林の中で、二本足で直立して歩行をはじめたときに誕生した。その猿人から原人が生まれ、原人は、約一七〇万年前にアフリカを出て、ヨーロッパやアジアに広がった。そして、その子孫から、五〇万年前に旧人が誕生する。

As ape people evolved in stages into new humans, what is noticeable about their shape are the facts that the brain got larger, and the teeth and chin retrogressed and got smaller. Ape people were born about 5 million years ago, when they stood on two legs and began to walk in the middle of the African forests. Those ape people gave birth to early humans, who came out of Africa and spread into Europe and Asia about 1.7 million years ago. And, from those descendants, ancient humans were born 500,000 years ago.

(9) さらに、人類誕生の地アフリカで、約十五万年前に、新人（ホモ・サピエンス）が誕生する。この新人こそが、現代人の直接の祖先なのだ。そして一〇万年前、彼らはアフリカを出て、世界の各地に広がり始めたのだ (2001:23).

Moreover, in Africa, the birthplace of humans, modern humans were born about 150,000 years ago. These modern humans are the direct ancestors of people today. And 100,000 years ago, they came out of Africa and began to spread all over the world (op.cit.).

(N.b. in the accompanying figure the Neandertal is shown with a brain case smaller than modern humans, contrary to skeletal evidence.)

Later in the same text:

(10) 縄文人のムラでは、男性と女性の仕事がはっきり区別されていた (ibid:60).

In the Jomon villages, men's and women's work were clearly separated.

Though this is a popular text aimed at elementary school students, it contains features quite similar to the more specialized text cited earlier. That is, conclusions are stated without supporting evidence or argumentation. In the next example, we see an apparently innovative approach to the study of archaeology, which seems to
point out some of the problems of the usual style of study without presenting any real solutions. We have already seen one example of classroom materials above, a mythohistorical timeline to be memorized. This recent Asahi newspaper article shows that though a more dynamic appraisal of prehistory was attempted in one classroom exercise in Toyama, this practice is far from the norm:

**Putting discussion into history class (translation)**

On May 19, the National Museum of Folklore and History announced that according to the results of radiocarbon analysis of earthenware excavated in northern Kyushu, the Yayoi period began about 500 years earlier [than previously thought]. In that the social studies class was just studying Jomon and Yayoi periods, this timely announcement was made to the class. At that time, a student asked, “What shall we write on the tests?” For the students, who think that 'social studies equals memorization,’ this is a very serious question.

Recently, it is said that improvement of the test contents continues; however, it is unreasonable from the start to expect many analytic questions on the in-school memorization-based tests that precede high school entrance examinations.

In order to impress students with the fact that though it is important to learn, it is also important to take data and think about it, this year debate was introduced into the first year history class.

This month’s theme was "If you were living [then], would it be Jomon Era? Yayoi era?" First, it was explained that in order to be able to persuasively assert various points of view, it is necessary to back up one’s reasons with data.

…

The students, who prior to conducting the debate seemed not to be keen about doing it, wrote their impressions that “though at first they were nervous, after beginning to speak they gradually came to enjoy it and wanted to speak more.”

Speaking based on data is not only an important skill in class but also in life in society. We would like to practice more classes in which, rather than memorization of textbook contents, students can speak of their own viewpoints and thoughts about history.

歴史授業に討論を取り入れ (original text)

5月19日、国立歴史民俗博物館が、放射性炭素年代測定法で北部九州出土の土器を調べた結果、「弥生時代が約500年早まる」と発表した。社会科授業ではちょうど縄文・弥生時代を学習していて、タイムリーなこの発表を授業で紹介した。
このとき、ある生徒は「それじゃテストのとき、どう書けばいいの？」と質問してきた。「社会科＝暗記教科」と思っている生徒には、この質問はとても重要である。
最近は、出題内容の改善が進んでいるとはいえ、高校入試をはじめ、校内テストでは暗記さえしていれば解ける問題が多い現状では無理もない。覚えることは重要だが、資料を使って考えることの重要性にも気づいてもらえると、今年度、1年生の歴史授業に討論を取り入れた。今月のテーマは「もし住むなら縄文時代か、弥生時代か？」である。まず、それぞれの立場の主張に説得力をもたせるためには、理由が必要であること、その理由が資料（事実）に裏付けられていることが必要だと説明した。

事実を調べることは討論には欠かせないことであるが、今回は時間の都合上、とることができなかった。わずかな準備時間だったが、教科書や資料集の中から資料（事実）を提示し、その資料を自分の立場に有利になるように解釈し、活発に発言した。

討論を行う前にはあまり乗り気ではなかった生徒が「最初は緊張していたけど、一言発言するとなんだか楽しくなってきました。もっと発言したかった」と感想を書いてきた。

資料に基づいて発言することは、授業だけでなく社会で生きるために必要な力である。教科書の内容を単に暗記する授業ではなく、自分なりの見方や考え方（歴史観）を発言できる授業を今後も実践していきたい。


It would have been interesting to have more detail in the article about how the 'thoughts and opinions' were grounded and expressed by these students. As middle schoolers, they would be learning English at this stage in their education as well. However, the English they are learning is similarly memorization-focused and is commonly referred to as “test English” (試験英語) that would not lead to development of native English discourse styles.

Let us now briefly consider differences between evidential expressions in Japanese and English, as the students’ Japanese surely exerts an impact on their English. Although Japanese is quite sensitive to evidentiality, particularly regarding psychological states, it lacks a grammatical category of evidentials (Shibatani 1986:383). Rather, evidentiality appears in various word classes. A survey of Japanese-English dictionaries further reveals that the English modal past participle construction seldom appears in translations of the various Japanese evidential markers. The words used as evidentials in either Japanese or English have other semantic or pragmatic entailments which complicate attempts to translate. For instance, in Japanese, evidentiality overlaps with pragmatic indexing of social hierarchy (e.g., daroo ‘probably’ which indexes authority and masculinity), and in English, with modal obligation or politeness (e.g., must).

In the Japanese case, social hierarchy-based pragmatic effects which constrain use of modals are consistent with a cultural model that precludes argumentation with the conclusions of a teacher or expert. This model, which is manifested behaviorally
in an educational focus on objective examinations during middle and high school, makes the development of logical argumentation skills in either language problematic for Japanese students. English is also presented in the memorization-based format, despite the Ministry of Education’s continued mandate for “basic and practical communication abilities” to be nurtured through the English curriculum (2003). The Asahi newspaper article cited above shows that debate, although rare, is viewed as a useful addition to the curriculum. This and other projects discussed in contemporary news on Japanese education indicate that debate is to be fostered between students who are social equals, rather than directed towards some established set of assertions or conclusions based on data. Asking students to decide “If you were living [then], would it be Jomon Era? Yayoi era?” provokes discussion of, as the paper states, “viewpoints and thoughts about history.” However, the question itself overlooks the simple fact that these eras were named later by archaeologists, not by the people living during those periods. We cannot know what role data analysis played in this exercise, if any. We do see that the debate is framed as a useful activity in preparation for “speaking about data” in daily life but not for the memorization-based examinations towards which the bulk of instruction is aimed. The debate is therefore a marginal activity at best in the larger educational context.

Examples above showed that samples of popular Japanese archaeological writing intended for younger, general, or even specialist audiences do not use forms that parallel the English structures to discuss conclusions based on evidence; rather they typically include potential + past or nonpast forms, relying heavily on verbs of thought and sight. Excerpts from classroom practice showed an uncritical inclusion of folklore into historical presentations of Japan’s development with an emphasis on memorization and relegation of recent archaeological findings to peer discussion of thoughts rather than analysis of data. Further insight into this cultural model for understanding Japanese prehistory can be gained by a deeper look at contemporary Japanese practice of professional archaeology.

However archaeologists may approach Japanese prehistory as individual scholars, the dominant cultural model for the origins of Japan is primordialist, rooted in the text-based Kokugaku (national studies) tradition which precedes the introduction of scientific archaeology in 1877 by at least 275 years. The Kokugaku tradition draws on older texts known as the Kojiki (AD 712) and the Nihon Shoki (720) (Hudson 199:23–4). Habu (1989:41) explains further:

…when ‘Western influenced’ Japanese archaeology is compared with European and American archaeology, it becomes obvious that the introduction of Western archaeology into Japan has been only partial. ‘Western influenced’ Japanese archaeology has been affected primarily by ‘scientific’ archaeology and generally has a relatively practical orientation, while European and American archaeology tend to concentrate on the discussion of theory. Archaeologists working in Japan will
accept techniques which they consider unrelated to questions of ideology, but they are closed to discussions which focus on ideological issues.

According to Habu & Fawcett (1990), post-WWII archaeology underwent a change of direction after its prewar and wartime use as a tool of militaristic ideology. Researchers tended to avoid development of theoretical discussions, focusing instead on description and typology. Some adopted a Marxist framework “to counteract any revival of nationalistic thought” (1990: 221). Among these were the influential Jomon (hunter-gatherer) scholars Wajima, Otsuka, and Izumi, whose works were apparently influenced by Morgan, Marx, and Engels. Another prominent Jomon specialist, Fujimori, has written prolifically on plant cultivation; however, he is criticized for writing emotionally and sentimentally rather than scientifically, as well as for changing his basic arguments over time – which themselves are based on circumstantial evidence. Habu tells us that these works were then adopted as models to which most work on Japanese prehistory has adhered uncritically, until the 1970s when improvement in data collection and theoretical influences from Anglo-American archaeology resulted in new types of subsistence studies (Habu 2001:17,22,25, emphasis added). She further notes in her introduction that as an undergraduate student of archaeology at a top-ranked private Japanese university she became aware of interesting issues in the sites she studied in preparation for writing her graduation thesis, but that she did not acquire theoretical sophistication until she undertook graduate studies in Canada (ibid:xi).

Charles Keally, a longtime archaeologist in Japan, describes the tendency for prominent figures to adopt stances which are then followed uncritically. This process resulted in a recent scandal involving Paleolithic sites. In November 2000 Shinichi ('God's Hand') Fujimura was caught on video camera planting artifacts on a site in northeastern Japan. For the past twenty years the group of archaeologists researching that area were claiming earlier and earlier dates for occupation of the Japanese archipelago based on Fujimura’s ‘findings,’ challenging decades of worldwide research on human evolution and migration. Though the ‘artifacts’ showed no signs of vertical displacement over time – hard to imagine given the ubiquity of this phenomenon in Japanese sites – this and all other criticism was squashed by Okamura, the site leader. Several attempts by Keally and his colleague Oda to publicize evidence to the contrary were criticized, though true rebuttals of Keally’s and Oda’s findings based on data were never presented. Nonetheless, Okamura

5. But recall Habu’s remarks above that archaeologists’ unwillingness to enter debates over textbooks is actually fostering a nationalistic presentation of prehistory.
6. Most of which, she notes, are published only in English thus far.
7. That is, movements of artifacts vertically in soil strata due to freeze/thaw cycles or the movements of flora or fauna such as tree roots, moles, etc.
and Fujimura remained leading figures until the fraud was revealed. The news media were taken in all along, and even the Ministry of Education had accepted the findings uncritically, incorporating some of the site ‘findings’ into textbooks by 1998 (Keally 2002). In this chain of events we can clearly see the clash between (1) a cultural model of Japanese prehistory which relies on expert opinion, is relatively uninterested in theory and hearkens to primordialist/nationalist sentiments, and (2) an imported (in Habu’s terms, Anglo-American) cultural model for archaeological study which bases arguments on critical analysis of evidence. The incompatibility between these cultural models underlies the conflict between Fujimura/Okamura and Keally/Oda which brewed prior to the revelations of the God’s Hand scandal. Keally concludes:

I can only speculate why archaeologists in Japan have so little knowledge of something – dirt – that seems so obviously to be fundamental to their research. Is it possible that much of the rest of Japanese archaeological “fact” and interpretation is no more illuminated by intelligence than the “facts” that allowed this massive hoax to go on for 20 years? I hope not, but I do know for certain that a considerable amount of nonsense about the Japanese past does get published in academic journals as sound scientific fact or interpretation. And this nonsense often gets a good airing in the news media and frequently also in the nation’s school textbooks...This hoax has very serious implications for how the outside world will view the quality of Japanese archaeological research. It also might have serious implications for how the outside world will view the quality of Japanese academic research in general. And it certainly gives us insights into the workings of Japanese education and society. (ibid:35)

Having discussed Japanese professional archaeology and its popular representation, an example of what is being referred to here as ‘Anglo-American’ or ‘Western’ archaeology is in order, to emphasize differences between their respective cultural models.

Popular archaeological discourse in English, in Japanese, and in English written in Japanese provides data for comparison of discourse styles, especially the use of evidentiality marking. As the lesson described at the end of this paper also shows, English-language discussions of fieldsites and findings often include great detail about the evidence used to construct conclusions about past human behavior. The target sentences for our lesson on modals were taken from the script of the Discovery Channel video production *Neanderthals* (2001). The Discovery Channel also posts lesson plans for school teachers on its website. Here is the list of objectives for the lesson based on *Neanderthals*, targeted at 6–8 graders (middle school):

1. Understand the two main theories regarding the relationship between Neanderthals and modern *Homo sapiens*
2. Examine the physical features and lives of the Neanderthals
3. Create a mural of a Neanderthal cave.
From this list it is clear that theory is considered inherent to the lesson objectives, specifically a comparison of the ‘Out of Africa’ and ‘Multiregional’ theories of human origins which the website describes. This emphasis on data analysis and theoretical development, along with reliance on evidential modals (among other evidential resources of English) derives from a cultural model often described as ‘scientific’ or based on ‘critical thinking.’ Further evidence emerges in talk about teaching, as the following discussion of university education shows.

Rubertone (2003) includes a section on ‘Teaching Critical Thinking’ in her discussion of an Anthropology of Death course she teaches at Brown University. She describes two student projects: One is an analysis of data from a fictive archaeological site; the other is a survey of representations of the archaeology of death in which students compare scholarly and popular media accounts of events. As she explains:

..besides (and more important than) making sure that students learn facts, the course aims at providing them with opportunities to critically assess theoretical positions, the evidence supporting archaeological interpretations, and issues concerning archaeology’s wider discourses…As educators…we need to think seriously about how anthropology can help them cultivate this type of thinking.

4. Classroom implications

Let us now turn to linguistic evidence regarding L2 English production of evidentials. As for the English overlaps between evidential, pragmatic, and obligatory construals of modals (such as must and should) mentioned above, it does not appear that these or any of the modals are easily negotiated by non-natives. In second language English writing, Hinkel finds that Japanese (along with Chinese, Korean, Indonesian, and Vietnamese) university students use English modals of obligation in ways that reflect their native language-and culture-based presuppositions (i.e., cultural models) rather than those associated with the English forms by native speakers (1995). Japanese students at my university fare no better. Samples of upper-division student writing (N=16) reflecting on the events at the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 written in September 2002 revealed that though they produced six grammatical sentences with modals of obligation⁸, (N=5, 7 attempts), the eight writers who used modals of evidentiality produced only two well-formed sentences in 17 attempts. Expressions of wish and intention were attempted 4 times by 3 writers yielding just one proper sentence.

⁸. Further discussion of the cultural model(s) underlying use of obligation modals in their writing probably belongs elsewhere, since this paper is focused on evidential modals.
Thus, students who come to our content-based second language English archaeology class with this educational background are challenged. Their cultural model for learning about prehistory lacks a strong inferential schema. The evidential resources of Japanese do not map neatly onto the English forms. Not surprisingly, in open-ended writing tasks they underproduce modal forms where their use is warranted.

To engage students in the use of the MHPP forms, and in the schema of inferential thinking that underlies their use, my teaching partner and I presented them with visual evidence from a U.S.-made television documentary program (Discovery Channel 2001), accompanied by printouts of the narrative structured in a cloze format (i.e. a text with words systematically deleted, in this case, every seventh word). We hoped to circumvent issues of L1 transfer as well as to cause students to focus on the explanatory language in the video. The video presented archaeologists’ conclusions regarding Neanderthal lifestyles based on skeletal and other evidence, and it includes several uses of the modal+have+past participle form. During the video, re-creations of Neanderthal life were interspersed with scenes of appropriate skeletal and other evidence.

Following the initial viewing, the cloze exercise based on the audio script, and a vocabulary review, students worked to create forms that express conclusions based directly from evidence, as in 1.

(1) Neanderthal leg bones were short => Neanderthals must have been short.

We then discussed situations appearing in the film in which conclusions are less clear cut. In these cases, evidence is combined with greater degrees of inference (i.e., input from the analyst’s cultural schemas). These conclusions must be expressed using modal forms that indicate lower levels of certainty, as in 2 and 3.

(2) Flowers were found with bones => Neanderthals may have had funerals.

Or

(3) Flowers were found with bones => The flowers may have been trash.

Students then practiced discussing evidence using MHPP constructions, creating sentences which appropriately expressed their conclusions. We wanted to be sure that students understood that inference about the past often contains ideas from the analyst’s present-day culture or from ethnographic analogy. We also wanted them to be aware that these sources of analogy and inference could be misleading.

One serendipitous bit of content in the documentary video reinforced the notion of cultural context with an element of surprise. In a segment discussing the difficulty of life and scarcity of food resources for Neanderthals, we see a young boy in a tree raiding a bird’s nest, dropping the eggs to an elderly (i.e., roughly forty-
year-old) man below. The last egg breaks in the old man’s hand, and he flings it to the ground. We suspect that a Neanderthal, lacking knowledge of the germ theory of disease, would be happy to lick the egg off his fingers. However, the film shows the egg being thrown away. This is a clear case of cultural bias on the part of the filmmakers. Though Americans are taught not to eat raw eggs due to fear of bacterial contamination, Japanese do eat raw eggs. Seeing the juxtaposition of wastage in the video with the audio discussion of food scarcity points to the cultural bias of the filmmakers and prompts a different inference for the students, shown in 4.

(4) “I would have eaten the egg” => He might have eaten the egg.

5. Conclusion

During the lesson on English inferentials described above, students could experience how the inferential schema often associated with use of the MHPP can connect physical evidence, analytic inference, and cultural models to form conclusions expressing varying degrees of strength. The exercise provided a foundation for subsequent analytic discussions on other topics throughout the course when appropriate. Loveday (1982) has argued that it is important in language instruction to teach culturally determined conceptualizations (viz. cultural models) or what he calls the “cognitive code of a community:”

Whatever the specific objective of L2 teaching may be, one of its fundamental goals must be to impart an ability to comprehend fully and with satisfaction what the target community means in speaking and writing. This must entail the comprehension of a distant and different way of organizing experience…language reflects and expresses the cognitive code of a particular community. If a teacher is going to provide an adequate explanation of the meaning of an item in the L2, this can only be done by referring to cultural knowledge (Loveday 1982:53).

Of course, not only words in the L2, but grammatical structures also need to be presented in an appropriate cultural context. This is especially critical when teaching inferential constructions and schemas. Students’ first-language set of cultural linguistic models should be taken into account whenever possible when designing appropriate curricula for second language learners. Considering which structures are appropriate for the topic being taught creates opportunities to integrate language and content in the classroom. (Occhi, Davis, and Vail, 2002)
References


CHAPTER 3

L1 cultural conceptualisations in L2 learning

The case of Persian-speaking learners of English

Farzad Sharifian

This chapter presents the argument that second language learning is likely to involve new systems of cultural conceptualisations, that is, new cultural schemas, categories, metaphors, etc. By providing examples from Persian-speaking learners of English the chapter discusses how L2 learners may draw on the cultural conceptualisations that have originally been associated with their L1. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of such processes in second language learning for the debates surrounding the notion of English as an International Language.

1. Introduction

Many scholars in the area of second language acquisition (SLA) believe that learning a new language mainly involves learning a set of grammatical “rules” and certain new sounds and sound combinations. However, for many second language learners, learning a second language may entail encountering new systems of conceptualising experience. Many learners bring the conceptual system that they have developed while learning their L1 into the learning of an L2, assuming that every single unit of conceptualisation in their repertoire has an equivalent in the conceptual system associated with the L2. This is, however, not always the case. In this chapter, I will explicate some cultural conceptualisations that speakers of Persian may bring into the task of learning English as an L2 and discuss some possible implications of this process for intercultural sense making. The chapter begins with a background on the notion of cultural conceptualisation and then moves into the discussion of Persian cultural conceptualisations in L2 learning.
2. Cultural conceptualisations

Human languages are systems through which we express the ways we conceptualise experiences of different kinds (e.g., Palmer 1996). It is now widely recognized that we do not always create a mirror image of an objective reality through our use of language; rather, we often negotiate with others around us as to how we should think of our various experiences. Consider the sentence “This land is me” uttered by an Aboriginal Australian. The sentence reflects the way in which the speaker conceptualises, rather than describes, the land. In the “traditional” Aboriginal worldview, human beings are often conceptualised as being part of the land, rather than possessing it. Such conceptualisations of experience may spark off from someone’s imagination, and then be subjected to negotiation by people over thousands of years. I refer to these culturally constructed ways of conceptualising experience as *cultural conceptualisations* (Sharifian 2003). These conceptualisations emerge from the interaction between members of a cultural group and are constantly negotiated and renegotiated across time and space.

People across various cultural groups often develop conceptualisations of almost every aspect of their thought and behaviour. These are usually referred to as beliefs, norms, customs, traditions, and values, and they may not have any “objective” correlate in the “external” world. Technically speaking, cultural conceptualisations are *cultural schemas* (or, for complex conceptualisations, *cultural models*), categories, metaphors, etc. that are emergent at the level of cultural cognition (see Sharifian 2003, forthcoming-a). At the level of individuals, cultural conceptualisations are *heterogeneously distributed* across the minds of a cultural group. That is, they are not equally imprinted in the mind of every individual member, but are rather shared in varying degrees between the members of a cultural group.

The role of human languages in cultural conceptualisations is two-fold, in that they both communicate cultural conceptualisations and may also embody them. The semantic content of lexical items depends on how speakers of a language categorize their experiences. For example, a language may have two words for an animal corresponding to its categorization either as food or a living animal (e.g., ‘mutton’ and ‘sheep’). Lexical items may also act as labels for schemas that are largely culturally constructed. A word like ‘politeness’ and its translations are likely to be associated with different, and even contrasting, schemas for people across different languages and cultures.

I would now like to make the observation, partly from my own experience, that learning an L2 may require learning a large number of new cultural conceptualisations (see also Danesi 1995; Hinkel 1999; Kramsch 1993; Krasner 1999). Watson-Gegeo (2004: 341) observes that “second language classrooms exhibit and teach—with varying degrees of explicitness—a set of cultural and epistemological
assumptions that often differ from those of the second language learner’s native culture(s)”. This is, of course, not to claim that all L2 learning involves learning the same number of new cultural conceptualisations. For a West European, learning English as a foreign language may require little acquisition of new cultural conceptualisations, when compared to the case of an Aboriginal Australian learning English as a second language. On the other hand, the closer the cultural conceptualisations of two groups, the less transparent the more subtle differences may prove to be.

3. Persian language and culture

The official language of Iran is Persian (also known as Farsi), which is spoken by about half of the population. Persian is an Indo-European language which has been influenced by a number of other languages, including Arabic. Iranian society is marked by a relatively high degree of diversity, due to the existence of different ethnic groups such as Turks and Kurds. The country as a whole, however, still revolves around a predominantly Persian culture, which is distinct from those of its neighbouring countries (e.g., Assadi 1980, 1982; Beeman 1976, 1986, 1988, 2001; Eslami Rasekh 2004; Hillmann 1981; Hodge 1957; Keshavarz 2001; Meskoob, Perry, Hillmann, and Banuazizi 1992; Modarressi-Tehrani 2001; O’Shea 2000; Wilber 1967). The uniqueness of Persian culture owes much to its rich and long history, which is marked by influences from several directions (e.g., Ahmadi and Ahmadi 1998, 2001; Arberry 1963; Bausani 1971). The distinctiveness of Persian culture is deeply embedded in the social and conceptual basis of the Persian language.

Sociologists have noted how even the basic notions of everyday encounter such as ‘family’ and ‘friend’ signify complex conceptualisations in Persian culture, which unfold themselves in the context of what Ahmadi and Ahmadi (1998:3) have termed “Iranian ways of thinking”. These ways of thinking, to be discussed below, are products of Iranian culture-history. The aim of this paper is to focus on some specific instances where the communicative behaviour of Persian speakers, either in their L1 or L2, reflects characteristically Persian cultural conceptualisations.
4. Persian cultural conceptualisations

4.1 The cultural schema of āberu¹ ‘face’²

Perhaps the most dominant social schema in Persian cultural cognition is āberu. Literally, āb means ‘water’ and ru means ‘face’, so the whole word āberu means ‘water of face’. This may refer either to the freshness and healthiness of one’s face, or to the sweat on one’s face. In the first sense, the concept of ‘face’ appears to be a metonym for one’s general wellbeing, and it is also metaphorically associated with a schema that embodies the image of a person, a family, or a group, particularly as viewed by others in the society. In the second sense, the sweat on one’s face may be used as a metonym for cases where damage to one’s honour and social image has made him/her upset to the point of sweating. Thus, āberu is a metonym, which has subsequently been used as a metaphor associated with a complex schema.

Although the concept of ‘face’ is claimed to be universal (Brown and Levinson 1987; Leech 1983; Spencer-Oatey 2000), research has shown significant cross-cultural differences in the nature and the prevalence of the concept (e.g., Hill et al, 1986; Ide 1989; Matsumoto 1988). Brown and Levinson consider face in the context of politeness, and identify two aspects, positive and negative. Positive face is a person’s desire to be approved of by selected others, whereas negative face relates to the desire to act according to one’s will and to be unimpeded by others. A number of researchers have rightly criticized Brown and Levinson for adopting a western, individualistic position in conceptualising face (e.g., Hill et al 1986; Ide 1989; Matsumoto 1988). In Japanese and Chinese cultures, for example, politeness expressions have a basis in concepts of the family, the reference group, and the society, rather than the individual. Matsumoto (1988: 405) observes that “[w]hat is of paramount concern to a Japanese is not his/her own territory, but the position in relation to the others in the group and his/her acceptance by those others”. Furthermore, what is identified as negative face by Brown and Levinson may not in fact be associated with face metaphors in other cultures. In this context, the Persian cultural schema of āberu is subject to several layers of interpretation. Āberu is usually multifaceted, in that one’s face is connected to the face of one’s family, which may be conceived to be connected to the face of the extended family or the groups with whom they identify themselves. It is to be noted that āberu does not just relate to one’s behaviour and personality, but largely extends to one’s family’s possessions, appearance, etc. The following Iranian joke reflects the last two points.

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1. The symbol â represents a low back unrounded vowel similar to a in the English word ‘father’.
2. The English translations provided in this paper are only intended as a rough guide for non-Persian speakers.
(1) Judge: *Did you think about your parents’ åberu when you were robbing the house?*

The thief: *Yes, but I couldn’t find anything that would be good for them.*

The punch line of the above joke is that the judge has meant that the thought of staining parents’ åberu should have stopped the thief from committing the wrongdoing, whereas the thief has interpreted the judge’s question as whether or not he was thoughtful enough of his parents to steal some goods (e.g., nice furniture) that could enhance their åberu. The joke reflects firstly that one’s åberu is closely tied to his/her parents, and secondly that what a person possesses is a source of åberu.

What is of special significance here is the degree to which an Iranian person’s life may revolve around åberu. There are many Iranian people for whom their åberu is the fundamental reference point in every aspect of their life. O’Shea (2000: 101) maintains that for Iranians “Aberu, or honour, is a powerful social force. All Iranians measure themselves to a great extent by the honour they accumulate through their actions and social interrelations.” The åberu schema frequently surfaces in Persian conversations in expressions such as the following:

(2) åberumand ‘presentable’, ‘honourable’
(3) åberu kharidan (buying åberu) ‘gaining face’
(4) åberu rikhtan (pouring åberu) ‘defame’
(5) åberum raft (my åberu went) ‘I’ve lost face’
(6) åberum bar bad raft (my åberu went with the wind) ‘I’ve lost face’
(7) åberu bedast avardan (åberu to hand bring) ‘gaining face’
(8) bi åberu (without åberu) ‘faceless’
(9) åberu dâdan (give åberu) ‘enhance face’
(10) hefze åberu (preserve åberu) ‘save face’

Apart from the above expressions, in which the word åberu is made explicit, there are many other implicit forms of negotiating face in Persian conversations. For example, the core concept of åberu, or how other people think about a person, surfaces itself in the care that one should give to harfe mardom ‘people’s talk’. People are continuously reminded of the consequences of their thoughts, behaviour, and appearance in terms of what others may say or think about them. This aspect of the schema of åberu is discussed in detail by Ahmadi and Ahmadi (1998: 212), who maintain that “[t]he prevalence of the metaphor of mardom (the people) in Iranian culture indicates to what extent the striving for negating individuality and achieving conformity has been profound in Iranian society”. Here the notion of
mardom may in fact imply an anonymous social force rather than a particular group of people.

In terms of learning English as an L2, many Iranian speakers of English have realized that the concept of āberu does not readily translate into English. This is reflected in English messages submitted to dozens of Internet sites by Iranian speakers, such as the following:

(11) … The word AABEROO-RIZI [āberu-pouring] came to mind when I was reading about the truly stupid people in charge of such things …

(12) … Goldman said. “There’s still so much concern about what others think.” Goldman refers to the Iranian concern with “keeping face” in the community – or aberu. If aberu is gone, then so is the family’s name and honor.

(13) … Pari bursts into tears, saying that the child support is not the main issue, it is because of her aberu (reputation) that she wants him …

(14) … I think the problem is more giving too much value to your social picture. We have even an important word for it in Farsi, Aberoo, that I don’t know of a good English equivalent for it.

(15) … However, in any case, denying the existence of the problem never helps solving it. It is much easier to face the issue here without feeling that “aaberoo” is lost …

(16) … I don’t see why the aabroo of a whole department must be jeopardized just because a member of the department may be going nuts.

The use of the Persian word āberu in the middle of such writings does not appear to reflect a lack of proficiency in the English language, as the examples mostly suggest a good command of English on the part of the writers. It is in fact the Persian schema which may not be conveyed thoroughly by the use of English words such as ‘reputation’ and ‘honour’.

The implication of the schema of āberu for learning English is of course much more than just a lack of an equivalent concept. Many Iranian learners are very cautious about making mistakes in English, for they are concerned with protecting their āberu in front of their teachers and their fellow learners. The schema may also act as the source of motivation for some Iranians to learn English, as it may be viewed as enhancing one’s āberu within the circles of family and society.

4.2 The schema of târof

The schema of āberu is closely associated with the Persian cultural schema of târof (Assadi 1980; Asjodi 2001; Koutlaki 2002). Aryanpour and Aryanpour (1984: 226) define târof as “compliment(s), ceremony, courtesy, and flattery”. In general terms,
the schema of târof encourages Persian speakers to avoid imposition on other people and also to refrain from directness in making requests and asking for favours. The general function of târof in Iranian society is to acknowledge and negotiate social relationships, status, personal character, etc. Also, târof provides a means for exercising a degree of “face work”, or âberu, before a request, for example, is made. This schema is manifested in the communicative behaviour of many Iranian people, partly through repeated attempts to refuse offers and invitations, hesitation in asking for services and favours, hesitation in rejecting requests, etc. Another reflection of târof is the use of plenty of hedges. Some may even include the use of honorifics and forms of submissives under târof (Wilber 1967).

O’Shea (2000: 122) believes that “Iranian society revolves around ta’arouf, a formalised politeness that involves verbal and nonverbal forms and cues”. She also adds that târof “is a ritual display of vulnerability that the other participant knows not to abuse, invoking a sort of noblesse oblige” (2000: 122). Assadi (1980: 221) observes that “foreigners variously find the ta’arof of Persian speakers baffling, intriguing, frustrating, complex, and time consuming”. Koutlaki (2002: 1741) observes that târof “is a very complex concept, carrying different meanings in the minds of native speakers and baffling anyone endeavouring to describe it”. Koutlaki also notes that the concept has both negative and positive denotations and maintains that it is a “central concept in Iranian interaction … felt to be indispensable in all communication by native speakers” (2002: 1741). Iranians often categorize each other in terms of how much târof they exercise. People who show higher degrees of târof in their behaviour may be categorized as târofee.

The origin of the târof schema is thought to be found in the Zoroastrian religion with its emphasis on good thoughts, good deeds and good words (Beeman 1986; Asjodi 2001). “Good words” here refers to praise and the use of kind words, which is in fact considered as prayer in Zoroastrian religion.³ It is already obvious that a thorough treatment of this cultural schema falls beyond the scope of this paper. It is, however, important to note that Iranian learners of English may find it difficult to abandon this schema in their use of English, and this may lead to misunderstandings on the part of those not familiar with the schema. Consider the following Internet submission by an Iranian person living in the US:

(17) I personally find one misunderstanding of Americans about Eastern cultures awkward: they often don't understand “ta’arof” and take it wrong! (I am talking about its broad meaning, i.e., whenever you offer your help or food or invite them or something) that is they assume that you must have some selfish hidden agenda behind being nice to them. they simply are not used to see strangers being

nice to them. I haven't given up the habit of ta’aroﬁ, but now I say it up front that it is a cultural habit and I don't expect anything in exchange. BTW, “ta’aroﬁ” is one of those words that has no translation in English, does it?

It is clear that the Iranian has found it difficult not to draw on the schema of târof in communicating with Americans, which has clearly been misunderstood by those Americans with whom he/she has come into contact. As in the case of âberu, an Internet search shows that many Iranians have used the word târof in the middle of their English writings, which reflects the feeling that no English word would be able to fully embody this schema. Consider the following two examples from the Internet:

(18) Thanks for the kind words. No taarof, there is no need for monetary compensation. I enjoy doing it. Yes, it is work, but I get a real satisfaction when I see friends finding each other and rekindling old relationships.

(19) Iranian politeness is as subtle as the intricate latticework on the mosques. The rituals are so complex they have a name of their own: târof. It has no English translation.

(20) Taarof is a verbal dance between an offerer and an acceptor until one of them agrees. It is a cultural phenomenon that consists of refusing something that has been offered to you even though you want it, out of politeness. On the giving end, it is offering something that may cost a lot in order to be polite, but not really wanting to give it away for free.

The following are from a weblog where several speakers of Persian, apparently residing in the USA, discuss târof.4

(21) It's kind of weird that no other culture has the tarof thing i don't think there is even a definition for it. I remember when we try to use it with our American friend's but they just don't get it hahaha then it comes out all wrong ya know?

(22) Ok here's how i try to explain it to anyone who's not persian: "it's like when you offer something to someone that you don't really genuinely want to give to them but are only doing so to make yourself look all nice and sweet and classic persian but at the same time you know that they won't accept your offer to be polite in the same way and maintain their own cool persian status... then its their turn to offer something more outrageous or extreme than what you have offered, they're doing it to up their so called politeness but then know that you would never accept... then you do the same and it goes on and on and on until people get too tired, sleepy, or someone starts crying, or people finally realize they have to get on with their lives...”

disaster happens when someone actually ACCEPTS one of the crazy polite offerings... hehehe

It should be mentioned that the instantiation of this Persian cultural schema is often naively misunderstood by some non-Iranians. For example, de Bellaigue (2004: 14) states that “You should know about ta’aruf. In Arabic ta’aruf means behaviour that is appropriate and customary; in Iran, it has been corrupted and denotes ceremonial insincerity. Not in a pejorative sense; Iran is the only country I know where hypocrisy is prized as a social and commercial skill.” As mentioned earlier, far from an exercise of hypocrisy, the linguistic realizations of târof are motivated by the cultural schema of târof, which is rooted in the ethos of traditional Iranian society.

A frequent manifestation of târof in conversations among many Persian speakers is “ostensible” invitations “which may function as a leave-taking act and an expression of good will on the part of the inviter” (Eslami 2005: 473). In many cases, these invitations take the form of inviting people to one’s house for a main meal. Eslami (2005: 479) maintains that “offering such invitations are part of the art of knowing how to make târof (ritual politeness), in order to be ba šaxiat (polite) and not to incur bad reputation: that is, to live up to the society’s expectations”. For those who are not familiar with this Persian cultural schema, such invitations may cause miscommunication. For example, Eslami (2005: 453) recounts that

over the years of my intercultural experiences in the United States and observation of other Iranian/American interactions, I have witnessed that Iranians sometimes take Americans’ genuine invitations as ostensible (not to be taken seriously) and therefore reject them, while Americans may take Iranian ostensible invitations as genuine and accept them.

It should of course be warned that not all invitations made by Iranians are “ostensible”. In fact, an invitation that may start as an instantiation of târof may then lead to a genuine invitation depending on how the communication flows. That is, there are not hard and fast rules for discriminating genuine invitations from acts of târof.

4.3 The cultural schema of shekasteh-nafsi ‘modesty’

O’Shea (2000: 83) maintains that flattery is very common among Iranians and instructs non-Iranians to “simply demur modestly, as Iranians would, and turn the comment around to flatter the other party”. This observation in fact reflects the Persian schema of shekasteh-nafsi ‘modesty’ (Sharifian 2005), which is closely related to āberu and târof. The word shekasteh-nafsi may be literally glossed as ‘broken-self’ or ‘breaking of the self’. The schema associated with shekasteh-nafsi encourages speakers of Persian to show modesty through the denial or downplay of
any praise or compliment that they receive, while trying to reassign the praise to either the initiator of the praise/compliment, family members, God, or simply to luck. In other words, the schema encourages speakers to make use of any compliments or praise that they receive to enhance the āberu of their interlocutors, their family, or whoever might have directly or indirectly contributed to a success or achievement. This cultural schema discourages any form of “self endearing” which would imply the exclusion of others.5 This schema also encourages Iranian people to perceive themselves as dependent members of a group and to view their existence, wellbeing, and success as part of, and related to, those of others in the group. The following exchange between two Persian speakers reflects this schema:

(23) Reza: vasf-e dâneshe khâregholâdeye shomâ ro kheili
    Description-of knowledge extraordinary you DO very much
    have-heard-we.
    ‘We have heard so much about your extraordinary knowledge!’

Mojtaba: khâhesh mikonam, mâ shâgerd-e shomâ ham hesâb nemishim.
    Please we student-of you even count not-we
    ‘Please don’t say that! I don’t even qualify as your student.’

It can be seen here that the recipient of the compliment has achieved the objectives of downplaying his talent and reassigning the compliment to the interlocutor both in one sentence. There are several formulaic expressions in Persian that are frequently used to reassign the compliment to the hearer, such as the following:

(24) Cheshmâ-tun ghashang mibineh
    Eyes-yours beautiful see
    ‘Your eyes see beautifully.’

(25) harchi dârim az shomâ dârim
    Everything have-we from you-PL(polite) have-we
    ‘Whatever we have is because of/from you.’

(26) Ghâbeleh shomâ ro nadâre
    Worthy of you DO has-NEG
    ‘It is not worthy of you.’

(27) Motoalegh be khodetun-e

5. See Ahmadi and Ahmadi (1998) for a discussion of the philosophical root of this aspect of Iranian ways of thinking.
6. In Persian, the second-person plural pronoun (shomâ) may be used as a singular pronoun to show respect or maintain a certain distance/formality with the addressee.
Chapter 3. L1 cultural conceptualisations in L2 learning

Belong to you-is
‘It belongs to you.’

The formulaic (24) may be used in response to a compliment about the beauty of what one has/is wearing or how one looks. Expressions (25), (26) and (27) are general formulaic utterances that may be used in response to compliments on one’s possessions, such as one’s car or house. The expression in (26) may also be used when receiving compliments on what a person has cooked, made, etc. In a recent study on the comparison of compliment responses in Persian speakers’ L1 and L2 (English) (Sharifian, submitted) I noticed that in several cases the speakers made attempts to render such formulaic routines in English. Consider the following excerpts from the Discourse Completion Test (DCT) that was employed in the study:

The DCT item: Your friend is visiting your newly-built house and says, “What a beautiful house!”

You:........................................................................................

   a) You’re welcome, it is your house.

   b) Thank you very much your kind eyes look at everything positively.

Cases where speakers of Persian draw on this schema in their use of English may lead to unwanted interpretations on the part of non-Iranians unfamiliar with this schema. Consider the following example:

(28) Lecturer: I heard you’ve won a prestigious award. Congratulations!

       This is fantastic.

   Student: Thanks so much. I haven’t done anything. It’s the result of your effort

            and your knowledge. I owe it all to you.

   Lecturer: (appearing uncomfortable) Oh, no!!! Don’t be ridiculous. It’s all your

            work.

       (Sharifian, 2005: 337–338)

In the above conversation between an Iranian student and an Anglo-Australian lecturer, the student’s reply to the lecturer’s congratulation appears to have left the lecturer with a certain degree of discomfort, as he feels that his contribution to the student’s success has been overestimated. When asked to comment, the lecturer, relying on his cultural schema of “individual merit”, commented that the student “had stretched the truth too far”. The student, on the other hand, maintained that she did not find anything wrong with her remarks. The student’s reply is in fact consonant with the Persian cultural schema of shekasteh-nafsi. Other anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases Persian speakers of English have lost some form of credit because of the degree to which they downplayed or reassigned their abilities, achievements, or talents.
Since the inclinations that are discussed in this paper are cognitive in nature, they may not necessarily be instantiated in fixed formulas and clichéd expressions. Although the schemas explicated here may have certain linguistic manifestations in Persian, it does not follow that they will always appear in the same wording. Take the case of shekasteh-nafsi. Although there are certain conventionalized expressions associated with this schema in Persian, such as ghâbel nistim ‘we are not worth it’, when speakers of Persian manifest this schema in their use of English, they do not necessarily use the verbatim translation of a formulaic Persian expression; rather, they may downplay their talent or capability using other expressions such as “Oh, no! In fact I have a low IQ” or “I think I am just an average person in terms of intelligence”.

The general point here is that while cognitive schemas are reflected in linguistic expressions, they are not merely linguistic in nature, nor are they realized only in linguistic terms. O’Shea (2000:122–123) observes, for example, that târof in Persian has both physical and verbal manifestations. She notes that “the former consist of activities such as jostling to be the last through the door, seeking a humble seating location, or standing to attention on the arrival or departure of other guests”. These activities are associated with the general sense of târof, which can encompass all politeness rituals in Persian.

4.4 Persian emotion schemas

The notion of emotion has long been a subject of cross-cultural research (Kitayama and Markus 1994; Mesquita, Frijda and Scherer 1997; Russell, Fernandez-Dols, Manstead and Wellenkamp 1995) and cross-linguistic research (e.g., Kövecses 2000; Palmer and Occhi 1999). However, there is still no consensus regarding the universality or cultural construction of general human emotions. In this context, Wierzbicka (1995) notes that different cultures may vary in terms of the attitudes they foster in their members towards the expression of emotions. She maintains that “different cultures take different attitudes towards emotions, and these attitudes influence the way in which people speak. ... different cultural attitudes toward emotions exert a profound influence on the dynamics of everyday discourse” (1995: 156).

For a long time, research in the area of second language acquisition (SLA) regarded emotional factors as irrelevant to the experience of L2 learning. Recent literature on bilingualism has, however, begun to highlight the role of emotions in the life of bilinguals (e.g., Dewaele and Pavlenko 2002; Pavlenko and Dewaele 2004). The early findings in this area suggest that “the L1 is preferred to express emotional involvement whereas the L2 is experienced as colder, more distant, and
more detached from the L2 user and less appropriate for the expression of emotions” (Dewaele 2005; 374).

It should be noted that attitudes towards emotions and emotional expressions are embodied in emotion schemas that prevail among the members of a cultural group (Sharifian 2003). The Persian emotion schemas, for example, encourage a stronger expression of emotions than those of many Western schemas, particularly among female speakers. This is reflected in O’Shea’s (2000: 83) comment that “excessive dramatic statements are quite normal among Iranians … someone may insist that they love you more than their siblings”. Persian emotion schemas are best represented in the linguistic category labelled ghorbun sadaghe (sacrifice-charity). The following are some examples of such emotional expressions, which are very frequent in Persian conversations.

(29) Elâhi ghorbunet beram
    May God sacrifice for you I do!
    ‘May my life be sacrificed for you.’

(30) Khodâ margam bede
    God kill me do!
    ‘May God kill me.’

While the former may be said by a mother to her child for receiving a good mark at school, the latter may be uttered by a mother to a child who has got the flu. It is obvious, at least to Iranians, that expressions of ghorbun sadaghe should not be taken literally, but nor are they entirely free from emotional content.

Persian emotion schemas not only include knowledge of the above mentioned expressions, but also to whom they can be used and for what reason. A husband and wife, for example, may show no expression of emotion towards each other in public. When it comes to the use and learning of English, some Iranians complain that English does not provide adequate means for them to express their emotions. It is also significant that while it is possible to gloss most expressions of ghorbun sadaghe into English (e.g., khodâ margam bede ‘May God kill me’), the majority do not have equivalents among current idiomatic expressions in English. A number of anthropologists have made similar observations. Beeman (1988: 20), for example, remarks:

I am hampered in my own description of emotional expression in Iranian society by lack of terms sufficiently neutral to avoid the overtones that adhere to English words for expressing emotions. Affection, anger, sadness, disappointment, etc. are all words that carry a cultural load, but they are all we have at present.
Thus, learning English for an Iranian person may mean learning new schemas with regard to the expression of emotions, or expressing their emotional experiences in English words, which may not entirely capture the Persian emotion schema.

Another aspect of L2 learning that relates to conceptualisations of emotion is the fact that different languages and cultures attribute their emotional experience to different body parts. For some, the heart is the seat of emotions, for others, it is the liver, the belly or even the throat (e.g., Enfield and Wierzbicka 2002; Sharifian, Dirven, and Yu forthcoming). Anglo varieties of English abound with expressions that reflect the heart as the seat of emotions (e.g., she broke my heart). Persian has many expressions that reflect the conceptualisation of del ‘heart-stomach’ as the seat of emotions, courage, reason, character, etc. An analysis of the conceptualisations of internal body organs in Persian reveals both similarities and differences with Anglo varieties of English (see further in Sharifian forthcoming-b).

Different cultures may also attach different meanings to emotional experiences of different kinds and may also value emotions differently. A good example of this in Persian is that of ‘grief’, which has an important symbolic place in the cultural life of many Iranians (see also de Bellaigue 2004). DelVecchio Good and Good (1988: 46) observe that

“Sadness and grief”—gham o ghoseh—pose special problems of understanding for the psychological anthropologists or for the student of Iranian society and culture. They have dramatically different meanings and forms of expression in Iranian culture than in our own. A rich vocabulary of Persian and Azeri terms of grief and sadness translate uneasily into English language and American culture. “Dysphoria” in Iranian culture is hardly the lack of happiness or pleasure of the individual, to be overcome by therapy or medical treatment—though it may be the focus of both. It is rather a core affect—the central emotion of religious ritual, an important element of the definition of selfhood, a key quality of a developed and profound understanding of the social order, and most recently a symbol of political loyalty.

Part of the complexity of gham o ghoseh comes from its dual role. For many Iranians, gham o ghoseh has religious significance, but it is also conceptualised in everyday non-religious experiences, and these two aspects influence each other in dynamic ways. In everyday experiences, gham o ghoseh captures a whole range of emotional states that one goes through, from being hurt by what someone has said, to being away from relatives, to having financial difficulties. Very frequently people exchange these emotional experiences during speech events that are known as dard-e del (lit. ‘pain of the heart’), which provide people with emotional spaces where they can find relief in communicating their gham o ghoseh. It is seen as a virtue to listen to and share others’ gham o ghoseh. The person who does this is referred to as ghamkhâr (lit. ‘gham eater’). A mother may refer to her caring daughter as ghamkhâr. A thorough treatment of such emotion schemas falls beyond the
scope of this paper, but it should be clear from this rather brief discussion that terms such as ‘sorrow’, ‘grief’, and ‘sadness’ may not capture all L2 learners’ emotional experiences and emotion schemas.

5. Concluding remarks

Learning a language involves more than mastering a set of grammatical rules and a number of labels for objects and entities. Language learning is part of a more general process of individual maturation, which includes gaining membership of a cultural group (see Atkinson 1999). This process requires sustained interaction and “negotiation” with other members with regard to the ways in which shared experiences are conceptualised and the ways in which language is used. In other words, learners learn schemas, categories, and metaphors drawn from their linguistic as well as non-linguistic experiences. In this context, second language learning may become much more complicated, depending on the degree to which the cultural schemas associated with the learner’s L1 overlap with those traditionally associated with the L2. In this process learners may face at least four possible situations:

a) L2 that they are learning does not conventionally encode some of their cultural conceptualisations,

b) L2 has labels for conceptualisations that only partly overlap with those of the learners,

c) L2 encodes conceptualisations that are not part of the cultural cognition that the learners initially draw on,

d) L2 and L1 both encode similar conceptualisations.

In this chapter, I have mainly addressed the first two of the above categories, for the sake of brevity. I have observed how L2 learners may draw on their L1 cultural conceptualisations, a process which leads to the development of learner varieties of English (e.g., Cook 1999).

The observations made in the preceding sections have significant implications for the current debates over the use of English as an International Language (EIL). One of the central questions in this debate is whether the cultural content and the communicative norms of English as an International Language should conform to those of native speakers, or rather to those characteristic of local cultures (MacKay 2002; Polzenhagen and Wolf this volume). MacKay (2002) rightly argues that with the increasing use of English by “non-native” speakers to communicate with each other, the use of native speakers as the cultural reference point becomes problematic and questionable. Today, English is used for communication between people from various non-Western nations, such as a Japanese speaker and a Persian-
speaking Iranian. In such contexts, drawing on Anglo cultural conceptualisations may not in fact help to facilitate communication. On the other hand, it would be unfeasible to ask speakers of EIL to familiarize themselves with cultural conceptualisations of all the people around the world. Perhaps the solution will involve firstly coming to terms with the idea that an international language can have various systems of conceptualisations associated with it. Secondly, speakers of EIL may be explicitly encouraged to develop a meta-cultural competence, which requires an understanding that various cultural groups may conceptualise experience differently, and that in EIL speech situations people may draw on various systems of cultural cognition. These different systems of cultural cognition may influence not only the content of discourse but also the organization of discourse, as well as learners’ learning styles, or what MacKay (2002: 3) calls “cultures of learning”. A key message for L2 teachers is that they should constantly encourage their students to minimize their reliance on the default assumption of shared cultural conceptualisations when communicating in EIL contexts. In addition, the diverse cultural conceptualisations expressed in EIL should be recognized as assets, rather than liabilities, since this diversity can: a) provide a springboard for lively conversations in language classrooms; b) expand learners’ horizons of life experience; and c) enrich the conceptual basis of EIL.

References


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Many Australian Aboriginal school students use Aboriginal English in home and community contexts. This dialect differs from the Standard Australian English of the school system in linguistic form and conceptual basis. Cultural linguistics provides a means of analysing the conceptual differences that distinguish the two Englishes, thus leading towards a culturally inclusive form of teacher preparation (“two-way bidialectal” education) which is bringing about more successful teaching of Aboriginal students. This chapter outlines the use of the concepts of category, schema and metaphor in analysing distinctive features of Aboriginal English and it describes the three main phases of two-way bidialectal education: awareness raising, easing the transition to the “standard” dialect and cultivating alternative ways of approaching experience and knowledge.

1. Introduction

Working in the field of non-standard dialect studies and education, one is confronted with a situation where the natural phenomena of linguistic and cultural difference come up against the humanly contrived phenomena of inequality which enable one cultural group to reduce the life chances of others by making one language variety the only path to education and opportunity. It is easy for the group whose language is dominant to rationalize the inevitable failure of non-standard dialect speakers in their education on the basis of such factors as lack of home support, erratic school attendance, lack of application and the disadvantaging factors of ill health and poverty, as if these were causes, rather than symptoms, of their social and educational marginalization. It is also easy for members of this group to use linguistics to show that the dialect of the students could be expected to interfere with the variety which is being used in school instruction, and perhaps to suggest that they have a linguistic problem which will yield to a linguistic solution. However easy answers are usually superficial. In this case, they miss the point that it is not just two life settings or two dialects that fail to correspond: it is two cultures
which have been set in an implicitly oppositional relationship. What is needed, if a constructive approach is to be made to this situation, is a method of inquiry that is able to keep in focus both linguistic difference and competing cultural values.

It is here that cultural linguistics has a unique contribution to make. By founding its analysis on the image rather than on the word or clause, and by extending its inquiry to the level of “mental representation” (Palmer 1996: 29), it enables the linguistic and the cultural to be investigated at the same time. In a bidialectal situation, this provides a tool for raising the awareness of the speakers of the dominant dialect, a tool which can transform bidialectal education from a kind of modified TESOL based on contrastive linguistic analysis to a process of two-way renewal which can effect significant change not only in the non-standard dialect speaking group but in the dominant group as well.

In this chapter I want, on the basis of experience in an ongoing project with Australian Aboriginal schoolchildren which has continued over more than ten years with positive effects on student achievement and attitude, to describe a model of two-way bidialectal education and to show how cultural linguistics has been applied to extend and enhance it.

2. Applicable cultural linguistics

Cultural linguistics draws on the combined resources of anthropological linguistics and cognitive linguistics (Palmer 1996: 4–5) in providing an account of the communicative behaviour of a speech community. It is thus able to employ linguistic, and sociolinguistic units of description and to cross-reference these with imagistic categories drawn from cognitive linguistics. In the case of dialect study, one is able to explore the conceptual implications of alternative selections within the same language. For example, the prepositional phrase on the ground is used the same way by most English speakers, but for an Aboriginal speaker in the same context it may become on top of the ground. With a cultural linguistic perspective one may explore the alternative orientation image schemas involved, one of which (on top) sees on as the upper level of something which extends below- i.e., in this case, it takes into account the subterranean dimension of ground- while the other carries no such implication. Similarly, a speech event, such as, for example, the interaction between a bereaved person and a comforter, which is patterned quite differently in Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal settings, may be considered as not only an event constructed by means of the use of speech (c.f. Hymes 1986: 56), but further, an event constructed out of speech in accordance with an event schema (Palmer 1996: 68).
From the educational point of view the relevance of this kind of analysis is seen in the claim, asserted by Palmer, that “[n]ew imagery and language emerge together” (1996: 6). The recognition of this has been particularly powerful in its effect on research into Aboriginal English and bidialectal education, in that it has enabled the linguistic differentiations within Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal English to be keyed into conceptual differentiations, opening up new potentialities for cross-cultural understanding, first among researchers, then among teachers and finally among students. We regard Aboriginal English as a dialect which has emerged and been maintained as a linguistic repository of Aboriginal imagery. Its importance in performing this function continues to grow as the original repertoire of Aboriginal languages accelerates its decline, leaving only about 12% of contemporary Aboriginal people able to speak an Aboriginal language.

In order to carry out this kind of research, we operate in teams involving speakers of Aboriginal English and speakers of Standard Australian English, and we problematize one another’s dialects, seeking to account, on the basis of our respective conceptualizations, for every point of divergence. Cultural linguistics provides us with a framework within which to understand the differences we find. We look at all levels of language, from morpho-syntax and lexico-semantics to discourse and pragmatics, and we attempt to account for what we find in terms of the three fundamental cognitive/cultural linguistic categorizations: categories, schemas and metaphors. Our attempt to show the interrelationships of the relevant concepts is shown in the following diagram (reproduced from Malcolm et al 2003: 22):
Both within the research group and in wider groups of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal informants, we have investigated categories by means of seeking the prototypes for familiar classes such as birds, dinner and roast (all of which contrast among the two groups), by inviting informants to free associate on key words, using the Association-Interpretation technique as developed by Sharifian (2005) and by exploring radial networks among terms which are differently distributed in the two dialects, such as the following (reproduced from Malcolm 2002b: 115):

stay in the bush \(\leftarrow\) camp \(\rightarrow\) stay with family  
(hunting schema) \(=\) dwelling  
(family schema)

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{bed down} \\
\end{array}\]

The above representation refers to the fact that, while the term ‘camp’ in Aboriginal English has usages which overlap with those in Standard English, it can also be used to support the hunting schema (as in, e.g. \textit{he campin out in the bush}) or the family schema (as in, e.g. \textit{at Derby I camped at my Granpa’s house}). Similarly, as shown below, ‘sing’and ‘stop’, for example, have radial networks specific to Aboriginal English.

\begin{align*}
\text{ritual} & ; \\
\text{(traditional law schema)} & \\
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{entertainment} & \leftarrow \text{singing} \rightarrow \text{spirit} \\
\text{communication} & \leftarrow \text{choruses, hymns} \rightarrow \text{taunting} \\
\text{(popular media schema)} & \leftarrow \text{(Christian worship schema)} \rightarrow \text{(smash schema)} \\
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{interrupt travel} & \leftarrow \text{stop} \rightarrow \text{stay overnight or longer} \\
\text{(travel schema)} & \leftarrow \text{= cease movement} \rightarrow \text{(family schema)} \\
\end{align*}
It is apparent that, in investigating categories one is perforce investigating schemas as well in that word associations and radial networks are informed by schemas. However, in order to explore *story and event schemas* more directly we have analysed oral narrative (see, e.g. Malcolm and Rochecouste 2000; Malcolm, et al 2002). In analysing a corpus of over 200 spontaneous oral narratives, we found certain recurrent schemas to be employed by Aboriginal speakers as frameworks for the depiction of experience. Commonest among these were schemas of “scary things”, Travel, Hunting, Observing and Family (Malcolm et al 1999; Malcolm and Rochecouste 2000; Malcolm and Sharifian 2002; Malcolm 2002a). *Proposition schemas*, like, for example, “It is good to know only what one is supposed to know” and “People who are related look after one another”, could often be inferred from such oral narratives, as also from more traditional narratives current in Indigenous communities. We differentiated two different kinds of *image schema* which were associated with dialect differences, and these tended to emerge from communicative discomfort in cross-cultural communication. The *orientation image schema* is illustrated for example in the case of *on top of*, mentioned above, or in the use of the word *long* with vertical reference, such that a tall person can be described as long. *Iconic image schemas* are associated especially with environmental features such as hills or rocks or items of vegetation which the Aboriginal speaker interprets in association with creation figures of the Dreamtime, where they carry no such significance to the non-Aboriginal speaker. The other area of investigation, metaphor, which has been the least researched so far, illustrates distinctive conceptual blends (c.f. Coulson and Fauconnier 1999) employed by Aboriginal speakers, to produce such forms as *heal the wound of the earth* ‘covering the ashes after having made a cooking fire’, *behind bars* ‘in an institution controlled by non-Aboriginals, not necessarily a prison’ and *peeling* (i.e. ‘skinning’) a rabbit or a goanna (Malcolm et al 1999: 46).

3. Bidialectal Education

I want now to give a brief introduction to the field of bidialectal education and to show how it has been interpreted and practised in Western Australia and how we have increased its possibilities through the application of cultural linguistics.

The rise of bidialectal education accompanied developments in sociolinguistics in the U.S.A. which showed that the vernacular speech of African Americans was rule-governed, systematic and effective in the contexts in which it was used. It was, in other words, a dialect which could be compared on equal terms with other dialects including the “standard” dialect of the school system. It followed from this that educational attempts to “eradicate” or “compensate for” the presumed defi-
cient linguistic system of “non-standard” dialect speaking students were misguided and likely to be ineffective if not harmful (See, e.g. Baratz and Baratz 1972). Rather than ignoring or suppressing the dialect, it was seen as desirable for educators to use it as a basis for instruction in the standard language. Early bidialectal approaches (summarized, for example, in Gardiner 1977) attempted particularly to base bidialectal education (like the foreign language education of the time) on contrastive analysis between the home dialect and that of the school. However, a review I made of bidialectal education in Australia in 1992 (Malcolm 1992) showed that such approaches had made little impact in Australia. I saw this as due in large measure to bidialectal education being framed as a “quasi-foreign language” teaching activity without sufficient social relevance and without an adequate values dimension affecting both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal learners.

4. Two-way bidialectal education

In a collaboration between Edith Cowan University and the Education Department of Western Australia, commencing in 1993, a modified approach to bidialectal education has been developed which takes much more account of the cultural and semantic dimensions of dialect difference. This we call two-way bidialectal education. Two-way bidialectal education may be defined as education which addresses the needs of both “standard” dialect speakers and “non-standard” dialect speakers for improved mutual linguistic and cultural understanding and promotes, for all students, at least receptive competence in both dialects and productive competence in the “standard” dialect. Two-way bidialectal education assumes the recognition of “non-standard” dialect speakers as resource persons for all students in the “non-standard” dialect and its culture.

Just as the bidialectal education of the 1960s and 1970s developed out of improved knowledge of language brought by sociolinguistics, so the bidialectal education of the 1990s and 2000s has, at least in part, developed out of improved knowledge of language brought by cognitive and cultural linguistics. It has also developed in reaction to the experience of generations of “non-standard” dialect speaking students who have gone through the motions of education, reaching at best minimal levels of achievement and never taking it to heart. Two-way bidialectal education attempts not only to recognize and use the “non-standard” dialect and to facilitate the extension of the repertoire to include Standard Australian English, but also to make the cognitive base of the “non-standard” dialect relevant to education.

There are two main phases which are involved in the implementation of bidialectal education and three main phases involved in the implementation of two-way bid-
4.1 Phase 1: awareness raising

If bidialectal education is to have any chance of success, it must have the support of the community who speak the “non-standard” dialect. This cannot be assumed, because it is typical for speakers of “non-standard” dialects to be stigmatized. Even in educational institutions Aboriginal English has been referred to as “rubbish English” and Aboriginal people have preferred not to be heard using their dialect in the company of “standard” dialect speakers. Having been told by educators that their dialect is wrong, many Aboriginal speakers have accepted this. There is also the problem that many people assume that exclusive exposure to the “standard” dialect is a prerequisite for learning it on the part of “non-standard” dialect speakers. In fact, research suggests that the opposite is the case (see, e.g. Siegel 1999).

Raising awareness within the dialect speaking community starts with incorporating Aboriginal speakers on an equal basis onto research and development teams. As Aboriginal English speakers have the validity of their dialect affirmed and see it respected by those who have studied it, they become strong advocates for change within school and community.

Awareness raising is also necessary within the educational community. Administrators of educational systems need to be made aware of the negative consequences in students of dialect suppression and of the historical (rather than inherent linguistic) reasons why the “standard” dialect has been privileged. We have found that when this awareness is gained, and supported by Indigenous spokespersons, administrators are prepared to release the funds necessary to establish bidialectal programmes.

The awareness raising has to continue at all levels, including that of the bodies which determine frameworks, guidelines and materials for curriculum, the district education offices which oversee the work in school districts, and finally the classrooms themselves, where teachers need knowledge about the dialect as well as closer acquaintance with Indigenous people through pairing with Aboriginal or Islander Education officers. In fact the separation of Aboriginal English and Australian English reflects the separation of their speakers and, if it is in schools that the dialects are to be brought together, it is necessary that, before this happens, the speakers be brought together.

Ultimately, the awareness-raising reaches the level of the students, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal. The former group are often under the mistaken impression
what they speak is no more than a loose and inaccurate form of Australian English. The discovery that the variety they had learned to regard as a symbol of failure can be seen as a symbol of significance has been found to be associated with a dramatic improvement in achievement, especially among older students (McKenny 1995).

The awareness raising which is envisaged here can only happen with the ready cooperation of system administrators, school personnel, community members and applied linguists. This presupposes a wide ranging programme of professional development as well as well-grounded research.

4.2 phase 2: easing the transition to the “standard” dialect

The second phase of bidialectal education builds on the students’ confidence in their first dialect to facilitate their transition to the “standard”. If the transition is to take place on the basis of the students’ existing linguistic competence, it presupposes a comprehensive description of the “non-standard” dialect which needs to be made accessible to teachers, curriculum writers and materials developers, leading towards the development of dialect-sensitive outcome statements, materials and pedagogies.

The work involved here is not only linguistic. It involves working with community groups to bring about policy change within systems which assume monodialectal education as normative. In the Education Department of Western Australia the commitment of Aboriginal educators helped to bring about the development of a policy on “non-standard” dialect (still to be finally ratified) which would make it obligatory for all schools with Aboriginal students to recognize their dialect and make appropriate special provision for their education.

Students need to learn how they can achieve additive bidialectalism rather than having to sacrifice their identity-related dialect in order to succeed. This cannot all happen at once and there should be a different expectation as to the stages by which biliteracy in Aboriginal English and Standard Australian English is acquired, by contrast with monoliteracy in Standard Australian English. Labov (1972: 5) suggested that full bidialectalism for non-standard dialect speaking students may be an unrealistic objective, and he prioritized the objectives as follows:

a) ability to understand spoken English (of the teacher)
b) ability to read and comprehend
c) ability to communicate (to the teacher) in spoken English
d) ability to communicate in writing
e) ability to write in standard English grammar
f) ability to spell correctly

g) ability to use standard English grammar in speaking

h) ability to speak with a prestige pattern of pronunciation (and avoid stigmatised forms).

Bidialectal education must involve the integrated efforts of teachers and linguists to enable monodialectal educational approaches to be supplanted with approaches which assume some level of passive competence in the “non-standard” dialect on the part of the teacher and provide rewards for success in using both dialects in appropriate ways.

Although it should not return to the old formula of pattern practice based on contrastive analysis of the two dialects, it should involve focus on form as a part of the negotiation of meaning (Ellis 2001) because the Standard Australian English forms, despite their widespread use, are new to many Aboriginal students.

4.3 Phase 3: cultivating alternative ways of approaching experience and knowledge

If bidialectal education is to be two-way, it must not only provide access for “non-standard” dialect speakers to the “standard” dialect, but also provide access for “standard” dialect speakers to the “non-standard” dialect and the cultural patterns and world view with which it is associated. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to underpin the educational process with an analysis of the dialects used in the classroom which goes beyond the formal linguistic to the cognitive level. This is where it meshes with cultural linguistics.

Some of the factors we have discussed above (under “Applicable Cultural Linguistics”) are the research foundation for two-way bidialectal education. The objective is to reach a mutual understanding among “standard” and “non-standard” dialect speakers of the “mental representations” (Palmer 1996: 29) which underlie not only their way of speaking but their ways of approaching experience and knowledge.

Aboriginal learning proceeds more by experience than by abstraction and the classroom is not the place to provide research data to students. Rather, the teachers need to have themselves internalized the research data which will alert them to the categories, prototypes, networks, schemas and uses of metaphor which are used by Aboriginal people to make meaning. Then they need to set up experiences which will enable these approaches to learning to bring educational rewards to students. At the same time, they need to replicate in the classroom some of the two-way research approaches which enable “standard” and “non-standard” dialect speakers to learn from one another as they explore the implications of their mutual communicative discomfort or incomprehension. The setting up of language-rich expe-
periences for Aboriginal students has been advocated by Gray (1990) in the name of “concentrated learning encounters”, though Gray tends to limit applicability of such encounters to the acquisition of Standard Australian English ways to thinking and talking. Rather I would see the teacher as being able to activate domains from both cultures, providing a rich background in the domain as an accompaniment or prerequisite to linguistic exploration and extension.

5. Conclusion

The application of cultural linguistics to bidialectal education is still in its infancy. The imagistic underpinnings of Standard Australian English are still far short of being fully described, and the corresponding work on Aboriginal English, enlightening though it is, represents the first step off the starting block. Much more needs to be known about the grammatical differences between Aboriginal English and Australian English. Many of these can be traced to creole and beyond creole to Aboriginal languages, strengthening the case that what we find in contemporary Aboriginal English is a maintenance of deep-seated imagistic conceptions which relate Aboriginal people to a shared past. Recent efforts to explore the cognitive significance of Aboriginal English morpho-syntax and lexico-semantics (Malcolm 2003) seem to support the idea that one of the key experiential concepts which strengthens the differentiation of Aboriginal English from Australian English is the overall striving to achieve integration of all experience rather than abstraction of elements from experience. This could help to explain the difficulty Aboriginal students find coping with an educational system which stresses analysis at the expense of synthesis. But this is something which awaits further research.

References


Chapter 4. Cultural linguistics and bidialectal education


CHAPTER 5

The Chinese conceptualization of the heart and its cultural context

Implications for second language learning*

Ning Yu

From the perspective of cultural linguistics, this study investigates (a) the Chinese conceptualization of the heart, based on a linguistic analysis, and (b) the cultural context for this conceptualization, based on a survey of ancient Chinese philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine. As found, the heart-mind dichotomy traditionally held by Western cultures does not exist in traditional Chinese culture, which regards the heart as the thinking and behavior guiding organ, as well as the organ that stores feelings and emotions. It then discusses the importance of studying cultural conceptualization, including conceptual metaphor, behind linguistic expression in the context of second language learning and teaching. Such study should facilitate the acquisition of conceptual fluency and metaphorical competence of the L2 learner.

1. Introduction

Cultural linguistics, with a broad interest in language and culture, maintains that language is a cultural form, and that conceptualizations underlying language and language use are largely formed or informed by cultural systems. It studies language in its social and cultural context, paying special attention to cultural schemas and cultural models that shape language evolution and govern language use (Palmer 1996, Sharifian 2002, 2003). Incorporating the major concerns of cultural linguistics, cognitive linguistics can gain a more balanced view of culture and body that should benefit its systematic study of language as a window into human cognition that is both embodied and enculturated.

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Conceptualizations are distributed across the minds in a cultural group, representing cognition at the cultural level (Sharifian 2003). This paper studies the Chinese conceptualization of the heart, which represents a fundamental difference between Chinese and Western cultures. Western cultures maintain a binary contrast between the heart and the mind. The mind is the place for thoughts and ideas whereas the heart is the seat of emotions and feelings. However, this distinction between the heart and the mind does not exist in traditional Chinese culture. The general conception of the heart in Chinese culture is reflected in the senses attached to the word *xin* (心) ‘heart’ in the Chinese language. Given in (1) is the translation (my own) of the first two senses listed under *xin* ‘heart’ in one of the most popular Chinese dictionaries (Lü and Ding 1996: 1397).

(1) a. the organ inside the body of human beings and other higher animals that gives impetus to the circulation of blood. The heart of a human being is in the center, a little to the left side, of the thoracic cavity, with the shape of a circular cone and the size of one's own fist. Inside the heart there are four cavities, of which the upper two are called atriums and the lower two called ventricles. The diastoles and systoles of the atriums and ventricles circulate blood to all parts of the body. The heart is also called “the heart organ”.

b. usually also refers to the organ for thinking, and to thoughts, emotions, etc.

Obviously, (1a) is more of a scientific definition of the “physical heart” while (1b) represents more of a cultural conception of the “mental heart”. According to a popular Chinese-English dictionary (Wei 1995), the word *xin* is given these two English senses supposed to be equivalent to (1a) and (1b): (a) “the heart”; and (b) “heart; mind”. That is, the Chinese word *xin* ‘heart’ also includes what is described as “mind” in English.

The present study first investigates (a) the Chinese conceptualization of the heart, based on an analysis of linguistic evidence, and (b) the cultural context in which the Chinese conceptualization of the heart was born, based on a survey of ancient Chinese philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine. The emphasis is placed on the fact that the Chinese heart is conceptualized as the combination of “heart” and “mind” as they are understood in English. Finally, it discusses the im-

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1. This binary contrast was not so clear, however, in the Old and Middle English periods. According to the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles* (2002, 5th ed.), for instance, the English *heart* was regarded in those periods as the seat of both feeling and thought, where one’s purpose, inclination, desire, courage, spirit, soul, disposition, temperament, etc. reside. It is very interesting that the heart conceptualized and characterized as such is very alike to the Chinese *xin* ‘heart’. See, also, Wierzbicka (1992: Ch. 1) for discussions of such English concepts as *soul*, *mind*, and *heart*, as well as similar concepts in other languages.
importance of cultural conceptualization, including conceptual metaphor, in second language learning and teaching.

2. Heart in the Chinese language

In the Chinese language, the word *xin* that primarily denotes the heart organ refers to it as the seat of thought and feeling, and by metonymy container for contained it also refers to one’s thoughts and feelings.

This section focuses on the conceptualization of the Chinese heart based on an analysis of linguistic evidence. As will be shown, the heart, while related to all emotional and mental states and processes, is often conceptualized as a container or a location, namely, the image-schemas of either three-dimensional or two-dimensional containment. For instance, Chinese has the following compound words referring to “heart”, or more exactly “heart-mind”, and related concepts:

(2) a. 心房 *xin-fang* (heart-house/room) ‘heart; interior of heart’
   b. 心间 *xin-jian* (heart-room/inside) ‘in the heart; at heart; in the mind’
   c. 心窝 *xin-wo* (heart-nest) ‘heart; deep down in one’s heart’
   d. 心田 *xin-tian* (heart-field) ‘heart; intention’
   e. 心地 *xin-di* (heart-land) ‘heart; mind; character; moral nature’

In (2a) and (2b) the heart is a “house” or “room”, which is a special kind of container, a dwelling place for humans. In (2c) the heart is a “nest”, the dwelling place for birds, for instance. As the following sentential examples show, the heart is indeed the “dwelling place” for thoughts and feelings. These and all the following sentential examples contain, in their word-by-word glosses, a few abbreviations: CL=classifier, DUR=duration, MOD=modifier, PER=perfective, and PRT=particle.

(3) a. 怡悦荡心房。
   *Yiyue dang  xin-fang.*
   joy wave (in) heart-house/room
   ‘Joy rippled in the heart.’

b. 进城几年了,乡亲们的嘱托他一直记在心间。
   *Jin  cheng ji  nian le, xiangqin-men de zhutuo ta yizhi ji  zai xin-jian.*
   enter city several years PER fellow-villagers MOD advice he always rememberin heart-room/inside
   ‘Having lived in the city for several years, he always bears in mind (lit. in the heart room or inside his heart) the fellow villagers’ advice.’
c. 他第一次把掏心窝的话都和她说 了。

Ta diyi-ci ba tao xin-wo de hua dou
he first-time PRT scoop heart-nest MOD words all
he ta shuo-le.

to her say-PER

‘For the first time he told her all his innermost thoughts and feelings (lit. he said to her all the words scooped out of his heart-nest).’

Example (3a) evokes the image of the emotion of joy, conceptualized as a liquid, “rocking” gently inside the heart-house. While this example has to do with the emotion of happiness, the Chinese “heart” is actually linked to various emotions and is the most recurrent of all body parts in conventionalized emotion expressions (see Yu 2002: 358–359). This linguistic phenomenon, as will be shown in the next section, reflects the claim in Chinese philosophy and medicine that the heart, as master of the zang-fu organs, governs the “spiritual light” (i.e., thoughts and emotions). (3b) has to do with memory. When the advice is remembered, it is actually stored inside the “heart-room”. In (3c), the words said are all “scooped out of the heart-nest”: they express the “innermost thoughts and feelings”.

As shown in the above examples, the heart is conceptualized as a “house” or “room”, and this “house” or “room” actually has a “door” with a “threshold”, which is the entrance of the innermost of the self.

(4) a. 心扉 xin-fei (heart-door leaf) ‘the door of one’s heart’

b. 心坎 xin-kan (heart-threshold) ‘the bottom of one’s heart’

Houses and rooms have doors for people to get in and out. Our hearts also have doors for things to get in and out. When we want to accept certain things, we open the door of our heart to let them in. When we want to keep certain things out we lock our heart’s door to prevent them from entering. By the same token, we can open or shut the door of our heart when we want to let the contents of our heart out or keep them in.

(5) a. 我愿意敞开自己的心扉，向她倾诉一切。

Wo yuanyi chang-kai ziji de xin-fei, xiang ta
I willing widely-open self MOD heart-door to her
qing-su yiqie.
pour-tell all

‘I’m willing to open the door of my heart widely, and pour out everything (inside) to her.’
b. 字字句句都说到我心坎上。
Zi-zi ju-ju dou shuo dao wo xin-kan shang.
each-word each-sentence all said reach my heart-threshold on
‘Each word struck a chord in my heart (lit. Each word said reached the threshold of my heart).’

In (5a) the speaker is willing and eager to “pour out” his thoughts and feelings that are stored inside his heart to someone he loves or trusts. To do that, he of course has to “open the door of his heart” first. When the door of the heart is widely open, one’s innermost thoughts and feelings stored inside are free to come out. That is, the speaker is ready for a “heart-to-heart” talk. Example (5b) poses the image of reception, as opposed to that of production in (5a). This time the words someone has said are so appealing that they have found their way to the entrance of the listener’s heart, its “threshold”. The words that have struck the “threshold” of one’s heart have “touched” the innermost of one’s self. Interestingly, in Chinese, a common way of describing those people who are ignoring what others say, by choice or not, is to say that words have entered one of their ears and come out of the other one. And those who choose to ignore other people’s words are said to have taken others’ words as “wind past their ears” (er-bian feng 耳边风). In both of these cases, other people’s words have never reached their heart.

As in (2d) and (2e) above, the heart is conceptualized as a two-dimensional location, either as “a plot of field” or “a stretch of land”. The “heart-field”, is apparently a soil metaphor that often appears in combination with, for instance, the plant and water metaphors, which together fall in the source domain of agriculture, as the examples in (6) illustrate.

(6) a. 我把环保种子播撒在他的心田里。
Wo ba huan-bao zhongzi bosa zai tade
I PRT environment-protection seeds sowed at his xin-tian li.
heart-field in
‘I sowed the environment-protection seeds in his heart (lit. heart-field).’

b. 有时她那短暂的微笑，真会令我的心田开出温暖的花朵呢!
Youshi ta na duanzan de weixiao, zhen hui
sometimes she that transient MOD smile really would ling wode xin-tian kai-chu wennuan de huaduo ne!
make my heart-field bloom-with warm MOD flowers PRT
‘sometimes that transient smile of hers would really make my heart (lit. heart-field) bloom with warm flowers!’
c. 她那无助的感觉一波又一波地涌进我的心田。

That hopeless feeling of hers surged wave after wave into my heart (lit. heart-field).

In (6a), ideas or thoughts are “seeds”, and to communicate ideas or thoughts to other people, or to educate them, is to “sow the seeds” into their “heart-field”. The seeds sowed into the field will grow, blossom, and bear fruits, and those fruits are the “fruits” of earlier education. Thus, (6a) involves the following metaphorical mappings and entailments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sower</td>
<td>Educator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td>Ideas/thoughts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowing</td>
<td>Communicating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Heart of the educated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected harvest</td>
<td>Expected result</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this point, the “harvest” is still expected as its realization will depend on many other factors: the quality of the soil in the field, the climatic circumstances, continued cultivation, and so forth. Buddhism maintains that the heart stores the seeds of good and evil that would grow under suitable circumstances, just like a field in which both crops and weeds would grow. It is said that the Buddha taught the disciples that the heart is a piece of land where you will get fruits in return for whatever seeds you have sowed.

As in (6b), the heart is the seat of feelings or emotions. Happy and warm feelings are “flowers” grown out of the “heart-field”. In Chinese, the idiom *xin-hua nu-fang* 心花怒放 (heart-flowers wildly-blossom) is a common metaphorical expression for the emotion of happiness (see, also, Yu 1995). In this case, the cause for the instant bloom of the “flowers”, i.e. the “transient smile of hers”, is the much-needed “nourishment” (say, sunshine, water, fertilizer) for the plants.

Example (6c) describes the state of empathy, i.e., the sharing of one’s feeling by another. Here, one person’s feeling of helplessness is the “water” that “surges” into the “heart-field” of another person. It shows that true understanding and sympathy are established upon the connection of the two hearts through which feelings and thoughts in one person’s heart can “flow” into that of another. This example involves the following metaphorical mappings and entailments:
Chapter 5. The Chinese conceptualization of the heart and its cultural context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Heart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way of water moving</td>
<td>Way of feeling experienced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force of water</td>
<td>Strength of feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water flowing from one field into another</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The metaphor here is structured by multiple image schemas, such as containers, link, force, and source-path-goal.

Here are some examples of the “heart-land” metaphor.

(7)  

a. “静”是心地最佳的风景。  
"jing" shi xin-di zui-jia de fengguang.  
“stillness/quiescence” is heart-land’s the-best mod scenery/landscape  
“Quiescence” is the best scenery of the heart-land.

b. 现在最需要的是清净你的心地。  
Xianzai zui xuyao de shi qingjing nide xin-di.  
now most needed mod is cleanse your heart-land  
‘Now what is needed most is to cleanse your heart (lit. heart-land).’

c. 我以为只要自己心地清白, 就可以避免肇害于人。  
Wo yiwei zhiyao ziji xin-di qing-bai,  
I thought as long as self heart-land clear-white  
jiu keyi bimian zhao-hai yu ren.  
then can do-harm to other-people  
‘I thought as long as I maintained a clear and clean heart (lit. my heart-land remains clear and pure), I could avoid doing harm to others.’

The sentences in (7) exemplify (2e). As in (7a), a frame of mind (a peaceful and quiet mind) is the “landscape” or “scenery” of that “heart-land”. This example reminds us of the traditional philosophical view that the heart should remain “still” or “quiescent” so that it can reflect the external reality accurately like still water or a mirror. The metaphor here contains the following mappings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Heart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape</td>
<td>Mental state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical quiescence</td>
<td>Mental peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both (7b) and (7c) reflect the traditional view in ancient Chinese philosophy that the heart is the locus of morality and moral character. To be moral and ethical means “to have a pure and clean heart”. They involve the following metaphorical mappings and entailments:
As shown by the above examples, the Chinese heart is the locus for various mental states and activities. This observation is reinforced by the following group of compounds containing xin 'heart':

(8) a. 心思 xin-si (heart-think/thought) ‘thought; idea; thinking; state of mind; mood’
   b. 心念 xin-nian (heart-think/idea) ‘thought; idea; intention; thinking; state of mind; mood’
   c. 心愿 xin-yuan (heart-hope/wish/desire) ‘cherished desire; aspiration; wish; dream’
   d. 心期 xin-ji (heart-expect) ‘expectation; hope; wish; aspiration; intention; purpose; mood’
   e. 心得 xin-de (heart-obtain) ‘what one has learned from work, study, etc.’

In (8a) and (8b), as we can see, when people think, their heart thinks, and thoughts, ideas, mood etc. are associated with the heart. People also hope, wish, desire, and expect with their heart (8c, d); desire, aspiration, hope, wish, expectation, and dream etc. come from the heart. Whatever one learns is also obtained by one’s heart (8e). Given in (9) are some sentential examples:

(9) a. 我猜不透他的心思。
   Wo cai-bu-tou tade xin-si.
   ‘I can’t figure out what’s on his mind (lit. his heart-thought).’

b. 他的话说出了大家的心念。
   Tade hua shuo chu le dajia-de xin-nian.
   ‘His words expressed (lit. brought out) everyone’s thought.’

c. 这就了却了我的一桩心愿。
   Zhe jiu liaoque-le wode yi-zhuang xin-yuan.
   ‘This serves to fulfill a cherished desire (lit. a heart-wish/desire) of mine.’
d. 这符合人民的心愿。
   *Zhe fuhe renmin-de xin-yuan.*
   This accords with the aspirations (lit. heart-wishes) of the people.’

e. 我想谈谈学习这篇课文的心得。
   *Wo xiang tantan xuexi zhe-pian kewen de xin-de.*
   ‘I want to talk about what I have gained (lit. what my heart has obtained) from studying this text.’

As in (9a), “reading people’s mind” is trying to figure out the thought in their heart. People may have a common thought that they each keep in their heart. The right articulation of that thought verbally will bring that thought out of their heart (9b). People all have desires and aspirations that they want to fulfill or satisfy, and these mental states and activities again originate in the heart: they are what the heart wishes for (9c, d). Learning is a process of receiving knowledge by the heart-container. What one has learned from study is the knowledge obtained by and stored in the heart (9e).

The above examples, all about mental activities, reflect the important difference across cultures: namely, in English, thinking is regarded as taking place in one’s mind associated with one’s head or brain, whereas in Chinese it is traditionally conceptualized as taking place in one’s heart. As I have observed elsewhere (Yu 2003b), however, in modern Chinese, *tounao* 头脑 ‘head and brain’ can also mean “mind”. It is where one’s thoughts and ideas are stored and one’s thinking takes place, as illustrated by the examples in (10) (from Yu 2003b). Nevertheless, this usage is limited to modern Chinese in a relatively small scope. On the other hand, the bulk of conventionalized expressions, including compounds, idioms, and idiomatic sayings, demonstrate that the heart, rather than the brain, is the locus for the “mind” as understood in English (Yu 2003b).

(10)  a. 我们要有冷静的头脑。
   *Women yao you lengjing de tou-nao.*
   ‘We should have a cool head (or, be sober-minded).’

b. 我们应该把头脑里的错误思想清除出去。
   *Women yinggai ba tou-nao li de cuowu sixiang qingchu chuqu.*
   ‘We should rid our minds of erroneous ideas.’
In this section, it has become clear, through analysis of linguistic evidence, that the Chinese heart is the combination of “heart” and “mind” in the Western sense. It is where emotions and thoughts are stored, processed, and manipulated. In the next section, I will cite evidence from ancient Chinese philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine to show that the linguistic evidence presented and analyzed in this section is actually embedded in its cultural context. Manifested linguistically, the conceptualization of the Chinese heart is indeed a phenomenon at the cultural level of cognition.

3. Heart in ancient Chinese philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine

Western philosophical tradition upholds the reason-emotion dichotomy, contrasting “the reasoning faculty (the mind) with the irrational, base, physical desires and passions (the heart)”, and to Western thinkers beliefs and ideas come from the mind whereas the heart is the seat of desires and emotions (Hansen 1992: 22). In ancient Chinese philosophy, however, the heart is “the site of both affective and cognitive activities” (Shun 1997: 48). In other words, the “heart” and the “mind”, as known in English, are conceptualized as being one, the xin ‘heart’, which houses thoughts and feelings, ideas and emotions.

Importantly, the Chinese philosophical conception of the heart differs from the Western one in that the heart is a thinking and reasoning organ. In Chinese thought, the heart distinguishes between right and wrong, between good and bad, and thus guides action, conduct, and behavior (Hansen 1992). For instance, the famous ancient Confucian philosopher, Mencius, asserted that the function of the heart organ is to think, and a good sense of understanding and reasoning can only be obtained through thinking (心之官则思，思则得之，不思则不得也。《孟子·告子上》).

Clearly, the “distinction between ‘heart’ and ‘mind’ in the Western sense does not exist in Chinese philosophy” (Lin 2001: 202). That is why the Chinese term xin ‘heart’ is often glossed as “heart-mind” or “heart/mind”, as well as either “heart” or “mind”, in English literature on Chinese philosophy (e.g., Chan 2002a, Hansen 1992, Shun 1997, Slingerland 2003, Yearley 1990), by “taking into consideration both the affective and cognitive concerns that the concept of xin encompasses”
(Chan 2002b: 42). As Hansen (1992: 20) points out, “The common translation of *xin* as *heart-mind* reflects the blending of belief and desire (thought and feeling, ideas and emotions) into a single complex dispositional potential”.

As “the most valuable part of the self”, the heart is conceptualized metaphorically as “the ruler of the other parts” (Slingerland 2003: 229). For instance, another famous Confucian philosopher, Xunzi, employed this heart/mind as ruler metaphor (see Slingerland 2003: 230–231) when he argued that the heart is the ruler of the body and the master of the spiritual light, who issues commands but does not receive commands (心者，形之君也，而神明之主也，出令而无所受令。《荀子•解蔽篇》). While the Chinese heart is “the master of spiritual light”, the “spirits”, which refers to the totality of the mental aspect of a person, are “treasures” stored in the heart (心者形之主也，神者心之宝也《文子·九守》). Apparently, the Chinese heart is conceptualized as the locus of the mind, and as the thinking organ, a faculty given at birth. Thus, Guanzi, a Daoist statesman and philosopher, asserted that a baby in the mother’s womb will take shape in five months, and be born in ten months: “After the birth, the eyes will see, the ears will hear, and the heart will think” (五月而成，十月而生。生而目视，耳听，心虑。《管子·水地》). It is taken for granted that humans are born with the heart to think, as much as with the eyes to see and the ears to hear.

In short, ancient Chinese philosophy held that the heart is the core of cognitive structure, conceived of as having the capacity for logical reasoning, rational understanding, moral will, intuitive imagination, and aesthetic feeling, unifying human will, desire, emotion, intuition, reason and thought. It is “part of a holistic-comprehensive structure in which all human faculties are unified and integrated” (Lin 2001: 202).

Traditional Chinese medicine is a mixture of folk and scientific medicine with a history of several thousand years. In the study of human body, it borrowed extensively from ancient Chinese philosophy, for instance, its theories of *yin-yang* and five-elements, which are aimed to explain the formation and operation of the universe. This is because traditional Chinese medicine shares the views of ancient Chinese philosophy that nature and human correspond to each other and they are a unified one.

In Chinese medicine, the internal organs of the human body are divided into two major classes. The five organs of primary importance are called *zang* (脏): liver, heart, spleen, lung, and kidney. Each of them is matched with, and closely related to, an organ of secondary importance called *fu* (腑): respectively, gallbladder, small intestine, stomach, large intestine, and bladder. An extra *fu* organ is called *san jiao* ‘triple heater, i.e., the three visceral cavities housing the internal organs’. According to the theory of *yin-yang*, all the *zang* organs belong to *yin*, whereas all the *fu* organs belong to *yang*. According to the theory of five elements
or five phases (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water), liver and gallbladder belong to wood, heart and small intestine belong to fire, spleen and stomach belong to earth, lung and large intestine belong to metal, and kidney and bladder belong to water.

In traditional Chinese medicine, while the heart is one of the eleven internal organs, its position among them is that of a “superior authority”. “The heart is the grand master of the five zang and six fu, and the house of spirits” (心者，五脏六腑之大主也，精神之所舍也。《灵枢・邪客》). So the heart, the “central command” of all internal organs, coordinates their functions, and stores spirits, which include all mental activities and emotional states. That is why it has received much attention from those interested in the study of Chinese medicine (see, e.g., Claude Larre and Elisabeth Rochat de la Vallée 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996).

Traditional Chinese medicine uses a government metaphor system to define the internal organs of the human body (see, also, Wang et al. 1997, Yu 2003a). According to this metaphor system, “the heart holds the office of monarch, whence the spiritual light emanates” (心者，君主之官也，神明出焉。《素问・灵兰秘典论》). So, it is the “master of the body” (心者，一身之主《医学入门・心脏》), as much as a king or emperor is the master of a nation. Functionally speaking, “the heart governs the spiritual light” (心主神明). Here, the “spiritual light” (shen ming 神明), also simply called the “spirits” (shen 神), refers to consciousness and mental vitality of a person. That is, as “the organ of emperor”, the heart controls all mental activities and psychological states: carrying out thinking, storing memory, producing emotions, commanding will, governing perception, and evolving dreams (Wang et al. 1997: 181).

It is worth mentioning that, uniquely in traditional Chinese medicine, the five zang organs are all related to mental functions. This is because they produce and store essential elements of the body such as blood, qi, fluid, essence, which are taken as the physical basis for mental vitality. It is believed that the operations of the five zang organs result in mental activities. The spirits, which include all mental activities, are classified as five different types: shen (神), hun (魂), po (魄), yi (意), and zhi (志). It is claimed that the five different types of spirits are stored separately in the five zang organs, but commanded all by the heart as the “grand master” of the five zang and six fu.

Also according to traditional Chinese medicine, the five zang organs produce five qi, which result in five emotions: anger (nu 怒), joy (xi 喜), anxiety or overthinking (si 思), sorrow (bei 悲), and fear (kong 恐). They are each classified with

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2. The five types of mental activities (wu shen 五神) are collectively called the “spiritual light” (shen ming 神明), or simply as the “spirits” (shen 神). There are varying ways of translating them into English. They are rendered respectively as “spirit”, “ethereal soul”, “corporeal/animal soul”, “intention/purpose”, and “will” in one way, and as “spirit”, “mood”, “soul”, “idea/reflection”, and “will” in another.
a zang organ: anger with the liver, joy with the heart, anxiety with the spleen, sorrow with the lung, and fear with the kidney. While these emotions arise from the functions of their corresponding zang organs, their excessiveness will hurt each of them accordingly. For instance, sudden excessive joy can hurt the heart by making the spirit inside unsteady or dispersed so that the person can hardly concentrate on anything. However, because the heart is the “governor” of all psychological states and mental activities, it reacts to other emotions as well. Of all the internal organs, in fact, the heart is the most sensitive to emotional changes. This is because emotional changes, as is believed, originate in the heart but affect other zang organs depending on their kinds. Thus, for example, when anger stirs in the heart, it will affect the liver; when fear shakes in the heart, it will affect the kidney. As Zhang Jingyue in the Ming Dynasty argued:

The heart is the master of the zang-fu, commanding soul and mood, and directing purpose and will. Therefore, when sorrow moves in the heart, the lung will respond, when overthinking moves in the heart, the spleen will respond, when anger moves in the heart, the liver will respond, and when fear moves in the heart, the kidney will respond. That is why the five emotions are operated only by the heart. … Wounds inflicted by emotions, although they each belong to one of the five zang, if their causes are traced, they all come from the heart.

(Apparently, traditional Chinese medicine also conceptualizes the heart as the “master” or “ruler” of the body, and as the locus of mental activity. It actually adopted the view from ancient Chinese philosophy (see Wang et al. 1997: 181). In the Ming and Qing dynasties, however, the functions of the brain as the organ for mental activities came to be recognized. Today, the relationship between the heart and the brain is still under debate in Chinese medicine (see Wang et al. 1997: 180–182, 929–931). One view sees the brain as the house for mental activities, but the heart ultimately controls it by transporting blood to it. A different view argues that the notion of “heart” in traditional Chinese medicine cannot be equated to the heart organ. Instead, it is a combination of heart and brain.

4. Conceptual fluency and metaphorical competence in L2 context

Language reflects an underlying conceptual system constructed in its cultural context. The underlying conceptual system, which is metaphorical to a substantial
degree, arises from the interplay of body and culture (Gibbs 1994, 1999, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). For instance, in Chinese, some of the words with the connotation of importance contain the body-part term referring to the heart:

(11) a. 中心 zhong-xin (center-heart) ‘center; heart; core; hub; key’
    b. 核心 he-xin (core-heart) ‘core; nucleus; kernel; key’
    c. 重心 zhong-xin (weight-heart) ‘center of gravity; heart; core; focus’

These compound words are formed on a combination of conceptual metaphors. Other than sharing the importance is heart metaphor, they are each based on another metaphor: importance is center/centrality for (11a), importance is core (and the core, which is the center of a fruit, is important also because it has the potential for reproduction) for (11b), and importance is weight for (11c). Note that most of the translated meanings given in English for (11) should be taken metaphorically too, as in English phrases such as a central issue (中心问题), the core of leadership (领导核心), the kernel of a story (故事的核心), the heart of a matter (问题的中心或重心), a key figure (核心人物), etc.

It is obvious that the importance is heart metaphor, by which the body-part term has extended to express the abstract concept of importance, has a bodily, experiential basis: the heart organ is the center of vital functions of the body. Nevertheless, it is the Chinese cultural model that has, in this case, highlighted this common bodily experience and interpreted it in such a way that makes explicit the connection between the bodily organ of heart and the abstract concept of importance. Such a connection is made by choice, not by necessity. In the English phrases listed above, for instance, only the heart of a matter contains a parallel bodily-based metaphor, whereas the core of leadership and the kernel of a story contain fruit metaphors. Even the heart of a matter has an alternate: the core of a matter. That is why conventionalized metaphorical expressions are said to be “culturally-loaded expressions” (Littlemore 2003: 273), and figurative language can serve as one of the main means for the transmission of cultural beliefs and attitudes (Chare-ris-Black 2003, Littlemore 2003).

What especially interests me here is the study of cultural conceptualization, including conceptual metaphor, behind linguistic expression in the context of second language learning and teaching, which has already attracted attention of many researchers (e.g., Achard and Niemeier 2004, Boers and Littlemore 2003, Cameron and Low 1999, Johnson and Rosano 1993, Ponterotto 1994, Pütz et al. 2001a, 2001b). One’s first language, together with its underlying conceptual structure, is acquired within one’s own cultural system, but the learning of a second language involves conceptual restructuring. That is, second language acquisition takes place in the process of transforming into a new cultural system. The ideal situation is where the acquired conceptual structure underlying the target language fits well
into the new cultural system regardless of its difference from, or similarity to, one’s own. This is, however, by no means easy.

As Danesi (1993, 1995, 1999) and Danesi and Mollica (1998) have suggested, second language learners often demonstrate a lack of “conceptual fluency” despite the fact that they may have achieved “verbal fluency”. Their nonnativeness is usually betrayed by the way in which they “speak” with the formal structures of the target language but “think” in terms of their native conceptual system. In other words, they typically use target language words and structures as “carriers” of their own native language concepts (Danesi 1993, 1995). This problem, as Danesi (1995: 6–7) argues, lies in students’ lack of “metaphorical competence”—parallel to grammatical competence and communicative or pragmatic competence—which “is closely linked to the ways in which a culture organizes its world conceptually” (see, also, Littlemore 2001). Very often, their typical “over-literalness” reveals their inadequate access to “the metaphorical structures inherent in the target language and culture” (Danesi 1995: 4). It is claimed that “to be conceptually fluent in a language is to know, in large part, how that language ‘reflects’ or encodes concepts on the basis of metaphorical reasoning”, which “is by and large unconscious in native speakers” (Danesi 1995: 5). The programming of discourse in metaphorical ways is a basic property of native speaker competence. The studies reported show that, due to the absence of teaching metaphorical competence, the students “learned virtually no ‘new ways’ of thinking conceptually after three or four years of study in a classroom” (Danesi 1995: 12). It is therefore suggested that conceptual fluency should be an objective for second language teaching, through a curriculum based on “the notion that metaphor is the organizing principle of common discourse” (Danesi 1995: 3), and aimed at reducing “conceptual interferences” from both native and target conceptual systems (Danesi 1995: 16).

In a study of the extent to which typical classroom learners can comprehend second language metaphors at various stages of learning, Danesi (1993) found that their metaphorical competence was inadequate even at the level of comprehension (see, also, DeCunha 1993). “The reason for this is not that they are incapable of learning metaphor, but most likely that they have never been exposed in formal ways to the conceptual system of the target language” (Danesi 1993: 497). In another study of “metaphorical density” in second language writing, Danesi (1993: 496–497) found that the compositions of this kind show a high degree of “literalness” and the students “tended to use conceptual metaphors that were alike in both languages” (see, also, Feng 1997). That is, student-produced discourse texts seem to follow a native-language conceptual flow that is “clothed” in target language grammar and vocabulary. Danesi (1993: 498) concludes that “if the research on metaphor is any indication of the significance of metaphor to discourse, then there is no reason to believe that it will constitute an impossible task to translate the
findings on metaphor into pedagogically usable insights and principles”. Such a task starts with a proposed research question: To what extent do the conceptual domains of the native and target cultures overlap and contrast? In the contrastive analysis so involved, interlanguage studies attempt to find out what kinds of conceptual interferences come from the student’s native conceptual system (interconceptual interference) and how much conceptual interference is generated by the target language itself (intraconceptual interference) (Danesi and Mollica 1998). In short, the central objective of “conceptual fluency theory”, according to Danesi (1999: 16), “is to ensure that learners have access to the conceptual structures inherent in the target language and culture in a systematic, sequential, and integrated fashion with other areas of language learning”. This theory underscores cultural variation and it views culture as being “built on metaphor, since conceptual metaphors coalesce into a system of meaning that holds together the entire network of associated meanings in the culture” (Danesi and Mollica 1998: 3).

In a *Metaphor and Symbol* special issue on “Cross-cultural Differences in Conceptual Metaphor: Applied Linguistics Perspectives” (Boers and Littlemore 2003), Boers (2003) points out that the general advantage of applying the notion of conceptual metaphor in the context of second language acquisition is that it offers motivation and coherence to whole clusters of figurative expressions that may otherwise appear to be arbitrary and unrelated. Without adapting the notion of conceptual metaphor, teachers can at best point out cross-linguistic differences at the level of individual expressions. Based on the studies reported in the articles (Low 2003, Deignan 2003, Littlemore 2003, Charteris-Black 2003) that appear in the same special issue, Boers (2003: 232) outlines three types of cross-cultural variation in metaphor usage:

(a) differences with regard to the particular source-target mappings that have become conventional in the given cultures; (b) differences with regard to value-judgments associated with the source or target domains of shared mappings; and (c) differences with regard to the degree of pervasiveness of metaphor as such, as compared with other (rhetorical) figures.

Systematic comparison of conceptual metaphors along these lines may lead to a better understanding of cross-cultural differences and similarities, historically
and/or currently, in conventional patterns of thought and conceptualization.³ Boers (2003: 236), therefore, concludes:

If language is an integral part of culture, and if culture is expressed (albeit indirectly) through metaphor, then it follows that cross-cultural communication would benefit substantially from a heightened metaphor awareness on the part of educators and language learners.

For instance, Boers (2000, 2004) demonstrates that conceptual metaphor awareness can help L2 learners expand and retain vocabulary. Csábi (2004) shows that the meaning structure of polysemous words is motivated by conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy and how making this motivation explicit to L2 learners can enhance their retention of the more peripheral senses of a polysemous lexical item. In a similar vein, Kövecses (2001) argues that such motivation always facilitates the learning of idioms in a L2 teaching context. Barcelona (2001) argues that the contrastive study of conceptual metaphors across languages should help L2 textbook writers and teachers in their selection and arrangements of the teaching materials.

As has been shown in the preceding two sections, the Chinese cultural model for the concept of heart includes some culturally constructed metaphors:

I. As a Physical Entity
   (i) the heart is a container
   (ii) the heart is a location

II. As a Part of the Body
   (i) the heart is the ruler of the body
   (ii) the heart is the master of the internal organs

III. As the Locus of Affective and Cognitive Activities
   (i) the heart is the house of all emotional and mental processes
   (ii) the heart is the headquarters of all emotional and mental activities

These conceptual metaphors characterize the cultural schematization and categorization in the Chinese conceptualization of the heart. They are therefore partly constitutive of the Chinese cultural model for the concept of “heart”. The identifi-

³. For the suggestion that metaphorical expressions are to some extent a cultural reliquary rather than a synchronic reflection of culture, see Deignan (2003). Although, as Deignan (2003: 270) points out quite correctly, many conventionalized figurative expressions may no longer be directly experienced by individual speakers, they allude to knowledge that is still shared as part of the “cultural repository”; thus, historical and systematic studies of figurative language are beneficial to the foreign language learner. For examples of comparative studies, see Barcelona (2001), Boers (2004), Charteris-Black (2002, 2003), Csábi (2004), Feng (1997), Johnson and Rosano (1993), Kövecses (2001), Yu (1995, 2000, 2003b, 2004). For a discussion of the issues involved in such studies, see Kövecses (2003).
cation of conceptual metaphors in specific languages, however, is just the first step of a series leading to their application to L2 teaching and learning. The next step comprises cross-linguistic and cross-cultural studies of thorough comparative and contrastive analysis (see, e.g., Sharifian et al., in preparation). Only conceptual differences and similarities are carefully mapped out across languages and cultures can findings of such studies benefit L2 teaching and learning.

The cultural conceptualization of the heart, as discussed in this paper, is automatically distributed across the minds of native speakers of Chinese. In a second language acquisition context, however, conceptualizations that underlie and govern linguistic use are not automatically given, but have to be acquired in a process of negotiation and renegotiation. If the cultural conceptualization of the heart, including the conceptual metaphors listed above, is delineated clearly to L2 learners of Chinese, it would facilitate their learning and enable them to avoid misunderstanding in intercultural communication.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have first cited linguistic evidence showing that the semantic difference between the Chinese word *xin* and the English word *heart* actually reflects an important difference in the conceptualization of the heart between traditional Chinese and Western cultures. The heart-mind dichotomy traditionally held by Western cultures, in which the heart is taken as the seat of emotion and feeling whereas the mind is the place for thought and reason, does not exist in traditional Chinese culture. In traditional Chinese culture, the heart is the locus of both affective and cognitive activities. Therefore, it is roughly equivalent to “heart” and “mind” conceptualized in English. As the linguistic analysis of compound words shows, the Chinese language evokes various images for the imagined mental functions of the heart: “heart-house”, “heart-room”, “heart-door”, “heart-threshold”, “heart-nest”, “heart-field”, and “heart-land”. It also evokes various images that explicitly ascribe various mental functions to the heart: thus, the heart thinks, hopes, wishes, desires, memorizes, expects, learns, etc. Such linguistic imagery, which requires imagination for its interpretation, is a central concern of cultural linguistics. “Cultural linguistics is primarily concerned not with how people talk about some objective reality, but with how they talk about the world that they themselves imagine” (Palmer 1996: 36).

In this paper I have also studied the cultural context of the conceptualization of “heart” in philosophy and medicine. The study sheds much light on why the Chinese word *xin* ‘heart’ differs from the English word *heart* the way it does. In ancient Chinese philosophy, the heart is taken as the thinking and reasoning or-
gan, and the “ruler” of the body. In traditional Chinese medicine, similarly, the heart is seen as the “ruler” of the body and the “grand master” of the internal organs, due to its perceived mental power. The metaphorical understanding of the heart, manifested linguistically in the Chinese language, is thus a cultural phenomenon, an instance of “cultural cognition” (Sharifian 2003: 188).

As language is embedded in culture (Palmer and Sharifian, this volume), cultural context is the “physical environment” in which language acquisition takes place. However, first language acquisition and second language acquisition are very different. First language acquisition is “traveling by day”, whereas second language acquisition is “traveling by night”. That is, second language learners have to “feel their way in the dark”. Introducing the cultural context to second language learners is to “set up street lights and road signs” for them so that they can “see” where they are going and “go faster”.

References


CHAPTER 6

The embodiment of fear expressions in Tunisian Arabic

Theoretical and practical implications*

Zouhair Maalej

The study investigates the conceptualization of fear in Tunisian Arabic, arguing that fear shows three types of “cultural embodiment”: (i) seemingly physiological, where the fear expression profiles a part of the body physiologically thought to be affected by fear, (ii) culturally driven, where the fear expression profiles a part of the body thought to be physiologically affected by the emotion, and the basic-level category is grounded in culture, and (iii) culturally specific, where the fear expression schematically profiles a part of the body associated with physiological change. The implications of such culturally constructed embodiment will be pointed out for the theory of embodiment, which needs to be made bi-directional in terms of directionality of mappings, for ESL, and for cross-cultural communication.

1. The embodiment thesis

The embodiment thesis constitutes a challenge to the Cartesian dichotomy of body-mind in Western philosophy (Sinha and Jensen de Lopez, 2000: 17), whose effect has long kept body and mind apart in matters of meaning, imagination, and reasoning (Johnson, 1987). The embodiment thesis “stresses the continuity and

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motivating character of the relationship between pre- or non-linguistic bodily experience, and cognition” (Sinha and Jensen de Lopez, 2000: 18). Rohrer (forthcoming) explains the body in embodied cognitive science as follows:

The body of embodied cognitive science is not limited to physiological and neurophysiological influences on mind, nor to that plus the physical body’s interactions with the physical world, but also incorporates the experiences of the social and cultural body as well. In other words, it has to take account of the socio-cultural context within which a particular body is situated.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 57) acknowledged the cultural basis of experience, but they did not systematize this acknowledgment in their study of metaphor owing to the fact that their agenda was filled more with conceptual and “physical” (physiological embodiment) concerns, although they admit that “every experience involves cultural presuppositions” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 57).

Although it has been nearly two decades since Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) introduced the embodiment thesis to cognitive linguistics, it is still somewhat controversial (Geeraerts and Grondelaers, 1995; Rohrer, 2001). The embodiment thesis presents a proliferation of views. For instance, Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 102–4) distinguish neural, phenomenological, and cognitive unconscious levels of embodiment, which seem to serve as universals of cognitive processing. Rohrer (2001) discussed ten senses in which the term “embodiment” was used, and the same author (Rohrer, forthcoming) later surveyed twelve of them in the cognitive science literature, ranging from “embodiment as the physical substrate” to “embodiment as broadly experiential.” Wilson (2002) isolated six views of embodied cognition that look more like underlying principles of cognition, questioning situated cognition and time-pressed cognition, and arguing convincingly that situated cognition does not only function online but also offline, and that cognition is not really time-pressed because humans tend to fall apart under extreme conditions of time pressure. A recent view (Ziemke, 2003) offers yet another six types of embodiment, most of them more or less different than the ones discussed by Lakoff and Johnson, Rohrer, and Wilson. However, in spite of this heterogeneity, the embodiment thesis shows consensus on the directionality of the body-mind embodiment.

Johnson (1987: xxxvi) was among the first modern philosophers to point to the importance of the body in concepts wrongly thought to be exclusively mental, and urged “putting the body back into the mind.” Lakoff (1987: 267) characterizes embodiment as “our collective biological capacities and our physical and social experiences as beings functioning in our environment.” In order not to shift from one extreme (mind) position to another (body), Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) argued for “experientialism” (and its variants “experiential realism” and “embod-
ied realism”), whereby “experience is always an interactive process, involving neural and physiological constraints from the organism as well as characteristic affordances from the environment and other people for creatures with our types of bodies and brains” (Johnson and Lakoff, 2002: 248, emphasis in original). However, Sinha and Jensen de López (2000: 20) claimed that “despite its many virtues, and its superiority to its formalist rival, it [the embodiment thesis] has failed to pay sufficient attention to the importance of culture and society in human cognition, in the motivation of linguistic structure, and in the acquisition of language.”

To remedy this failure, Sinha and Jensen de López (2000: 22) proposed “an extended conception of embodiment that is no longer restricted to the ‘humanly corporeal’.” They (2000: 24) characterize it as in line with “aspects and features of the experientially or ecologically significant, noncorporeal world.” Such a conception of “cultural embodiment” was exemplified from cross-cultural data, explaining the differences in the acquisition of containment by Zapotec, Danish and English children “in terms of language ‘entrenching’ cognitive differences induced by cultural embodiment and cultural practice” (Sinha and Jensen de López, 2000: 37). What was uniquely powerful in Sinha and Jensen de López’s study is that they showed how cultural behaviors shape habitual patterns of language, whereby the socio-cultural dimension shapes the “cognitive unconscious” (the psychological dimension of embodiment) in ways that could be measured using psychological methodologies, thus reversing Lakoff and Johnson’s physiological to psychological to socio-cultural directionality of embodiment. Although the basis of their conception of cultural embodiment is not the same as the one developed here, Sinha and Jensen de López’s (2000) and the author of this chapter hold the body-mind only directionality of embodiment as inadequate, and offer a complementary view where socio-cultural factors impact mind and language.

2. Revised extended embodiment

To spell out the view of embodiment used in this chapter, reference will be made to three concepts: directionality of metaphor, grounding, and the socio-cultural di-

1. When Maalej (2004) was published, the author was not aware of the existence of Sinha and Jensen de López (2000). Although Sinha and Jensen de López (2000) used the same expression of “cultural embodiment,” they did not use it in the same sense as the present author is using it. They extended embodiment beyond the corporeal, using “Vygotsky’s socio-cultural, or cultural-historical, developmental psychology” (Sinha and Jensen de López, 2000: 37), while the present author uses it in the non-physiological sense, i.e. when the body part used in the conceptualization of emotion is overridden by a cultural category, metaphorically, metonymically, or image schematically (Maalej, 2004: 73).
mension of cognition (Rohrer, forthcoming). What Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 112) called directionality in metaphor is the fact that “we tend to structure the less concrete and inherently vaguer concepts (like those for the emotions) in terms of more concrete concepts, which are more delineated in our experience,” with mappings proceeding unidirectionally from the concrete source domain to the abstract target domain. Notwithstanding the existence of empirical evidence in support of other types of directionality, unidirectionally engendered a second kind of directionality in embodiment theory, in which a normative body-to-mind “directionality of explanation” (Rohrer, forthcoming) provided grounding for our mental and cultural lives in bodily terms. For instance, Sweetser (1990: 30) argued that “bodily experience is a source of vocabulary for our psychological states, but not the other way round”. However, this unidirectionality has been rather ashamedly put into question by Jäkel (1999: 385), who pointed out that “the conception of metaphor as a kind of one-way street suggests a rigidity of fixed, rule-governed direction of transfer which simply does not exist in linguistic reality.” Jäkel (1999: 374–75) discussed many counterexamples to the proposed concrete-to-abstract unidirectionality from German poetic aphorisms. Forceville (forthcoming) points out that “since, in advertising, metaphorical targets usually coincide with promoted products, the targets are depicted – and hence are necessarily concrete: a beer brand is depicted as a wine; an elegant watch as a butterfly, a close-fitting bathing suit as a dolphin’s tight and supple skin.”

In T. Arabic, the same abstract-to-concrete mappings discussed by Jäkel can be found as in expressions such as Sxaar-him janna (Their children are paradise: “Their children are well-behaved”), where janna (paradise) as a source domain is abstract and Sxaar (children) is concrete (Maalej, forthcoming). In this chapter, I show how challenges to directionality of embodiment as unidirectionality also has implications for the directionality of grounding.

Another dimension of embodiment is the fact that embodiment does not proceed just from the body, but also from the socio-cultural offloading itself onto the bodily and the linguistic. Johnson (1987: xvi) suggests that experience should be “understood in a very rich, broad sense as including basic perceptual, motor-program, emotional, historical, social, and linguistic dimensions.” Lakoff (1987: 12) situates conceptual embodiment “in a physical and social environment.” Thus, although they make provisions for the socio-cultural in experience, both Lakoff and Johnson do not seem to allow for enough maneuver for the socio-cultural to impregnate the bodily and the linguistic, owing to the concrete-abstract directionality of mappings they are committed to. Johnson (1987: 207) argues that “our structured experience is an organism-environment interaction in which both poles are altered and transformed through an ongoing historical process.” But the “organism-environment interaction” is a misnomer in light of the dominance given to the bodily over the non-bodily in Johnson’s (1987: xxxviii) “the body is in the mind”
Conceding that the biological nature of embodiment is a primeval dimension, the present chapter proposes also a socio-cultural basis for embodiment, thus postulating a dual way between the body of embodied cognition and the non-bodily (cultural). Together with Jäkel and Sinha and Jensen de López, the present author confirms that there are exceptions to unidirectionality and its theoretical underpinnings. These exceptions challenge not only the formulation of the embodiment hypothesis, but also Lakoff and Johnson’s companion formulation that the physiological body grounds cultural thought and never the reverse. Thus, these exceptions do not mean to invalidate the rule that embodiment exists, but that embodiment is better seen as bi-directional.

In Maalej (2004), I offered an extended view of embodiment on the basis of data about anger expressions in T. Arabic. In addition to actual physiological embodiment, I found that the conceptualization of anger relies on an important kind of embodiment that I tentatively called “cultural embodiment” which was differentiated into two classes: (i) culturally specific embodiment, which capitalizes upon a body part that is not actually involved in the physiology of the emotion in question, and (ii) culturally driven embodiment, where the expression of anger is physiologically embodied, but the basic-level category selected for the conceptualization of the emotion is culture driven. Although Lakoff (1987) and Kövecses (1995, 2000a-b, 2002) acknowledged a cultural grounding for emotions, the view of emotion they presented is dominated by physiological embodiment, whereby the emotions are actually the direct causes of their own conceptualization as the metonymy of THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN EMOTION STAND FOR THE EMOTION suggests. However, as Maalej (2004: 52) argued in connection with anger, “this explains only the portion of the emotion whose conceptualization comes as a result of a physical cause-effect relation.”

Cultural embodiment is not a misnomer, with culture and embodiment as part of an oxymoron. It is a kind of embodiment that offloads cultural phenomena onto the body and expressions of fear, thus describing cultural models/schemata that can be subsumed by metonymic, image-schematic, or metaphoric models. The cultural embodiment offered here is one kind of embodiment that was invited for cognitive linguistics: “What is missing from the psycholinguistic work, and from aspects of the work on metaphor in cognitive linguistics, is an explicit acknowledgment of culture and its important, perhaps defining, role in shaping embodiment and, consequently, metaphorical thought” (Gibbs, 1999: 153). And al-

2. Recently, Kövecses (2000b) proposed a schematic generic-level metaphor governing all emotions, namely, EMOTIONS ARE FORCES, under which specific-level instantiations are subsumed such as EMOTION IS INTERNAL PRESSURE, EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE, EMOTION IS FIRE, EMOTION IS A BURDEN, etc.
though Palmer (1996: 109) states that “the dance of culture and biology is delicate,”
the chapter will show how culture can also lead the waltz with biology and lan-
guage. The nearest formulation to what is defended in this chapter is Gibbs’ (1999:
153) view of the interaction between mind, body, and culture:

> Scholars cannot, and should not assume, that mind, body, and culture can somehow
> be independently portioned out of human behavior as it is only appropriate to study
> particular “interactions” between thought, language, and culture, respectively. The-
> ories of human conceptual systems should be inherently cultural in that the cogni-
> tion which occurs when the body meets the world is inextricably culturally-based.

The reason that people from the same community share more or less the same
conceptualizations is evidence that, although it is found in individual minds, cog-
nition is “a property of cultural groups,” which is an “emergent cultural cognition”
that is “heterogeneously distributed across the minds in a cultural group” (Sharifian,
forthcoming, emphases in original).

3. **Cultural embodiment**

For the purposes of the present chapter, the view of cultural embodiment that
Maalej (2004) previously proposed will be revised. Cultural embodiment, I argue,
is best seen as a gradient, featuring at one pole “physiologically realistic expres-
sions” (called “physiological embodiment” and treated as outside cultural embod-
iment in Maalej, 2004); at the opposite pole, I propose “culturally selective expres-
sions” (called “culturally specific embodiment” in Maalej, 2004). In the middle of
the gradient, I propose “culturally schematized expressions” (called “culturally
driven embodiment” in Maalej, 2004). I propose that these embodied expressions
mostly show interaction between culture, body, and language in this order, where-
by the body as a biological entity is, so to speak, hijacked by culture, to varying
degrees of figurative conceptualization, thus bending body and language to cul-
tural conceptualizations.

I take “physiologically realistic expressions” to be instances where the physio-
logical embodiment of semantic categories is most obvious, with language simply
profiling the physiologically embodied concepts, usually via metonymy. However,
the body part used in the conceptualization of fear is only thought to be associated
with and physiologically affected by the emotion in question. As Kövecses (1995:
184) demonstrated for anger, the account is physiology-based “only to the degree
to which the issue of embodiment plays a role in our understanding.” For instance,

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3. I owe some of these tentative appellations to Gary Palmer.
if it is almost physiologically universal that fear may interfere with normal blood circulation, it is not the case that this is profiled in the same way in different languages and cultures. Indeed, it may come as paleness, whiteness, yellowness, blueness, etc. depending on cultures, which is evidence that this type of embodiment is not merely physiology-based. “Culturally schematized expressions” are different than “physiologically realistic expressions,” in that the part of the body selected may or may not be known to be associated with fear, and its image schematic profile emerges according to imagined scenarios in the culture. For instance, one conceptualization of fear in T. Arabic profiles the heart as ascending to the mouth and remaining between the teeth, thus implicitly describing an image-schematic upward movement. “Culturally selective expressions” share with the “physiologically realistic expressions” the fact that a body part associated with fear is used. However, the former differ from the latter in profiling a body part in conjunction with a culturally specific category. For instance, yellowness in T. Arabic is profiled as “cottoning” (used as a verb) of the face.

3.1 Physiologically realistic expressions

Having physical bodies makes physiology available to humans in the conceptualization of their various experiences. But what is conceptualized as occurring to the body in profiling an emotion is not always veridical. Fear expressions in T. Arabic, for instance, use the part of the body that is usually thought to be affected by the emotion of fear, thus taking what is only an entrenched belief or cultural association for a reality in the conceptualization of fear as in the following examples:

(1)

(a) wijh-u  Sfaar  bi-l-fij3a
Face his yellow-PERF by the fright
His face turned yellow out of fright.
“His face lost its color.”

(b) wijh-u  laxlax  bi-l-fij3a
Face his pale-PERF by the fright
His face was pale out of fright.
“He almost fainted from fright.”

(c) š3ar  bidn-i  wqiff  bi-l-xawf
Hair [of] body my [it] stand up-PERF by the fear

4. The presentation of examples abides by the following pattern: the first line gives a transliteration of the T. Arabic conceptualization, the second the Arabic morpheme gloss, the third the English close translation, and the last line the English closest idiomatic equivalent.
The hair of my body stood up from fear.
“My hair stood on end from fear.”

(d) laHm-i qaš3ar bi-l-xawf
Flesh my shudder-PERF by the fear
My flesh shuddered from fear.
“It gave me goose bumps.”

(e) mSaarn-i daarit mi-l-fij3a
Guts my rotate-PERF from the fright
My guts reeled out of fright.
“I was about to have diarrhea from fear.”

The fact that the expressions include bi-l-xawf (by the fear), mi-l-fij3a (from the fright), bi-l-fij3a (by the fright) indicates that they are shared by other emotions such as happiness, sadness, embarrassment, etc. The expressions in (1a-e) select and profile parts of the body, namely, the face, the flesh, and the guts. According to folk theories of emotion, the state reported in (1a) is blood changing color in the face under the effect of fear. However, yellow is not the color that the face literally assumes in actual fear situations. In (1b), although the change in color is presupposed, the face is perceived as that of someone fainting. The physical correlates of emotion as reflected in “facial expression” have been used to suggest universal basic emotions (Ekman and co-workers, quoted in Lakoff, 1987: 38). As the two expressions in (1a-b) have to do with visual perception of the face, they are used to describe fear in others, since one cannot see oneself when one is under the influence of fear.

However, one can conceptualize fear with what one believes as occurring in and to one’s body as a result of fear. In (1c), the hair is said to be affected by fear, causing it to stand on end. Such an effect of fear on hair is talked about in many languages and cultures such as English (My hair stood on end), French (L’accident que j’ai vu m’a donné la chair de poule: The accident I witnessed gave me the goose flesh), etc. In (1d), fear is conceptualized as a change in physiology that can be felt in the flesh. The effect of fear on guts described in (1e) may also be part of physiological embodiment, where targets of fear sometimes may want to rush to the toilet as a result of a sudden shake-up to the body. This instance of conceptualization of fear is tied to a T. Arabic proverb whose substance is l-xawf yjarri l-jawf (fear causes diarrhea). All the foregoing examples suggest a cultural model of fear using physiology as a support for the conceptualization of fear to be captured in the conceptual metonymy, THE LIKELY PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN EMOTION STAND FOR THE EMOTION. LIKELY is used to hedge PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS, because it is not always veridical that what one uses in the conceptualization of fear is an actual result of it.
Interestingly, hyperbole can be used to enhance the force of metonymies realizing the cultural conceptualization of fear as can be seen in the following examples:

(2)

(a) yday-ya txabblit mi-l-xawf
Hands my entangle-PERF from the fear
My hands were entangled out of fear.
“I had no control over my movements.”

(b) id-dam jmid fi 3ruqi mi-l-fij3a
Blood coagulate-PERF in veins my by the fright
Blood coagulated in my veins from fright.
“Blood froze in my veins out of fear.”

(c) qalb-i skitt
heart-my silence-PER
My heart was silent.
“My heart stopped beating.”

The expressions of fear in (2a-c) illustrate further the mismatch between the expression of fear and the involvement of the body profiled in physiological change. The expression in (2a), helped by the verb *txabbil* (to get entangled), shows lack of control over one’s hands as a result of fear. The verb is borrowed from tailoring, and used in connection with threads or wires when they become entangled. This metaphorical entanglement of two hands is a counterfactual hyperbole. Example (2b) selects blood and makes it freeze in the veins while example (2c) selects the heart and makes it stop beating. The foregoing examples suggest the conceptual metaphor FEAR IS A FORCE (Kövecses, 2000: 23), where the metaphor is strengthened by hyperbole. The force of fear judged by its effects as exemplified in (2a,b,c) is culturally exaggerated, because hands simply cannot be entangled, blood does not clot in the veins, and the heart does not stop beating as a result of fear. Examples (2a-c) can be subsumed under the conceptual metonymy FEAR IS INABILITY TO MOVE/ACT/THINK. Thus, even these physiologically realistic expressions, which may be thought to be cases of actual physiological embodiment, are simply inaccurately or hyperbolically so.

### 3.2 Culturally schematized expressions

The physiologically realistic embodiment builds on beliefs deeply entrenched through the use of a given fear expression in correlation with a given body part. However, culturally schematized expressions of fear in T. Arabic describe what is
schematically imagined to occur to the parts of the body as a result of fear. Thus, the cultural specificity of this type of embodiment does not come from the use of metaphor, metonymy, or image schema, but from the imagined scenario that the image schema constructs. In line with cognitive linguistics’ concern with imagina-
tive structures, Palmer (1996: 36) proposed that “cultural linguistics is primarily concerned not with how people talk about some objective reality, but with how they talk about the world that they themselves imagine.” The following examples illustrate this claim:

(3)

(a) qalb-i fi snaan-i bi-l-xawf
   Heart my in teeth my by the fear
   My heart is between my teeth out of fear.
   “My heart jumped in/out of my throat.”

(b) TayyaH-l-i qalb-i bi-l-fij3a
   [He] drop-PERF to me heart my by the fright
   He caused my heart to fall out of fright.
   “He caused my heart to drop.”

(c) habbaT-l-i/TayyaH-l-i l-ma fi-rkeyb-i
   [He] drop-PERF to me the water in knees my
   He dropped water into my knees.
   “My knees turned to Jello/jelly.”

(d) qalb-i xrajj min blaaS-tu
   Heart-my leave-PERF from place-his
   My heart left its place.
   “My heart is not in the right place.”

(e) qalb-i sqiTT
   Heart-my fall-PERF
   My heart fell.
   “I nearly died.”

All the examples in (3a-e) above are governed by an image-schematic structure. Gibbs (1999: 154) rightly argues that “even image schemas, which arise from re-
curring embodied experiences […] might very well have a strong cultural compo-
nent to them, especially in terms of which aspects of embodied experience are viewed as particularly salient and meaningful in people’s lives.”

There are two dimensions of containment in (3a). The indisputable physiological containment is described by the mouth as a container for the teeth and the body as a container for the heart. However, this is not the whole story. The cultural import of the image schema in (3a) has to do with the ascension (UP) image schema, where
the heart is understood to ascend to the mouth, with the teeth saliently functioning as constrictors of blood circulation in the heart and perhaps controlling the pulse in gripping the heart. This imagined scenario of fear with the help of the embodied image schema is certainly not physiological, but culturally constructed. What makes (3a) typically cultural is the way the image schema is profiled by emphasizing the teeth as gripping the heart. However, the displacement of the heart is not unique to T. Arabic. The English idiom, My heart is in my mouth, though about anxiety and nervousness, does describe the same ascension schema. In (3b), the heart falls out of fear, which is the opposite movement (DOWN). Needless to say also that the heart falling from its place is culturally imagined and constructed. It should be noted that in the case of fear both UP/DOWN ARE BAD. One could, thus, conclude that owing to the fact that fear is a negative emotion, fear is bad to the heart. The heart must be anchored in its position, not UP not DOWN. And it is precisely the way culture manipulates the body through the UP and DOWN schemas that makes this type of embodiment of fear cultural.

In (3c), the knees are the target of fear, profiling it as a DOWN image schema. To speakers of T. Arabic, it is a commonly held belief that what enables our knees to flex is a liquid substance that oils them. However, in our folk model of medicine and fear, if you have “water” in your eyes and knees, you are unable to see or walk, respectively. The schema is metaphorically extended as FEAR IS A DISEASE and its derivative FEAR IS INABILITY TO MOVE. In (3d), however, the heart describes an IN-OUT image schema, which assumes that when our body is not the container of its own contents (here, the heart), something is affecting it. In (3e), the heart describes a DOWN image schema similar to the movement in (3b). Although the three motions described for the heart in (3a-e) are not of the same nature, they are not in contradiction. As Palmer (1996: 66) characterized them, image schemas are “intermediate abstractions that are readily imagined, perhaps as iconic images, and clearly related to physical (embodied) or social experiences.” It is interesting to note that English may schematize fear as FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER as in The sight filled her with fear. Imagining the body as a container filled with fear has nothing physiological to it, but the English culture imagines fear to be a fluid filling the body, which is also only culturally veridical. Thus, cultural imagination invents the way the body and language should work in the conceptualization of fear in both English and T. Arabic.

3.3 Culturally selective expressions

Culturally schematized conceptualizations create through image-schematic structures cultural configurations of fear that have been shown to involve no actual physiological processes. The similarity between culturally schematized and cultur-
ally selective expressions is that both use imaginative structures. However, while the former make use of image schemas (and their metaphoric extensions) to create a specific imagined configuration for fear, the latter capitalize on metaphor and capture it in a cultural category. The following examples illustrate culturally selective expressions of fear:

(4)

(a) wijh-u saffif bi-l-fij3a

Face his turn-PERF the color of the hull of a grain of wheat/barley by the fright

His face turned the color of the hull of a grain of wheat out of fright.

“His face was white out of fright.”

(b) wijh-u qaTTan bi-l-fij3a

Face his [it] cotton-PERF by the fright

His face turned [the color of] cotton out of fright.

“His face was white from fright.”

Palmer (submitted) argues that “even embodied categories may be shaped by the architecture of dwellings and other material products of culture.” It can be added that natural products of the culture may also have a say in the conceptualization of experience. The expressions in (4a) and (4b) are parallel to their physiologically realistic counterparts in (1a-b). The similarity between (1a-b) and (4a-b) is that the two sets use the face as a locus of fear. However, while (1a) and (1b) use more culture-neutral collocates to conceptualize fear in the face (sfaar: to turn yellow; laxlax: to show signs of fainting, respectively), (4a) and (4b) use more culture-specific categories, namely, saffif (to turn the color of the hull of a grain of wheat/barley) and qaTTan (to turn the color of cotton), respectively.

To show how a cultural artifact impacts the body and language, consider another example from T. Arabic:

(5)

saqay-ya tHaSdit mi-l-xawf

Feet my FEM-scythe-PASS-PERF from the fear

My feet were scythed from fear.

“I was paralyzed with fear.”

This association of fear as a reaper with a scythe is a culturally-driven conceptualization of fear arising from how a cultural icon has become inscribed into the language, namely, using scythe as a verb in T. Arabic. Fear is conceptualized according to the conceptual metaphor FEAR IS A REAPER. One of the entailments of this metaphor is inability to move as a result of the grim reaper (fear) that para-
lyzes the fearful person and cuts him/her down with a scythe, making him/her fall to the ground as a bunch of wheat or barley does. This is an instance of a cultural icon—a scythe—lexicalized in habitual language.

Another, but different, example of culturally-driven conceptualization of fear can be found in the following instance:

\[(6)\]
\[
\text{qalb-i walla ydiq bi-l-fij3a}
\]

Heart my become-PERF beat by the fright
My heart started beating out of fright.
“Fear accelerated my heart beat.”

Although it is proper for the heart to beat while one is alive, the example in (6) above presupposes that in normal circumstances the heart does not beat. Presumably, the body here as represented by the heart seems to have been vanquished even to play its basic physiological role of beating as hearts normally do. The phenomenological, felt sense of the physiological heartbeat is that it “starts” when it beats faster due to fear—in other words, when we become conscious of it, and that’s what we metaphorize as “starting,” i.e. fear. The heartbeat is culturally started in the heart when one is filled with fear, thus turning the physiological occurrence of a heart beating into a cultural metaphor for fear in heartbeat terms. The fear-as-heart-beat dispenses with the heartbeat as a physiological necessity, profiling it as a typically cultural event. The fear-as-scythe and fear-as-heartbeat metaphors argue for a cultural to physiological directionality, and show that the metaphors are modified in relation to their “basic-levelness” in the Tunisian culture. The scythe becomes a cultural instrument in the hands of fear for reaping external beings while the heart beating stops doing so in normal individuals and starts beating when fear is authorized by the culture to make it beat.

4. Practical implications

As pointed out earlier, the existence of counterexamples to the unidirectionality of mappings has a theoretical consequence for the scope of embodiment, and, therefore, the formulation of the embodiment hypothesis, which should be more accommodating to include not only the physiological body as grounding cultural thought, but the total reverse of this as evidenced by Jäkel, Sinha and Jensen de López, and the study of expressions of fear in this chapter.

However, several areas can be potential recipients of the practical implications of culturally embodied metaphor. One important area of application is TEFL. Tunisian students are likely to grasp most conceptual structures behind linguistic
metaphors in English, but they are more likely to produce calques from T. Arabic if asked, for instance, to express themselves in speech or writing in English. Such a situation is likely to persist unless students are taught to recognize cultural differences in conceptual metaphors, metonymies, and image-schematic structures (Bowers, 1992; Deignan et al., 1997). Kövecses (2002: 183) offers a useful scale of cross-cultural variation in the use of metaphor and metonymy in terms of variation in the range, elaborations, and emphasis of conceptual metaphors and metonymies for a given target.

For instance, Kövecses (2000b: 23) documents fear in English as conceptualized as FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (The sight filled her with fear), FEAR IS A HIDDEN ENEMY (Fear slowly crept up on him), FEAR IS A TORMENTOR (My mother was tormented by fear), FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING (He was haunted by fear), FEAR IS AN ILLNESS (Jill was sick with fright), FEAR IS INSANITY (Jack was insane with fear), THE SUBJECT OF FEAR IS A DIVIDED SELF (I was beside myself with fear), FEAR IS AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE (Fear took hold of me), FEAR IS A BURDEN (Fear weighed heavily on them), FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE (She was engulfed by panic), FEAR IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR (His actions were dictated by fear), etc. English and T. Arabic seem to differ in the range of conceptual metaphors, metonymies, and image-schemas. For instance, in English FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER as in “The sight filled her with fear” but also FEAR IS BEING SURROUNDED FROM THE OUTSIDE as in “be overcome by/with fear.” In T. Arabic, however, fear is simply a CONTAINER as in “X is living in fear.” Conversely, consider the situation where the teacher is a native of English and the student is a non-native. Knowledge of the student’s culture would enable the teacher to target possible areas of confusion for their students, thereby minimizing interference and cross-cultural miscommunication. Left to her own devices, the Tunisian learner is likely to produce forms such as “I have fear” instead of the more English “Fear took hold of me.”

Translation studies is another potential area which can benefit from metaphor studies of emotion in general. Since metaphor is grounded in culture (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Quinn, 1987; Kövecses, 2002, 2005), attention should be drawn to the risk of falling into literal traps. Knowledge of conceptual metaphors across languages and cultures is more predictable for someone versed in the findings of cognitive sciences that are adopted by the contemporary theory of metaphor. However, it is more difficult to aim at knowing the linguistic categories realizing these conceptual metaphors. For that, both translators and students of translation should be alerted to the different conceptual-linguistic configurations. Hiraga (1991: 151–161), for instance, offers four different combinations of conceptual metaphor and metonymic expressions:
Chapter 6. The embodiment of fear expressions in Tunisian Arabic

i. similar metaphorical concepts and similar metaphorical expressions
ii. similar metaphorical concepts but different metaphorical expressions
iii. different metaphorical concepts but similar metaphorical expressions
iv. different metaphorical concepts and different metaphorical expressions

Concerning (i), Hiraga gives the example of TIME IS MONEY as shared by American English and Japanese, and realized by the same metaphoric expressions. With regard to (ii), she mentions the fact that American English and Japanese agree on LIFE IS A SPORT, but disagree on the kind of game in the realization of the conceptual metaphor. Thus, while the Americans have baseball jargon, the Japanese allow sumo words to realize the conceptual metaphor. Regarding (iii), she shows how American English and Japanese share metaphoric expressions of sweetness, but in American English SWEETNESS IS GOOD while in Japanese SWEETNESS IS BAD. Concerning the last combination, she shows that American English and Japanese do not share conceptual and linguistic metaphors about the conceptualization of ideas. In American English, IDEAS ARE IN THE MIND while in Japanese IDEAS ARE IN HARA (BELLY).

Based on Hungarian students’ translations into English of the TIME IS MONEY metaphor, Kövecses (2005: 141) draws a profile of Hungarian-English translations of metaphor as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word form</th>
<th>Literal meaning</th>
<th>Figurative meaning</th>
<th>Conceptual metaphor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Most frequent case</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Less frequent case</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>Different</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Least frequent case</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>Different</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Literary works (everyday speech)</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>Different</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the T. Arabic data presented in this chapter, it can be argued that the order of the possibilities offered by Kövecses does not strictly apply to T. Arabic if compared to English. Thus, there is need to consider other languages and cultures to see whether the same patterns hold for different languages in translating.

The last, but not least, area of application is linguistic typology. Linguistic typologies are well furnished mainly for syntax (Foley and Van Valin, 1985; Dryer, 1991; Comrie, 1998) and semantics (Meseguer, 1991; Ohori, 1995). However, typology in the cognitive persuasion is still less studied. Although undertaking such cognitive semantic typological studies is challenging in terms of time, having such typologies may facilitate the job of teachers and researchers alike.
5. Conclusion

Three patterns of embodied expressions of fear in T. Arabic and their correlative cultural models have been isolated in this chapter. First, the cultural model called “physiologically realistic expressions” and based on folk physiology and captured in the conceptual metonymy, THE LIKELY PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN EMOTION STAND FOR THE EMOTION, which profiles fear in various ways ranging from the face becoming yellow(ish) or shrinking, the hair standing on end, having goose bumps, to the guts experiencing some sort of shaking. Second, the model called “culturally schematized expressions,” which is based on the UP/DOWN, IN/OUT, FORCE, and CONTAINER image schemas and their metaphoric extensions in UP IS BAD and DOWN IS BAD. Third, the model called “culturally selective expressions” and based on cultural metaphors such as FEAR IS A REAPER, which metaphorically profiles the body part involved using a category showing cultural specificity.

These types of embodied expressions of fear have been found to be culturally embodied in a sense that departs from mainstream embodiment in more than one respect. First, cultural embodiment is not restricted to metaphor; metonymy and image schema are important carriers of cultural imagination. Second, culturally schematized and culturally selective expressions (more than physiologically realistic expressions) show a cultural to physiological direction of embodiment, where what is said to happen to the part of the body profiled is culturally determined. Third, although Lakoff, Johnson, and Kövecses acknowledge a place for the socio-cultural in experience and talk about interactions between mind, body, and experience, they proceed from the physiological through the psychological to the socio-cultural. However, like Sinha and Jensen de Lopez (2000), who found that cultural behaviors shape habitual patterns of language, the current research on T. Arabic reveals that cultural artifacts can impact our physiological experience and language.

Notwithstanding the dominance of concrete/abstract mappings, embodiment as consisting of the body-in-the-mind has, thus, been extended to include the culture-in-the-body. This extension requires a bi-directionality for embodiment, instead of the unidirectionality of mappings. Emotions such as fear can be used as a starting point for teaching about the relations between culture, body, and language across languages and cultures. Teachers would need to understand that both bodily physiology and cultural articulations of bodily physiology play a role in conceptualization. They would also need to understand that differing cultural models of physiology guide and constrain the ways in which imaginative structures emerge. Different cultures may emphasize bodily physiology more than its cultural articulations in conceptualizing experience, and cultural constructs as used in fear expressions in T. Arabic can be used as facilitators of language teaching and cross-cultural communication,
and as incitement to study more languages and cultures for a cultural variation and typological programs to emerge for the cognitive linguistic community.

References


CHAPTER 7

Semantic primes and cultural scripts in language learning and intercultural communication

Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka

Because meaning is fundamental to language and culture, a practical technique for describing meanings and transposing them across languages has multiple practical applications. This chapter demonstrates several applications of the NSM approach to semantics: as a guide to core vocabulary in the early L2 syllabus, as a means of writing cultural scripts and interpreting cultural key words for language learners, and as the basis for a culture-neutral international auxiliary language. Illustrative material is drawn from English, Russian, and Korean.

1. Introduction

This chapter explores how the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) developed by the authors and colleagues can be applied in practical situations in language teaching, intercultural education and training, and in international communication. We will proceed without any initial exposition of the NSM theory, introducing the required theoretical and empirical material along the way. This can be readily done if we take as our starting point the notions of core vocabulary and procedural vocabulary, as used in applied linguistics.

2. Semantic primes as “core vocabulary” in the L2 curriculum

The notion of core or basic vocabulary depends on the idea that some meanings are simpler than others; and that the simpler meanings are necessary and useful in
order to explain and to grasp more complex meanings. In his book *Vocabulary*, Michael McCarthy (1990) introduces the concept as follows:

The idea that there might be a core or basic vocabulary of words at the heart of any language is quite an appealing one to language educators, for if we could isolate that vocabulary we could equip learners with a survival kit of core words that could be used in virtually any situation... (McCarthy 1990: 49).

The concept of procedural vocabulary (Widdowson 1983: 92–95) is similar, but with a different emphasis, namely, the role that certain relatively simple words and concepts play in the process of making sense of other, more complex, words and concepts. The minimal procedural vocabulary is “the simplest lexis of paraphrase and explanation” (McCarthy 1990); that is, a vocabulary of words for making sense, for negotiating the meanings, of other words.

Over the years there have been many attempts to clarify these concepts, and to identify core or procedural vocabulary for practical purposes, using a variety of assumptions and techniques. Carter and McCarthy (1988) review two such attempts: C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards’ work in the 1930s on Basic English, which was derived from conceptual analysis and practical experience, and Michael West’s (1953) *General Service List*, one of the first attempts to use word frequency as a guide. By contemporary standards both projects were confused on certain basic points, e.g., not taking adequate account of the fact that many common words are polysemous, i.e., have multiple related meanings.¹ Perhaps more importantly, neither Ogden and Richards, nor West, ever really resolved the conflict between rival criteria for “basicness” or “coreness”: simplicity and versatility, on the one hand, versus raw frequency, on the other. Moreover, they also had recourse to other proposed criteria, such as “native speaker instinct”, non-culture specificity, and the existence of antonyms and a wide range of polysemic senses (cf. Carter 1987).

More recent times have seen the advent of large-scale corpus linguistics, and the adoption of “controlled vocabulary” by leading major dictionaries, such as the Longman Dictionary and COBUILD. But there has still been no real agreement on the criteria for identifying core vocabulary, or even on the question of whether there is any ultimate core vocabulary in a principled sense.

This is where the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) research program has a special contribution to make. For over 30 years, Anna Wierzbicka and colleagues have been seeking to identify an ultimate core vocabulary—a vocabulary of simple basic concepts or “semantic primes”—using a single criterion: reductive paraphrase.

¹. In any case, as often pointed out, the notions of ‘word’ and ‘word frequency’ are not as simple as they may seem. Really the appropriate unit of analysis is not the word (or word-form), but rather the lexical unit, i.e., a pairing of a form and a meaning (cf. Bogaards 1996: 369–371). One cannot determine the frequency of particular lexical units by simple inspection or statistics in corpora.
Chapter 7. Semantic primes and cultural scripts

Table 1. Table of semantic primes – English exponents* (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantives:</th>
<th>I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE, SOMETHING/THING, BODY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relational substantives:</td>
<td>KIND, PART</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determiners:</td>
<td>THIS, THE SAME, OTHER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantifiers:</td>
<td>ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MANY/MUCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluators:</td>
<td>GOOD, BAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptors:</td>
<td>BIG, SMALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental/experiential predicates:</td>
<td>THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech:</td>
<td>SAY, WORDS, TRUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions, events,</td>
<td>DO, HAPPEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>movement, contact:</td>
<td>MOVE, TOUCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location, existence,</td>
<td>BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS/EXIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>possession, specification:</td>
<td>HAVE, BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and death:</td>
<td>LIVE, DIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time:</td>
<td>WHEN/TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space:</td>
<td>WHERE/PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIDE, INSIDE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logical concepts:</td>
<td>NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensifier, augmentor:</td>
<td>VERY, MORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarity:</td>
<td>LIKE/WAY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - exponents of primes can have other polysemeic meanings which differ from language to language—they can have combinatorial variants (allolexes) • they can have different morphosyntactic properties (including word-class) in different languages • they have well-specified syntactic (combinatorial) properties

They have been attempting to discover, by trial and error lexical-conceptual analysis, the smallest set of basic concepts in terms of which all other words and concepts can be explicated; literally, “the simplest lexis of paraphrase and explanation”. The fruit of this research can be laid out in summary form in Table 1. On the present picture, it appears that the number of semantic primes (semantic elements, analogous in some respects to the chemical elements) is in the mid-sixties. Just as the vast proliferation of chemical compounds are the product of combinations of a smallish number of chemical elements, so the vast proliferation of possible lexical meanings in the world’s languages are the product of this set of shared semantic elements—meanings such as: I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING, and PEOPLE; DO, HAPPEN, THINK, SAY, KNOW, and WANT; GOOD and BAD, BIG and SMALL; THIS, WHEN, WHERE, BECAUSE, CAN, IF, NOT, and LIKE.2

2. The research bibliography of NSM semantics is extensive, including literally hundreds of studies and taking in languages of Australia, Africa, the Pacific, East Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as English and other European languages. This work spans the domains of lexical semantics, grammatical semantics, and cultural pragmatics. A detailed bibliography can be found at the following website: http://www.une.edu.au/LCL/index.php
Research on a wide range of languages suggests that semantic primes have linguistic exponents, as words or word-like elements, in all languages (Goddard and Wierzbicka eds, 1994, 2002). Table 2 gives some examples. Furthermore, for each semantic prime, research has identified certain characteristic grammatical properties—patterns of combination, valency and complementation—and these properties also appear to be universal (Goddard 2002a). To give a more concrete impression of what is involved, Table 3 below summarises the grammatical frames for some predicate primes. The prediction of NSM researchers, so far borne out by cross-linguistic investigation, is that in all languages it will be possible to express meanings equivalent to those with DO, HAPPEN, and SAY in the specific syntactic contexts set out in Table 3. Perhaps not surprisingly, semantically generic words like DO, HAPPEN, SAY, KNOW, THINK, etc. can be used to “carve out” whole areas of the lexicogrammar. For example, Lock’s (1996) Functional English Grammar, which takes a Hallidayan approach, uses headings such as (in part): ‘doing and happening,’ ‘seeing, liking, thinking, wanting, and saying,’ ‘being and having.’ NSM researchers are developing

Table 2. Exponents of a selection of semantic primes in five unrelated languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Malay</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Yankunytjatjara</th>
<th>Ewe</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>buat</td>
<td>hacer</td>
<td>palyani</td>
<td>w</td>
<td>suru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THINK</td>
<td>fikir</td>
<td>pensar</td>
<td>kulini</td>
<td>süsü/</td>
<td>omou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANT</td>
<td>mahu</td>
<td>querer</td>
<td>mukuringanyi</td>
<td>dí</td>
<td>hosii/-tai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOOD</td>
<td>baik</td>
<td>bueno</td>
<td>palya</td>
<td>nyó</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BECAUSE</td>
<td>sebab</td>
<td>porque</td>
<td>-nguru</td>
<td>ta/ŋůt</td>
<td>kara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF</td>
<td>kalau</td>
<td>si:</td>
<td>tjinguru</td>
<td>né</td>
<td>moshi + -ba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Syntactic frames for three semantic primes

DO: X does something
    X does something to someone [patient]
    X does something to someone with something [patient + instrument]

HAPPEN: something happens
    something happens to someone [undergoer]
    something happens somewhere [locus]

SAY: X says something
    X says something to someone [addressee]
    X says something about something [locutionary topic]
    X says: “— — —” [direct speech]
a systematic approach to comparing and contrasting the grammatical organisation of languages on a semantic basis (Goddard and Wierzbicka eds, 2002). This, however, is an aspect which cannot be pursued here.

The mini-vocabulary and the mini-grammar of the natural semantic metalanguage represent, in a very real sense, the intersection of the set of all languages. This means that the same “mini-language” can be used as a kind of conceptual lingua franca for investigating and explaining meanings across languages and cultures, as well as within any single language and culture. We will expand on this in Section 2, but first we want to draw out some of the implications for language teaching and language learning.

Clearly, semantic primes have major implications for the lexical syllabus of early L2 teaching. By definition, they are the minimum procedural vocabulary – the set of concepts which are maximally useful and versatile for understanding and explaining other words. Another consideration, perhaps less obvious, flows from the assumption that semantically prime meanings should all be pre-existing in the learner’s L1 mental lexicon. Unlike L2-specific meanings, therefore, they should be easily recognisable and easy to learn. Additionally, along with the core vocabulary of primes there is a “core grammar” which could and should form part of the early syllabus.

Because exponents of semantic primes tend to be high-frequency items, one might think that they would “naturally” find their way into the early lexical syllabus, but this appears not to be the case. We sampled three introductory textbooks intended for English-speaking students: the German Deutsch Heute (Moeller et al. 2005), The New Practical Chinese Reader textbook (NOCFL 2004), and Korean 1 (Language Education Institute, Seoul National University). In the first 500 vocabulary items, the number of semantic primes presented ranged from about 30 (in Korean 1) to about 40 (in Deutsch Heute). That is, even in the “best” text (from this point of view), fully one-third of the prime inventory was not introduced in the early lexical syllabus. Remarkably, to our way of thinking, none of the three
texts included the primes like, the same, happen, there is, part of kind among their first 500 words, even though one would have thought these to be extremely “high value” words for an early language learner. The Chinese and Korean texts, which each introduced less than half the prime inventory in the early syllabus, omitted items such as maybe, other and because, as well as providing very incomplete coverage of the temporal and spatial domains. These brief observations obviously raise many issues which would reward extended study, beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it seems sufficiently clear that language teachers and curriculum designers would be well advised to re-consider their early lexical syllabi with a view to including all or most semantic primes in the early stages.

We now move to other ways in which semantic primes can be useful in culturally informed language teaching (cf. Kramsch 1993; Liddicoat and Crozet eds, 2000; Lo Bianco, Liddicoat and Crozet 1999) and in intercultural communication. This might seem paradoxical, for semantic primes (meanings like do, happen, say, one, two, all, and so on) are in themselves supremely un-interesting from a cultural point of view. In fact, however, the “culture-neutrality” of semantic primes offers a solution to a serious but often unrecognised problem in culture studies, namely, the problem of terminological ethnocentrism (Goddard 2004a). This occurs when complex, culture-specific words of one language/culture (e.g., English) are used as descriptive tools for analysing the meanings, values, assumptions of another language/culture—thereby imposing an inaccurate and inauthentic “outsider perspective”.

For example, if we simply gloss the Malay word hormat as ‘respect’, or the German word Angst as ‘fear’, or the Japanese word omoiyari as ‘empathy’, we are necessarily distorting the Malay, German, and Japanese concepts (cf. Goddard 2000; Wierzbicka 1999: 123–167; Travis 1998). The situation does not improve if, in place of a single gloss, we produce a list; e.g., hormat ‘respect, deference, proper politeness’. English-specific analytical tools are necessarily blunt tools for cross-cultural analysis. The heavily culture-laden vocabulary of other languages cannot
be adequately explained by any simple procedure of glossing into their apparent English translation equivalents. What we have to do is find ways of “unpackaging” the conceptual content in terms which are both precise and non-ethnocentric. This, of course, is where semantic primes come in. Because they are maximally simple and because they are shared between languages, they can be used to explain complex language-specific and culture-specific meanings in maximum detail and clarity, and without terminological ethnocentrism.

A similar problem arises in descriptions of discourse and culture; for example, if discourse styles are described using English-specific descriptors such as ‘indirect’, ‘formal’, or ‘polite’, or if cultures are described using abstract sociological parameters such as ‘collectivist vs. individualist’, ‘high-context vs. low-context’, ‘high power distance vs. low power distance’, etc. (cf. especially Wierzbicka 2003[1991]). The ethnocentrism is inherent in choosing terms of description which do not have equivalents in the language being described. The cultural scripts approach, which can be regarded as the pragmatic “sister theory” to NSM semantics, provides an alternative non-ethnocentric approach.

3. Cultural scripts and intercultural communication

The term ‘cultural scripts’ refers to a technique for articulating cultural norms, values, and practices using the NSM metalanguage of semantic primes as the medium of description (Wierzbicka 1996a; Goddard and Wierzbicka eds, 2004). Because the simple words and grammatical patterns of NSM have equivalents in all languages, cultural scripts are accessible to both cultural insiders and to cultural outsiders alike. The cultural scripts technique is one of the main modes of description of “ethnopragmatics” (cf. Goddard 2004a, ed., 2006), i.e., the quest to understand speech practices from the perspective of cultural insiders. For this purpose, the techniques of cross-cultural semantics are equally essential, because to understand speech practices in terms which make sense to the people concerned, we must be able to understand the meanings of the relevant culturally important words—words for local values, social categories, speech-acts, and so on (Wierzbicka 2003[1991], 1997). Despite its tightly controlled vocabulary and syntax, the NSM metalanguage is surprisingly flexible and capable of capturing small nuances of cultural meaning.

In its general orientation and “stance”, the cultural scripts approach has a lot in common with the ethnography of communication and with aspects of cultural psychology (Hymes 1962; Gumperz and Hymes eds, 1986; Shweder 1993). Its primary distinguishing characteristic is its improved methodology of representation, based on empirically established semantic primes. A secondary distinguishing
characteristic, more a matter of degree than an absolute difference, is the high importance placed on linguistic evidence. Aside from the semantics of cultural key words, other kinds of linguistic evidence which can be particularly revealing of cultural norms and values include: common sayings and proverbs, frequent collocations, conversational routines and varieties of formulaic or semi-formulaic speech, discourse particles and interjections, and terms of address and reference.


Cultural scripts exist at different levels of generality, and may relate to different aspects of thinking, speaking, and behaviour. We will illustrate with some relatively high-level scripts (sometimes termed “master scripts”) from Anglo, Russian, and Korean cultures. High-level scripts such as these are often closely associated with core cultural values. Although they are not directly about interaction as such, they articulate broad cultural themes which are typically played out in detail by way of whole families of related speech-practices, which themselves can be captured in detail by means of more specific scripts.

Script [A] is arguably a master script of Anglo culture, expressing a cultural preference for something like personal autonomy (Wierzbicka 2003[1991], 2006a). It is associated with the Anglo cultural key word freedom (and free).

[A] an Anglo cultural script connected with “personal autonomy”

people think like this:
when a person does something, it is good if this person can think like this:
“I am doing this because I want to do it”

4. Many scripts are hinged around evaluative components: ‘it is good if – ’. Evaluative components can also take the form ‘it is not good if – ’; ‘it is bad if – ’; ‘it is not bad if – ’; etc.; or other variants such as ‘it can be good if – ’ and ‘it can be bad if – ’. Another kind of framing component, useful for other scripts and in other contexts, concerns people’s perceptions of what they can and can’t do: ‘I can say (think, do, etc.) – ’ and ‘I can’t say (think, do, etc.) – ’. Lower-level, more specific, scripts are often introduced by ‘when’-components and ‘if’-components, representing relevant aspects of social context.
Many important Anglo speech practices flow from this script and others allied to it—above all, the avoidance of direct or "bare" imperatives and the existence of a range of alternative strategies, such as the prolific interrogative imperatives so characteristic of English, and common “suggestive” formulas, such as You might like to..., Perhaps you could..., and I would suggest.... Other related phenomena include relative avoidance of the performative use of ask (cf. *I ask you...) and of pleading, begging, and other modes of “insistent asking”, and the existence of common disclaimer formulas, such as It’s up to you, You don’t have to, Only if you want, and so on. Having regard to the strongly negative impression that direct imperatives can create in Anglo culture, Wierzbicka (2006a) goes so far as to say:

The avoidance of the imperative in modern English and the development of an extended class of interrogative directives (so-called ‘wh-imperatives’, e.g., ‘could you/would you do X’) is a linguistic phenomenon whose cultural and linguistic significance can hardly be overestimated. It is a phenomenon which should be the subject of the first lesson in acculturation taught to every immigrant to an English-speaking country… (Wierzbicka 2006a).

Ethnopragmatic description of Anglo English is a pressingly urgent task, for in both scholarly and general circles there is a tendency to regard English, especially in its role as an international language, as culturally and pragmatically neutral. Nothing could be further from the truth: in its lexicon and grammar, and in its ethnopragmatic norms and values, English carries as much cultural baggage as any other language (Wierzbicka 2006b). We will return to this issue in Section 3.

While not denying the continuities and consistencies in Anglo English, it is also important to acknowledge and to document local cultural variations in national and regional varieties of English, such as in Australian English, British English, and American English. There can be significant differences between these varieties, which can be, and often are, the cause of intercultural miscommunication and cross-talk. (The same applies, incidentally, to other “big” languages, such as Spanish, where there are significant differences between Standard (Castilian) Spanish and the Spanish(es) of Latin America.) Even more significant differences, of course, exist in “linguacultures” such as that of Singapore English, which employ varieties of English infused with values and practices altogether outside the Anglo tradition (Wong 2004a, 2004b, 2006). Space does not permit us to pursue these matters here.

Script [B] is arguably a master script of Russian culture, expressing a cultural endorsement of, roughly speaking, an “expressive” stance in speech and action, and linked with the Russian key word iskrennost’ (roughly, ‘sincerity’) (Wierzbicka 2002a).
Script [B] is one of a family of Russian cultural scripts which help explain and motivate the characteristically Russian preference for and appreciation of frankness of expression, uninhibited by concerns as to whether the thoughts and feelings expressed are confrontational, negative or socially unacceptable. Linguistic manifestations include various particles, interjections and response expressions (such as Nepravda! ‘Untruth’, Ty ne prav ‘You are wrong’, Da net ‘Emphatically no!’), and the high frequency in Russian of words expressing extreme moral evaluation, such as podlec, negodaj, merzavec ‘scoundrel, base person’ and blagorodnyj ‘noble, lofty’.

Societies are of course heterogeneous, and not every member of Anglo and Russian cultures would accept or endorse scripts [A] and [B], respectively. However, the claim is that even those who do not personally identify with the content of such scripts are nonetheless familiar with them, i.e., that they form part of the interpretative backdrop to discourse and social behaviour in their own particular cultural contexts.

Just as these two cultural scripts can be portrayed in English NSM, so they can equally well be portrayed in Russian NSM, as in [A1] and [A2] below. The scripts will therefore “work” equally well on both sides of the cultural fence: to help English speakers articulate their own Anglo cultural attitudes and to recognise how these differ from characteristic Russian attitudes; and equally, to help Russians articulate Russian cultural attitudes and to recognise how they differ from Anglo attitudes. This can be done in language which is culturally neutral.

[A1] an Anglo cultural script connected with “personal autonomy”

ljudi dumajut tak:
kogda čelovek čto-to delaet, xorošo, esli ětot čelovek možet dumat’ tak:
“ja delaju ěto potomu, čto ja xoču ěto delat”

[B2] a Russian cultural script connected with “expressiveness”

ljudi dumajut tak:
xorošo, esli čelovek xočet, čtoby drugie ljudi znali, čto ětot čelovek dumaat
xorošo, esli čelovek xočet, čtoby drugie ljudi znali, čto ětot čelovek čuvstvuet

To take an example from farther afield, script [C] can be regarded as one of the master scripts of Korean culture, capturing attitudes connected with yeyuy (roughly, ‘deference, decorum’). It applies in particular to interactions with noin (roughly,
'respected old people'), and people from other highly regarded groups, such as teachers (Yoon 2004).

[C]  
a Korean cultural script connected with "deference"
person think like this:
when I am with some people, I have to think like this:
"this person is not someone like me
this person is someone above me
because I am with this person now I cannot do some things, I cannot say some things, I cannot say some words
if this person says to me: 'I want you to do something', I can't say to this person: 'I don't want to do it'
if this person wants me to do something, it will be good if I do it
it will be very bad if this person feels something bad because of me"

Script [C] stipulates that certain people must be seen as unlike oneself and as "above" oneself, 5 that with such people one must be mindful of certain verbal and non-verbal constraints, that one cannot defy the expressed wishes of such a person (and even has a positive attitude towards complying with their wishes), and that one feels the need for caution to avoid causing such people any negative feelings. In linguistic terms, script [C] is manifested in a wide variety of Korean language practices—especially in the use of honorific words and speech-styles, but also in the use of titles and other respectful forms of address.

Needless to say, the Korean script in [C] represents a very different cultural stance to that of Russian culture. Nevertheless, the script can be rendered into Russian, as follows

[C1]  
a Korean cultural script connected with "deference"
ljudi dumajut tak:
kogda ja naxožus' s nekotorymi ljud'mi, ja dolžen dumat' tak:
"ētot čelovek ne est' kto-to takoj, kak ja
ētot čelovek – kto-to nado mnoj
potomu čto ja naxožus' s ėtim čelovekom sejčas, ja ne mogu delat' nekotorye vešči, ja ne mogu govorit' nekotorye vešči, ja ne mogu govorit' nekotorye slova esli ētot čelovek skazet mne: 'ja xoču, čtoby ty sdelal čto-to',
ja ne mogu skazat' ētomu čeloveku: 'ja ne xoču ēto delat"
esli étot čelovek xočet, čtoby ja sdelal čto-to, budet xorošo, esli ja éto sdelaju budet očen' ploxo, esli étot čelovek budet čuvstvovat' čto-to ploxe iz-za menja”

Conversely, the scripts from Anglo and Russian culture can be transposed into Korean.

[A2] *an Anglo cultural script connected with “personal autonomy”*

사람들은 이렇게 생각한다:
어떤 사람이 무슨 일을 할 때는, 이렇게 생각하는 것이 좋다:
“나는 이 일을 내가 하고 싶기 때문에 하고 있다”

[B2] *a Russian cultural script connected with “expressiveness”*

사람들은 이렇게 생각한다:
어떤 사람이 다른 사람들로 하여금 그 사람이 생각하는 것을 알기를 원한다면 그것은 좋은 일이다
어떤 사람이 다른 사람들로 하여금 그 사람이 느끼는 것을 알기를 원한다면 그것은 좋은 일이다

Reading these scripts from other cultures for the first time, speakers of Korean, English, and Russian often experience a sense of strangeness or unfamiliarity, because the ideas and attitudes being expressed are culturally strange. Nonetheless the scripts themselves are clearly intelligible and highly explicit. They articulate the culturally strange in terms of the linguistically familiar, i.e., in terms of simple common words whose meanings are shared between the languages concerned. This is in stark contrast to culture-specific words such as *freedom*, *iskrennost’*, and *yeyuy*, which are truly untranslatable. Needless to say, neither do cultural scripts have recourse to any value-laden language-specific terms of the sort which are commonly used in everyday talk about the impressions conveyed by foreign ways of speaking; for example, that Russians are often seen as *intense* (from an Anglo perspective), and that Anglos can be seen as *xolodnyj* (roughly) ‘cold’ and *bezdušnyj* (roughly) ‘soulless, heartless’ from a Russian perspective, or as lacking *ceng* (very roughly) ‘caring feelings, personal bonds’ from a Korean perspective.

Finally, it must be emphasised that scripts [A]–[C] are but isolated examples of high-level scripts from their respective cultures. A fuller description would include many more scripts for each culture—whole families of scripts interconnected in a variety of ways, and existing furthermore at different levels of detail and with different degrees of situational specificity. For example, cultural scripts can deal with “rhetorical” speech practices such as active metaphor and sarcasm (Goddard 2004a; Wierzbicka 2002b), and even go down to matters of fine linguistic detail, such as the usage of terms of address, and interactional routines (cf. Wong 2006; Ameka and Breedveld 2004; Ye 2004a, 2004b, among others).
The main point is that the NSM-based theory of cultural scripts provides a new and powerful medium for intercultural education training, which can be readily adapted into any language and can be used relatively easily with speakers of any background.

4. **NSM English as an auxiliary international language (“nuclear English”)**

Despite the importance of having a medium of intercultural education which can be readily “indigenised” into the various languages of the world, it remains a truism that for international communication a single medium is needed and that English is increasingly fulfilling this role. The problem is that “English” is not a neutral value-free code, either at the level of its words and grammatical constructions or at the level of pragmatic norms. This applies even to so-called “international English” or “global English”. The existence of multiple “Engishes” around the world, and the fact that as a global lingua franca English is now used most extensively among “non-native” speakers complicates the picture further. Many scholars object to the imposition of “native speaker norms” (e.g., Seidlhofer 2001: 133), but it remains unclear how English can be an effective medium for international communication if it is not to be tied to some particular norms. Where would the (relative) stability, which is the prerequisite of intelligibility, come from if there were no shared code of communication?

Discussing this problem more than 25 years ago, Randolph Quirk (1981) proposed a solution in the form of an auxiliary language—“nuclear English”. This would be English stripped to the bone and freed from its historical and cultural baggage, “easier and faster to learn than any variety of natural, (full) English”, and at the same time “communicatively adequate” (Quirk 1981: 155).

Culture-free as calculus, with no literary, aesthetic or emotional aspirations, it is correspondingly more free than the ‘national Engishes’ of any suspicion that it smacks of linguistic imperialism or even (since native speakers of English would also have to be trained to use it) that it puts some countries at an advantage over others in international communication. Since it is not (but is merely related to) a natural language it would not be in competition for educational resources with

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6. It is ironic that such words often crop up in the very passages in which their authors denounce the “unfair” position of Anglo English in the world today. For example, Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1999) condemn as unreasonable the “Englishisation” of the world: “it is unreasonable to expect that Danes, Catalans or other users of English as a second language to use English supremely well” (1999: 33, quoted in Seidlhofer 2001: 137). The words reasonable and unreasonable are among the most quintessentially Anglo, and untranslatable, words in the English language (Wierzbicka 2006b).
foreign languages proper, but rather with that other fundamental interdisciplinary subject, mathematics.

Although in the intervening twenty-five years Quirk himself did not seek to implement this programmatic idea, in a sense “nuclear English” is now not only a real possibility, but a reality. NSM English, i.e., the English version of the natural semantic metalanguage, is nothing other than such a “nuclear English”. It is a subset of “full English”, easy to learn, and culture-free as calculus, with no literary, aesthetic or emotional aspirations, and in a very basic sense, communicatively adequate. At least, it meets the condition prescribed by Stein (1979: 68), in relation to Quirk’s concept of “nuclear English”, that: “its vocabulary is conceived of as self-contained: with the items included it will in principle be possible to express whatever one wants to express”. (This condition is met by the NSM in any of its versions: Russian, Korean, Chinese, Malay, Spanish, etc, as well as English.)

Could NSM English serve as a medium for international communication? Here the answer is of course: no. Certainly not in the sense envisaged by Quirk: “the emblematic consumers of Nuclear English should not be seen as Indonesian children in a village school room, but as Italian and Japanese company directors engaged in negotiating an agreement” (1981: 156). One can hardly imagine Italian and Japanese company directors negotiating an agreement in NSM English (or any other version of the natural semantic metalanguage), that is, in a mini-language with just sixty-five or so words.

The key question about any “nuclear English” however—and about any language of international communication—is the question of vocabulary. Quirk (1981: 156) reluctantly avoided “issues in the lexicon”, but if lexical issues are ignored, the whole project of creating a nuclear English for international communication can be no more than a promissory note, utopian and lacking in substance. A “culture-free calculus” must be based on universal human concepts (otherwise, it will be culture-bound, not culture-free), and as decades of empirical investigations carried out with the NSM framework have shown, there are only sixty-five or so such universal concepts.

One writer who has considered such issues was Gabriele Stein (1979), in her article “Nuclear English: reflections on the structure of its vocabulary”. But sensible as Stein’s reflections were, the soundness of the argument cannot make up for the absence of an empirical basis. For example, she proposed as “culture-free” lexical items for the hypothetical “nuclear English” words like female, brother, and sister, that is, words which are in fact exceedingly culture-specific: most languages of the world do not have a word corresponding to female (covering women and girls as well as bitches, cows, mares, hens, etc.); and numerous languages do not have words covering both ‘elder brothers’ and ‘younger brothers’, or ‘elder sisters’
and 'younger sisters', the distinction between older and younger brothers and sisters being often culturally very important. As these examples illustrate, a “nuclear English” based on the speculations of native speakers rather than on extensive cross-linguistic investigations is bound to reflect ethnocentric preconceptions.

A genuinely culture-free nuclear vocabulary cannot exceed the set of word meanings which constitute the intersection of the vocabularies of all languages. Although such a minimal (but truly universal) vocabulary is sufficient for the elucidation of culture-specific concepts encoded in “full” natural languages, as shown by the extensive corpus of NSM semantic studies, it is not sufficient for tasks like negotiating international agreements, conducting business negotiations, safeguarding human rights or coordinating anti-terrorism or disaster-relief operations on a global scale. For such purposes speed is as important as accuracy.

Clearly then, a truly nuclear, culture-free subset of English cannot fulfil such a role: only a much richer, larger subset of English can do that, and such a larger subset cannot be “culture-free”. In particular, culture-specific concepts like ‘negotiations’, ‘compromise’, ‘deal’, ‘agreement’, ‘efficiency’, ‘evidence’, ‘commitment’, ‘deadline’, ‘probability’, ‘performance’, ‘competition’, ‘opportunity’, ‘feasible’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair’ are unlikely to disappear from English-based international communication. On the other hand, NSM English, being culture-free, can play a useful role in the contemporary world as a universal cultural notation for elucidating meanings, ideas, assumptions, and so on, i.e., as an auxiliary language.

Three quarters of a century ago in his paper on ‘The function of an international auxiliary language’, Edward Sapir (1931: 113) wrote:

> What is needed above all is a language that is as simple, as regular, as logical, as rich, and as creative as possible; a language which starts with a minimum of demands on the learning capacity of the normal individual and can do the maximum amount of work; which is to serve as a sort of logical touchstone to all national languages…. It must, ideally, be as superior to any accepted language as the mathematical method of expressing quantities and relations between quantities is to the more lumbering methods of expressing these quantities and relations in

7. Kirkpatrick (2004) rejects Quirk's proposed “nuclear English” in favour of the opposite approach: a “Lingua Franca English” in which speakers with different mother tongues all speak according to their own native norms, yet understand each other by virtue of goodwill and mutual tolerance without any “standard monolithic norms” (p. 7). He sees no problem with the use of various local cultural norms: “I think it is inevitable and desirable that speakers will transfer some of the pragmatic norms of their L1 to lingua franca English” (p. 6). This seems to us unduly sanguine. What will happen when the pragmatic norms of different speakers are in conflict? For example, when one interlocutor's cultural background encourages him or her to express requests by way of bare imperatives (“do this!”; “go there!”; “bring me that!”), whereas another regards bare imperatives as an intolerable assault on their personal autonomy (cf. Wierzbicka 2006b: Ch 2; Clyne 1994)?
verbal form. This is undoubtedly an ideal which can never be reached, but ideals are not meant to be reached: they merely indicate the direction of movement.

Obviously, NSM English does not look exactly like what Sapir had in mind, because with its sixty-five or so lexical items, it is lexically poor rather than rich. In many other respects, however, it fits Sapir’s requirements for an ideal auxiliary language amazingly well. It is simple and can do the maximum amount of work with a minimum of demands on people’s learning capacities, and it can indeed be regarded as a logical (or cognitive) touchstone to all natural languages. It is also culturally neutral and can serve as a cultural notation for cross-cultural comparisons and explanations. While it cannot serve as a full-fledged language of intercultural communication, it can serve as an auxiliary language of intercultural training: as a “neutral” cultural notation for comparing languages and cultures.

5. Concluding remarks

The original impetus behind the natural semantic metalanguage program was not motivated by the prospects of practical application. Yet as the theory has been developed and refined, its applicability and practical importance has become increasingly obvious. To learn how to use semantic primes and cultural scripts in practical settings, one does not need to be a specialist in semantics or semantic typology, or to be concerned to any great extent about the technical details or theoretical underpinnings of the metalanguage. One does not need to be a linguist at all. The metalanguage is there “on the shelf”, as it were, ready to be used for various purposes. Of course, a certain amount of familiarisation and training is necessary, just as with learning to use any kind of equipment; and there are certain potential problems which users should be aware of and prepared for. There is an urgent need for materials and programs which can “train the trainers”, so as to promote and facilitate the application of NSM in different fields of applied cultural linguistics as surveyed in this chapter.

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References


In this chapter, we provide a cultural-linguistic analysis of African English expressions from the domains of political leadership, wealth, and corruption, with a special emphasis on the latter. It is an application of theoretical concepts developed in Cognitive Linguistics and cognitive anthropology, in particular of the notions ‘cultural model’, ‘cultural schema’, and ‘conceptual metaphor’. This analytical apparatus, which is briefly surveyed in section 2, is combined with corpus-linguistic methods. Section 3 discusses cultural conceptualisations central to the African community model, and thus provides the background for the focal analysis of linguistic expressions of corruption in section 4. These expressions are found to be induced by a set of underlying conceptual metaphors which in turn reflect salient cultural practices like gift-giving, negotiating and favouritism. These metaphors are euphemistic; they are drawn upon in the conceptualisation of corruption in order to hide the illicit nature of corrupt practices. In our analysis, special attention is paid to food-related and gift metaphors. Section 5 outlines some consequences of the cultural-linguistic approach for the study of the pragmatics of intercultural communication. We argue for the strengthening of the semantic/hermeneutic component, which takes differences in culture-specific conceptualisations into account.

*Keywords*: Cultural model; cultural conceptualisation; conceptual metaphor; cultural keyword; comparative corpus analysis; intercultural communication in English; intercultural pragmatics; African English; African model of community; corruption

*We are much indebted to Gary Palmer for his numerous comments on an earlier version of this chapter. Some of the ideas expressed and examples referred to here are discussed in Wolf & Polzenhagen (forthcoming) from the angle of multi-word units in varieties of English.*
1. Introduction

With this chapter, we wish to contribute to the newly emerging cultural linguistics approach. A thorough theoretical basis of this paradigm was first laid out by Palmer (1996). It was further developed by Sharifian (e.g. 2003) and is about to be established as a research program in its own right within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics. Although the need for considering cultural aspects has been continuously argued for in Cognitive Linguistics (see, e.g., Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1994; Dirven, Wolf & Polzenhagen forthcoming), it is only more recently that we witness a growing scholarly interest among cognitive linguists in the socio-cultural dimension of language. This trend is, for instance, most noticeable in the current attempts towards the development of a cognitive sociolinguistics, e.g., by Geeraerts (2003), Kristiansen (2003), Kristiansen & Dirven (forthcoming), and in the prominence cultural issues have recently been given in applied Cognitive Linguistics (see Pütz, Niemeier & Dirven 2001a, 2001b; see also Geeraerts & Grondelaers 1995). Moreover, we notice a renewed pronounced interest among cognitive linguists in the universalism-relativism issue (see, e.g., the papers in Pütz & Verspoor 2000 and Niemeier & Dirven 2000). In other words, there are thus numerous points of contact between Cultural Linguistics and focal trends within Cognitive Linguistics in general.

Our project applies the methods of Cognitive Linguistics to the study of L2 varieties of English (or World Englishes), with a focus on African English. Several studies compare conceptualisations cross-linguistically (see, e.g., Kövecses 2002: chapters 12 & 13, for an overview), but Dirven's (1994) book on Dutch and Afrikaans may be the only comprehensive attempt to apply cognitive analysis to varieties of a single language that are rooted in markedly different cultural environments. Some precursory studies to this chapter are Wolf & Simo Bobda (2001) (see Palmer 2003 for a discussion), Wolf (2001, 2003), Polzenhagen & Wolf (2002), and Polzenhagen (2005).

1. Within the last two decades, cognitive-linguistic methods and analytical tools have been applied to the full range of objects of linguistic inquiry (see Geeraerts & Cuyckens forthcoming for a comprehensive overview). The spread of Cognitive Linguistics is not the least due to its strong interdisciplinary commitment; Cognitive Linguistics has sought and seeks common ground in and with congenial strands in the social and human sciences. The present volume illustrates this commitment for the field of applied linguistics, with a strong emphasis on the cultural dimension of language.

2. For our purpose, the term «African English» refers to the second language varieties of English spoken in Africa, and includes Liberian English, which, for some of its speakers, is a first language variety. General information on the classification of the varieties of English can be found, for instance, in Quirk (1995).
Chapter 8. Culture-specific conceptualisations of corruption in African English

Given that English is the language that is most widely used in intercultural encounters and that, on a daily, world-wide basis, probably more conversations take place between L1 and L2 speakers and between L2 speakers than between L1 speakers of English, the application of cultural linguistics methods to varieties of English is of immediate relevance to the field of intercultural communication (see Wolf & Polzenhagen 2006 for discussion).

In this chapter, we investigate African English expressions from the domains of political leadership, wealth and corruption. First, however, we briefly outline the analytical concepts and the methodology we employ in our chapter.

2. Analytical Concepts and Methods

2.1 Conceptual Metaphor, Cultural Models and Cultural Schemas

In our analysis, we draw on three related theoretical concepts: Conceptual Metaphor, Cultural Model, and Cultural Schema. We take the notion of conceptual metaphor, including its elaboration within the framework of Blending Theory (e.g. Fauconnier 1997), to be well-known and well-established and do not review its basic conception (see, e.g., Kövecses 2002 for an overview). Our use of the other two notions, however, requires some brief discussion. The concept of ‘cultural model’ was developed in the Cognitive Anthropology of the 1980s (e.g., Holland & Quinn 1987; then D’Andrade & Strauss 1992; Strauss & Quinn 1997; see Palmer 1996 and Dirven, Wolf & Polzenhagen, forthcoming, for an overview). In this tradition, cultural models, or ‘cultural cognitive models’, as it has been called by Morgan (2001), are seen as “cognitive schemas that are intersubjectively shared by a social group” (D’Andrade 1987: 112). Since its early days, the notion of cultural models has been closely tied to that of conceptual metaphor, and their exact relation is still a matter of debate (see, e.g., articles in Gibbs & Steen 1999). Linguists often regard metaphor as being constitutive of these models (e.g. Kövecses 1999), but anthropologists more often argue for the “cultural postulates” view, i.e. that the numerous metaphors within the model are derived from non-metaphoric proposition-schemas (Quinn 1987, 1991, 1997); see Palmer (1996: 104ff.) for a discussion of this issue. Leaning towards a comprehensive view, we take cultural models to be more encompassing than metaphorical networks, in that they are complex systems, including metaphoric, metonymic, as well as non-metaphoric conceptualisations in a socio-cultural group. Broadly speaking, we thus follow the theoretical framework proposed by Sharifian (2003), who uses the cover term “cultural conceptualisation” for such schematic representations. In this chapter, we describe one particular cultural model in a specific setting: the kinship-based African community model.
Any approach to cultural models faces well-known philosophical and methodological problems. Cultural models may differ in different settings, and there is no third or “neutral” model against which they can be compared (cf. Hutton 2001). This yields, at least theoretically, two possible perspectives: the perspective of an “outside observer”, which in fact inevitably takes the observer’s conceptualisations as its reference point, and the “culturalist perspective”, which attempts to capture the other culture from “within”, i.e. from “the actor’s point of view” (in anthropology, this is referred to as the “emic” approach). In reality, however, the two perspectives cannot be neatly separated. This tension is also evident in the application of our analytical tools. It is, for instance, sometimes hard to decide whether a particular expression in a non-Western variety of English has a metaphorical or a non-metaphorical conceptual basis (also see the brief comparative discussion of the extension of kinship terms in Western and African varieties of English given in section 5.). We therefore prefer to sometimes speak of “conceptualisations” instead of “metaphor” in the framework of the African cultural model of community. The indeterminacy of the relation between cultural model, metaphor, and metonymy is, however, not a theoretical weakness; on the contrary, sometimes it is theoretically necessary to leave open the question if a particular conceptualisation is metaphoric or non-metaphoric if one does not want to fall into the trap of taking one’s own (in our case, Western) understanding as the exclusive vantage point for making judgements on the metaphoricity of a particular conceptualisation. As the discussion of conceptualisations of corruption in African English will show, the decision to call a particular conceptualisation metaphoric or metonymic may even have far-reaching socio-cultural implications.

A theoretical concept closely related to cultural model is that of ‘cultural schema’. For some, cultural model and cultural (or cognitive) schema may even be synonyms (see D’Andrade 1987). Drawing from connectionism, cognitive anthropologists have defined schemas as “networks of strongly connected cognitive elements that represent the generic concept stored in memory” (Strauss & Quinn 1997: 6, leaning on Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland & Hinton 1986). Cultural schemas are then viewed as idealised patterns of interrelated cultural knowledge, enabling individuals to interpret cultural experiences. This evidently poses the question where these cultural conceptualisations are to be located. The cognitivist position would hold that, ultimately, “individual minds are the primary locus of linguistic and cultural knowledge” (Langacker 1994: 26) and from this perspective cultural schemas are largely subsumed under the general notion of ‘cognitive models’.³ The counter-position sees systems of cultural conceptualisations as “folk

³ One could also argue for the opposite. Since culture is the general phenomenon, then individual schemas may be subsumed by cultural themes (Gary Palmer, personal comment).
models”, a view which is based on the assumption that a community’s cultural wisdom resides in the community’s collective mind rather than in the minds of the individual members (see Keesing 1987: 370 for a criticism of this label, and Gibbs 1999 and Borofsky 1994 for further discussion). The concept of ‘cultural model’ is intended to transcend this problem in that it can accommodate the notion of 'distributed representation', which allows for uneven and partially shared distributions of cultural schemas across community members (see Sharifian 2003).

We use the term “cultural schema” in a maximally narrow sense. We apply it to representations that display a low degree of complexity and a high degree of abstractness. This use will become more apparent in our discussion of specific expressions of corruption and their underlying conceptualisations. There we refer, *inter alia*, to the GIFT-GIVING schema. It represents a basic socio-cultural experience. It is minimally complex in that it comprises no more than the act of GIVING and the associated roles, i.e. a GIVER, a RECEIVER, and a GIFT. It is maximally abstract in that nothing is specified beyond these roles and the mere act of GIVING. This schema is involved in various cultural practices and the conceptual representations thereof, which we refer to as “cultural scenarios” (this usage is consistent with Palmer’s 1996 definition of scenarios). For example, gift-giving is part of the Christmas scenario, of a birthday scenario, a name-giving scenario, a visiting scenario, a wedding scenario. These scenarios are schematic, too, in that they do not pertain to specific actual events but rather contain and provide the structure common to a particular type of events. However, they are less abstract, as the participant roles and the occasion of the gift-giving are further specified. In a visiting scenario, for instance, the gift-giver role coincides with that of the host or guest. And such scenarios are more complex, as they involve knowledge of typical sequences of particular activities and typical settings. As the above examples illustrate, scenarios are highly culture-specific (compare, for instance, the Catholic christening scenario to traditional name-giving ceremonies in the West African context). Again, our approach is largely in line with Sharifian’s (2003) framework, which proposes the general label “event schema” for such conceptualisations.

### 2.2 Empirical basis

Our approach is strongly corpus-based. The corpora are employed for two purposes: Firstly, we use them as a source of text examples that illustrate the conceptualisations we identify. Secondly, we use them comparatively to elicit what Wierzbicka (1997: 16–17) calls “cultural keywords”, i.e. “focal points around which entire cultural domains are organized.” The latter use is based on the assumption that one should expect lexis and the frequency of particular lexical items to reflect
such focal points in a given culture. Both lexis and frequency should reveal and be consistent with the underlying cultural conceptualisations.

The first and main African English corpus we use for this study is the Corpus of English in Cameroon (CEC), which was compiled as part of the ICE project (see Tiomajou 1995; cf. International Corpus of English 2002). Beside the CEC, we mainly draw from a thematic text data base (WCL) compiled by one of the authors. WCL comprises authentic African English written material obtained from internet sources and is thematically restricted to the domains we investigate. It is used as a source of text examples only. For the comparative frequency analysis, we use the CEC and a combined version of two standard corpora of Western varieties of English, FLOB (British English) and FROWN (American English). These three corpora lend themselves to a comparative analysis, as they all follow the basic corpus-design principles of the earlier BROWN corpus of American English, in that they comprise, in a largely parallel way, written texts from different text types, and in that they have about the same size. They are thus representative of the respective varieties: The CEC then stands pars pro toto for West African English and the combined FLOBFROWN for Western varieties of English.

In the section dealing with consequences of diverging cultural conceptualisations in the context of intercultural encounters (section 5) we will further illustrate our arguments with data from a small-scale questionnaire survey we conducted among university students in Germany and Cameroon. This survey was meant to test our corpus findings and their interpretation by yet another empirical means.

Against this theoretical background, we first provide a brief analysis of the kinship-based African community, as a cultural model. An understanding of the community model is indispensable for the analysis of the focal topic of this chapter, which is the conceptualisation of corruption in African varieties of English.

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4. Work on the corpus stopped shortly before its completion. Thus, there are only “unofficial” copies of it. The one we use was given to one of the authors by Josef Schmied, TU Chemnitz, who is a member of the ICE project, and whose kindness we acknowledge here.

5. We collected 39 questionnaires from Cameroonian students at the University of Yaoundé and 19 from German students at Humboldt University Berlin. The survey also includes 39 questionnaires from Cantonese students at The University of Hong Kong. Wolf & Polzenhagen (2006) gives details on the format of the questionnaire and a comparative analysis of some of the German and Hong Kong data. We wish to thank Samuel Atechi (University of Yaoundé) for conducting our survey in Cameroon.
3. The Kinship-based African Community Model

3.1 General considerations

The kinship model of society is an extension of the family concept. Schatzberg (1986: 10) has correctly pointed out that the African concept differs from the Western notion of ‘family’. For example, while lineage and in-law relationships do play a central role, family in the African context is not restricted to such relations. Traditionally, the concept of kinship embraces the entire local community. Factors like age and specific duties, in particular those of protection and nurture, are crucial components of the concept. The kinship-based nature of the African community model has often been noticed in the literature (see, e.g., Musopole 1994; Mbiti 1990; Alo 1989; and Wolf 2001 for more references). As Weekes-Vagliani (1976) has aptly put it:

In Africa, the notions of family and society are closely intertwined. The boundaries of family are defined by the social exchanges as much as by the biological ties between people, and the term covers far more than the strict nuclear unit of two parents and their children. (Weekes-Vagliani 1976: 15)

Likewise, its most evident linguistic manifestation in the extension or generalisation of kinship terms is well-known. Simo Bobda (1997), for instance, makes the following observation for Cameroonian English (see Wolf 2001: 212–214 for a more detailed discussion), which is equally valid for African English in general:

The terms father, mother, son, daughter, brother, and sister designate referents ranging from relatives in the Western sense to members of the same race, through close and distant relatives, people of the same village, tribe, country, continent, etc. (Simo Bobda 1997: 228f.)

The underlying kinship model has generally been described as a horizontal network that stretches laterally and embraces everybody who is perceived to belong to a particular social group (Mbiti 1990: 102). As stated above, the model’s original and immediate reference point and prototype is the traditional local community. One may rightly argue that, in contemporary Africa, the local village is no more the dominant mode of community and that it is no longer an intact social space (cf. Bastian 1993; Geschiere 1995; Chabal & Daloz 1999: 75, for a discussion). However, the idealised community persists and modern social life continues to be judged and modelled in terms of the kinship-based community system. In other words, the structures and moral principles of the idealised kinship community are mapped onto the spheres of modern life. As van Binsbergen (2000 online) observes:
Rural populations in Africa struggled, through numerous forms of organisational, ideological and productive innovation combining local practices with outside borrowings, to reconstruct a new sense of community in an attempt to revitalise, complement or replace the collapsing village community [...]. [Rural Africans] have sought to re-formulate the notion of the viable, intact village community in new terms and with new outside inspiration and outside pressure. (Van Binsbergen 2000 online)

These are, essentially, metonymic and metaphoric processes. Most importantly, in these processes the elements are transformed, appropriated, and receive new meanings. As van Binsbergen (2000 online) puts it, “modern life is the kinship order virtualised.”

On the conceptual level, the process of extension of the family concept to the local community and beyond may be captured by the metonymies COMMUNITY FOR KINSHIP and KINSHIP FOR COMMUNITY, respectively, which entail the conceptualisations COMMUNITY MEMBERS ARE KIN and LEADERS ARE FATHERS. In the African context, this model is at work with respect to any “modern” community and social group. For example, it is applied to urban communities, where the mayor becomes a father figure, and to the state itself, where the head of state is conceptualised and portrayed as father. This is manifest in the specific use of kinship terms, as in example 1. The reference group is the Anglophone community in Cameroon:

(1) You see, brother, it’s difficult to hide the truth. At the time when our radio sycophants were still shouting that the best thing to happen, is to continue eating shit in the uneasy marriage. Our son in Garoua, Nsuh Martin, cried out that frogs in the choir house were still referring to him as a slave from Southern Cameroons (“L’anglo la”). (WCL: 82)

Example 2 is from a Cameroonian newspaper and refers to a political party, the CPDM:

(2) the Santa CPDM is planning a mass decamping because none of their sons was appointed into the new government. (Ntoi 1998: 8)

Example 3 refers to the Igbo, an ethnic group in Nigeria:

(3) In as much as the Igbo nation is trying to unite with itself and with its South-South brothers because the Igbo people know that they cannot do without neighbouring brothers, non-Igbo brothers and non-brothers believe they cannot do without us. There must be a kind of marriage or rethinking between these two brothers. (WCL: 72)
Example 4 shows that even nations (i.e. Cameroon and Nigeria) can be kin:

(4) That the two countries were brotherly nations, with the same ancestors. (*The Mail*. Cameroon. Sept. 5: 2)

Example 5 illustrates the well-known FATHER OF THE NATION metaphor, which is, of course, part of the overall KINSHIP FOR COMMUNITY conceptualisation:

(5) On the head of state's contribution to the division, he said 'it may not be as perfect as people may have wanted but people should know that the means are limited and that the president of the republic is the father of all divisions in the country.' (WCL: 83)

The KINSHIP FOR COMMUNITY conceptualisation constitutes the backbone of the entire model. It is, however, linked to numerous further cultural conceptualisations, which constitute the model as a whole. These may also be transferred from the original local context to its various extensions. Two aspects are of utmost importance here. Firstly, the kinship-based model has a pronounced spiritual dimension. Stretching vertically, it includes, first of all, the realm of the ancestors, who are believed to actively participate in the community affairs as shown by example 6:

(6) To all our ancestor spirits … and all other dear departed souls, both big and small: We give you thanks and praises for the sacrifices you made for our well-being. We are here today, because you were here. We ask that you all continue to guard and guide us. We ask that you help us and direct us as we follow that divine path to our individual destinies. (WCL: 124)

The ancestors are closely associated to higher gods, as shown in 7 and 8:

(7) I greet you in the names of the Most High God, the Lesser Gods and The Ancestors. (WCL: 55)

(8) Ancestors and gods keep a watchful eye on the living. (CEC)

Closely related is the view that people, in the course of their lives, increasingly acquire spiritual power, which makes the elders mediators between the living, the dead and the gods, as shown in 9:

(9) The elders consulting their ancestors to beg them to allow peace to return to the troubled children. (Luangala 1991: 49)

Beyond this vertical extension to the spiritual world, the kinship-based community model includes, at almost all its levels, the notion of the magical, or, more specifically, witchcraft. Again, the local community and family context is the original locus. Here, witchcraft is a well-known and omnipresent influence, and,
most importantly, a highly ambivalent one. It may manifest as a destructive force, as everything “that falls outside the kinship order, is not regulated by that order, [and] challenges, rejects, destroys that order” (van Binsbergen 2000 online: 3.7.). Witchcraft is, as Geschiere (1997) put it, the “dark side of kinship”, which we find expressed in example 10:

(10) The pity of witchcraft is the destruction of parental or kin relationship, the strength of rural African societies that is also the area of witchcraft operation. (WCL: 77)

But magical forces may equally be applied in order to protect the kinship order, i.e. in what Geschiere (1997: 95ff.) calls their “levelling” function. “Levelling” refers to the balancing function, which falls, first of all, in the province of the witch-doctor. Thus, witchcraft may also exert a positive force which stabilises the kinship system. The spiritual dimension of the kinship model and the role of witchcraft are discussed in more detail in Wolf (2001, 2004) and Wolf & Polzenhagen (forthcoming). There, we provide evidence of mappings of witchcraft expressed in the idiom of family and village to almost all spheres of modern social life.

In the present chapter, we focus on the second central dimension, which revolves around the notions of ‘nurture’ and ‘care’. This dimension is crucial to the conceptualisation of corruption, as will be discussed in detail below. Again, the specific African application of kinship terms may be taken as a starting point. Kin terms connote expected behaviours; they come with scenarios attached. As Mark Turner puts it in a general consideration of kinship labels:

A given term, though applicable to perhaps many people, carries connotations of personal affection, of expected behavior, of rules of behavior, and of rites and duties, or, as an anthropologist might say, of affect, practice, etiquette, and obligation. (Turner 1987:55)

In the African context, such obligations and expectations are pervasively expressed as kin-based reciprocal nurture patterns. As we have seen, leaders in a social community are conceptualised as fathers. In the logic of the nurture pattern, the father receives and distributes community resources. Yet in turn, it is his duty to nurture and protect. What it boils down to is a reciprocity of eating and feeding (cf. Schatzberg 1986: 14f.). To put it in terms of conceptual metaphors: leadership is eating and leadership is feeding; specifically, feeding one’s kin, that is, one’s community and adherents. The salience of this pattern is fully in evidence in the sphere of modern African politics, as expressed in Bayart’s (1993) notion of the ‘politics of the belly’. For a particularly clear manifestation of the eating metaphor note that one Nigerian party adopted the slogan “I Chop You Chop Party”
(cf. Schatzberg 2001: 40), with *chop* being the Pidgin English word for ‘to eat’. The following corpus example provides a further illustration of the nurture aspect:

(11) But nothing can be as insane as that because the success of his Presidency does not depend on how badly *he dishes the Igbos*. (WCL: 113)

The strong patrimonial and clientelistic structures, which are pervasive in African politics, may be seen as an immediate manifestation of the eating-and-feeding schema:

African governments have been built around patronage networks whereby followers are rewarded for their support in the form of public jobs and resources. Politicians and bureaucrats have used the public sector to generate the benefits needed to fashion patron-client linkages of support. (Tangri 1999: 137)

This system rests, by and large, on the availability and distribution of resources along vertical structures. Its impact on political decision making is considerable. According to Chabal & Daloz (1999):

> to succeed as a ‘Big Man’ demands resources; and the more extensive the network, the greater the need for the means of distribution. The legitimacy of the African political elites, such as it is, derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests. It is therefore imperative for them to exploit governmental resources for patrimonial purposes. (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 15)

This strong patrimonial aspect of the African state certainly differs from the idealised Western model. Leaning on Max Weber, Chabal & Daloz (1999: 5ff., 27f.) hold that the modern Western state is first of all characterised by a significant emancipation from society. By contrast, they argue, this emancipation and institutionalisation of the state has never been thoroughly established in Black Africa. Thus the African state has remained, to some degree, an empty shell, with politics being made to a large extent along the lines of the kinship model. The two modes of politics are often incompatible and conflicting, as they rest on different necessities and considerations. They operate in different registers. As van Binsbergen (2000 *online*) states:

> The single most important defining feature of the state is not its monopoly of violence, but its radical rejection of the kinship order.

This problematisation is reflected in the following corpus examples 12 to 15:

(12) In reality, it is the leader himself who thus has become the greatest subversive element against the state. His greedy, gossipy, sycophant aids are his great accomplices in subverting the state. (CEC)

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6. For the situation in the colonial state, see Comaroff (2002).
When the Senate President goes back to Ebonyi, the Igbos will ask him how many of his Igbo brothers did he manage to install as heads of prominent Senate Committees. He will find that surrounding himself with his schoolmates as aides has nothing to do with adequate representation of his tribe. (WCL: 73)

Elections itself is [sic] a mystery, just imagine being in a voting booth and deciding within some few minutes who is to rule you, haven't earlier being subjected to multiple images by multiple candidates, most of whom say the same thing (s), some doing no more than appealing to your tribal sentiments and nakedly over exaggerating what they can deliver to your community. (WCL: 47)

Opportunistic Tom Kamara argued that the Standard Bearer of the LPP, Dr. Togba-Nah Tipoteh is a cheap man who does not like to give money to his partisans. Kamara said that Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is his choice for the Presidency because according to Kamara, Ellen is connected with the United Nations and has lot of money and that she can easily dash the funds to her partisans for their personal use. (Corpus Liberia)

When we refer to patrimonial structures and clientelism against the background of the kinship-based community model we certainly do not imply that they are exclusively African nor that they are a manifestation of some primordial traditional African culture. Items like *Big Man* may suggest ancient cultural roots; however, the impact and the specific make-up of clientelistic networks are, to a considerable degree, the product of colonialism and decolonisation. This crucial point is discussed by Szeftel (1998: 235ff.). These networks were readily available, Szeftel (1998: 236) argues, as a result of the structure of colonial administration with its decentralised despotism of native authorities, and they were activated after independence for achieving and ensuring political power. Clientelism thus “provides a mechanism for mobilizing support and controlling the electorate in a political economy in which socially and economically excluded rural producers and urban migrants predominate” (Szeftel 1998: 237). The African kinship-based community model and its ingredients, like patrimonialism and clientelism, are continuously shaped by the specific socio-political and economic environment. They are highly dynamic.

In this section, we have given a brief outline of the African kinship-based community model, with a special emphasis on the eating-and-feeding pattern in the political sphere. Section 4.2. will show that the reciprocal duties and expectancies built into this model are crucial in the conceptualisation of corruption. Given that these duties and expectancies are pervasively encoded in eating-related metaphors, and given that eating metaphors are omnipresent in the discourse of African corruption, we need to elaborate on this point before turning to the discussion of the corruption issue itself. In the following section, we analyse the domains of
LEADERSHIP and ENRICHMENT as parallel and connected domains in a network of eating conceptualisations.

3.2 The LEADERSHIP is EATING Network

Metaphorical conceptualisations involving FOOD, HUNGER, and EATING as source domains are, of course, by no means limited to African English. A full range of general eating metaphors can be observed across cultures and languages. For our purpose, the following ones can be highlighted (cf. Lakoff 1993 online):

- STRONG DESIRES ARE HUNGER
- RESOURCES ARE FOOD
- ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS EATING

(see Wolf & Polzenhagen, forthcoming, for more details)

These metaphors are interrelated, and, together with the conceptualisation IMPORTANT IS BIG, they form a network of general eating metaphors. Strictly speaking, the metaphor IMPORTANT IS BIG is not an eating metaphor, as it may have source domains other than that of EATING. In the logic of the network, however, BEING BIG IS HAVING EATEN and BEING BIG IS HAVING FOOD, which links up to and integrates the metaphor IMPORTANT IS BIG. The general metaphor IMPORTANT IS BIG is most directly expressed in the meaning of the lexical item big itself: It is a recurrent pattern across languages that the word for ‘big’ also has the meaning ‘significant’, with the metaphor in question being responsible for this polysemy (for examples from various languages see, e.g., Grady 1999: 80).

A particular West African English expression generated by this metaphor is the well-known item Big Men, in the political context as in 16:

(16) their customers range from bureaucrats to Presidents, the Small Man to the Big Man. (WCL: 29)

In cases like Big Men, the integration of IMPORTANT IS BIG into the eating-metaphor network is fully evident. IMPORTANT IS BIG interacts with the metaphor ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS EATING where being fat indicates success and being lean indicates failure. This is closely related to the conceptual metaphor LEADERSHIP IS EATING identified above against the background of the African community model. There, we already provided evidence of the pervasiveness of eating-related

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7. In the African context, this finds further expression in specific terms of address and respect, e.g. bwana mkubwa (< Swahili ‘big man’) to address an extremely important person (Dalgish 1982) and Makhulu (< Swahili -kuu ‘big’) a term of respect in South Africa (Dalgish 1982). Yoruba, too, has a parallel item (Adegbija 2003: 47).
conceptualisations in the African political context. Examples 17 to 20 are particularly striking:

(17) They have taken food of his plate. (Said in Cameroon when a government official is dropped, Waliggo n.d. online: 12)

(18) They have given him plenty to eat. (Said in Cameroon when a new government official is appointed, Waliggo n.d. online: 12)

(19) I eat and let others eat also. / I chop you chop.  
(Popular Nigerian adage in reference to political power; Waliggo n.d. online: 12; Schatzberg 2001: 40)

(20) Maybe, they were born to rule, chop life. (WCL: 124)

(21) All over the world, government is not bad, government is about service. It is the desire to serve. But here, you will hear people say ‘Ah, he don go chop money!’ (WCL: 90)

(22) So like the noises of the Party when all the first promise had been eaten up and it had become a place where fat men found things to swell themselves up some more. (Armah 1988: 95)

The eating metaphors also appear in visual media. The Nigerian cartoon in figure 1 provides an illustration of this point. It alludes to the decamping of some 100 APP members in Osun State to the PDP, the ruling party of president Obasanjo, in 2001.

![Cartoon Image]

The caption reads I beg God, make I no go chop and quench, which means Please God, I hope I don’t die from eating (Medubi 2003: 174).

**Figure 1.** Nigerian cartoon (taken from Medubi 2003: 174).

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8. Note that this is evidence of Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) key claim that metaphor is a conceptual device rather than a merely linguistic phenomenon.
Note that all the elements of the conceptual network outlined above are present here. Political power is represented by access to food, by the ability to feed, and by physical size, as the result of eating. Lack of power is depicted by small size and lack of food. Political aspiration is represented as the desire to eat (go chop, as the caption reads). The pervasive nature of this imagery is confirmed by the following observation made by Matory (1993) on tabloid comics in Nigeria:

Detractors of the postcolonial “big men” allege that these nonroyal businessmen and politicians have women with pots behind them – implicitly witches – guiding their greedy acquisition and providing the mystical means of their enemies’ undoing. In tabloid comics, their diurnal personae are enormously fat women who stand alongside overfed men in flowing agbada gowns. The Alagbada – “Wearers of Agbada” – are the stereotypic embezzlers of government funds and receivers of kickbacks. (Matory 1993: 79)

Here, we again meet the strong association between the domains of political leadership, wealth, and witchcraft, conceptualised in terms of eating-related metaphors. For a linguistic expression of this link, also consider example 23:

(23) [...] to challenge the bewitching of our impoverished populations by selfish dictators and politicians who suck the blood off the social and economic fabric for their own ends. (WCL: 77)

Thus, within this model, not only material resources but also community members and political opponents are regarded as food. This is most literally the case in the practice of ritual killing, as evidenced by examples 24 and 25:

(24) Human sacrifice and cannibalism are very real here, but not expected to emerge as the next fast food franchise concept. It is believed by some that eating an opponent’s still-beating heart gives them strength. (Corpus Liberia)

(25) Human hearts were reportedly being removed and eaten by candidates for various offices to enhance their chances of winning elections. (Anderson 1998 online)

We thus propose the following schematic representation of the conceptual network identified and exemplified above:
3.3 The enrichment is eating Network

A parallel model can be constructed for the conceptualisation of wealth and enrichment in African English. The conceptualisation of enrichment in terms of eating is immediately motivated by similar topology in the two input domains. Figure 3 presents some of these similarities.

The specification of the eating-related conceptual network to the wealth domain yields the following structure:
The metaphoric network sketched in Figure 4 can also be found in non-African varieties of English. Even a rough search in standard corpora of Western varieties of English will produce linguistic expressions of the same metaphors. However, we notice a higher salience in African English, as evidenced by a higher comparative frequency in our corpora (see Table 2 below). We take this to be a reflection of the eating-and-feeding pattern at the heart of the African community model. Eating metaphors highlight precisely this aspect of the model. Furthermore, beyond mere frequency, there is a whole range of specific African English linguistic expressions that are generated by these metaphors.

Here are some African English examples from various sources that illustrate eating metaphors in the domain of enrichment:

**MONEY IS FOOD**

(26) he would not only *eat the national cake*, but also huge mouthfuls of *national chin chin*! [*Chin chin* is a staple Nigerian dish] (WCL: 69)

(27) Also, look at the 2001 budget in which the southwest got a very disproportionate share of the *national cake* where they bake none. In all these, the idea is to let Yorubas get as much as possible before the eventual break-up Afenifere is engineering. What goes to the Niger Delta where the *national cake* comes from? (WCL: 110)

(28) President Obasanjo knows he has unwittingly provoked the intensity of the economic liberation struggle in the Niger-Delta. He has disconnected that by his actions or in-actions, politics or impolitic, he has infuriated the owners of
the *cake* to veer from just asking for a *big share of the cake* to saying I want to share my cake myself. And that is why Mr. President has of late been desperately trying to counter and stop the escalating demands for resource control. (WCL: 102)

**GREED IS HUNGER / THIRST**

(29) money thirsty women and girls (CEC)
money drinkers (Corpus Ghana)

The metaphor **GREED IS HUNGER/THIRST** is metonymically extended to body parts involved in taking in food, yielding

**GREED IS A BODY PART INVOLVED IN TAKING IN FOOD**

(30) She never *chop money belle full.* [Nigerian Pidgin English] (Adimora-Ezeigbo 1999: 29) (also see example 36 and *mouthful* in example 26)

(31) How can anyone be so daft enough to think that just by putting down $20,000,000, you can double it in just 1 week. Get real guys! and please *shorten your long throats.* (WCL: 88)

**ENRICHMENT IS EATING**

(32) How many million promises can fill a bucket when you *eat money* the way locusts eat tons of green. (CEC)

(33) The song by the night soil men which goes thus “– cow dichop [sic] for place whey them tie him? –” which clearly explains that embezelment [sic] is common among the mayors, “my brother frog *chop –*” shows that Francophones *should eat all what we have in our coffers*, “Frog” refers to Francophones. (CEC)

(34) There is the case of those who use the second one perjoratively [sic] saying “self-reliant development means one should *feed fat from the resources put at his disposal* and which are meant to be used for the general good”. (CEC)

(35) “This national coffers koraa, where is it?” “As for you, the thing is empty and you are cross-examining me about it. They’ve *chopped* everything in it.” “But when you look at them, especially their mouths, nothing indicates they can *chop so much money* in so short a time o.” (WCL: 147)

(36) For I do honestly believe that in the fat-dripping, gummy, eat-and-let-eat regime just ended – a regime which inspired the common saying that a man could only be sure of what he had put in his gut or, in language evermore

9. Meaning ‘the cow eats where they tie it.'
suited to the times: ‘you chop, me self I chop, palaver finish’; [...] (Achebe 1988: 149)

(37) No, my brother, I won’t spoil anybody’s good fortune. When Eddy’s father married me I was not half her age. As soon as her mother recovers let her come and eat Nanga’s wealth. (Achebe 1988: 88)

BEING RICH IS BEING BIG

(38) Big Men, Big Women (various sources)

(39) [Nigerian Pidgin English] Fine big woman wey dress like dis. She never chop money bele full. (Adimora-Ezeigbo 1999: 29)

(40) [Nigerian Pidgin English] Few people dey fat with big money, and the rest dey hungry (WCL: 124)

Largely similar observations can be made for francophone West Africa. The corresponding French items, manger (equivalent to to eat) and bouffer (equivalent to to chop) display the same pattern as observed for the English items (cf. Olivier de Sardan 1999: 27f.).

Numerous expressions evoke the bribe is food metaphor, as a special instance of money/resources are food. Consider the West African English expressions in 41, all of which can be used to mean ‘bribe’ (Wolf & Polzenhagen forthcoming):

(41) kola ‘cola nut’
soya ‘fried beef skewers’ (Cameroon)
chop money to chop (PE word for ‘to eat’)
mimbo ‘alcoholic beverage obtained from the raffia palm tree’ (Cameroon)
beer money ‘the 20 Naira banknote’
cold water ‘bribe paid to traffic policemen’ (Nigeria)

Examples 42–45 illustrate the conceptual metaphors bribe is food and bribing is feeding:

(42) Corrupt citizens dish out heavy bribes and the government prosecution team mellows in its responsibility. (WCL: 41)

(43) An unqualified contractor is allowed to bid on a project – in exchange for a little kola and a little dash. (WCL: 128)

(44) It is said that one cannot have any service rendered him in any of the public offices in Sierra Leone without a government functionary demanding the usual “cold water”. (WCL: 40)

(45) Were they not, sort of, justified in supposing that the loans were some gifts to be taken as chop money? (WCL: 95)

These and other specifically African English expressions and their underlying conceptualisations are discussed in more detail in the following sections, after some general considerations on the issue of corruption.

4. Conceptualisations of Corruption in African English

4.1 General Considerations on the Corruption Issue

Irrespective of political system, corruption is one of the most pressing concerns in Sub-Saharan countries.11 No direct correlation holds between the degree of corruption and a country’s transition to Western-style democracy: Corruption affects dictatorships as much as relatively “democratic” multi-party systems (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 33f.). It is perceived as an every-day experience and a major social issue by the ordinary African (cf. Olivier de Sardan 1999: 28f.). It has become a prominent topic in African media and in contemporary African politics, especially during election time.12

The pervasiveness of the problem is reflected in statistics such as those provided by the Berlin-based NGO “Transparency International” (TI). Annually, TI publishes a so-called Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for meanwhile 133 countries. Table 1 below lists the countries with the worst scores in 2003. Sub-Saharan countries are highlighted.

Eight of the 21 countries with the highest perceived degree of corruption are Sub-Saharan. In previous years, the picture was basically the same: In 1998 and 1999 Cameroon had the lead, in 2000 Nigeria, who ranked second in the following years. These are also the figures that dominate the portrait given in the media and on which most treatments of the corruption issue lean. However, as Szeftel (2000a) argued, these statistics should be read with caution. The index does not rate the actual degree of corruption but the perceived degree of corruption. A closer look at the CPI sources


12. See, for example, its prominent position among the topics of the inaugural speech by the current Nigerian President Obasanjo (http://www.ngex.com/nigeria/govt/president/obasanjio naugspeech.htm).
reveals that the perspective that lies behind the perceptions is Western. The data are based on information furnished by bodies like the World Bank, Columbia University, and The World Economic Forum. The informants are managers, political analysts, economists and other academics, journalists, and expatriates. The index clearly reflects the Western view of what counts as corrupt and what not (cf. Szefel 2000a: 291ff. for a detailed discussion). Corruption is difficult to measure, as corrupt practices are rarely performed openly. Furthermore, there is scant agreement over what counts as corruption. Watertight criteria are lacking and corrupt practices are too vast a field to give an “exact” definition (see, e.g., Kyora 1998 and Szefel 2000a on that issue). Thus statistics such as those in the CPI table are controversial. Nevertheless, corruption is indeed rampant in Sub-Saharan Africa if we take the term to mean practices regarded as illegitimate by a wide spectrum of Africans.

Table 1. Corruption Perception Index 2003 (TI 2004 online).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equador</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The index ranks from 0 to 10, zero equals a very high perceived level of bribery and ten represents an negligible degree of corruption. For the design and methodology of the CPI see www.transparency.org.
One needs to distinguish between what is illegal and what is actually perceived as illegitimate in a particular cultural environment (cf. the detailed discussion by Szeftel 2000a). These two perspectives do not necessarily coincide in the African or in any other context. Certainly, there are clear cases of corruption, in terms of the law and in terms of public perception. However, there are numerous practices that are widely regarded as illegitimate but are not, strictly speaking, illegal. Conversely, unlawful practices are not necessarily viewed as illegitimate. There is a fuzzy boundary between bribery and thanking in some material form for services rendered (cf. Olivier de Sardan 1999: 35). Certain practices are only perceived as illegitimate by those who are placed at a disadvantage and not by those who benefit. From a cross-cultural perspective, further incongruence arises, on both dimensions. Legal regulations governing corruption differ from country to country, and the same holds true for public perceptions. Thus, we see the need of a culturalist approach. Such differences, however, usually concern only the periphery of the problem or what is called ‘petty corruption’. In the centre, there is no disagreement. It is wrong, for instance, to claim that large-scale corruption in African politics is the result of and licensed by cultural traditions and values. Likewise, it is wrong to assume that African politicians and bureaucrats lack the notion of what is corrupt and what is not (Szeftel 1998: 236).

In African varieties of English, the significance of the corruption issue is reflected in the vast stock of lexical items and expressions that denote corrupt practices, including the examples given in section 3.3. Following Wierzbicka (1997: 1), we assume a “very close link between the life of a society and the lexicon of the language”, in that the presence of a vast vocabulary in a certain domain is taken to be an indicator of a culture’s preoccupation with the topic. That corruption and related items are indeed cultural keywords, is supported by a comparative analysis of our corpora. Items from these domains are significantly more frequent in our African English corpus (the CEC) than in the combined FLOB/FROWN reference corpus (British and American English). Table 2 shows the results of our comparative analysis. It was restricted to common core items, for methodological reasons, and includes the domains of wealth, money, exploitation, and food, which are closely related to the corruption issue.

13. The legal regulations of Western countries concerning corruption generally operate under a double standard in that corrupt practices abroad are not considered. The United States is an exception here, because its 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act sanctions corruption abroad, specifically the bribing of the public service (Szeftel 1998: 230; Kyora 1998: 351).
Table 2. Comparative frequency of lexical items from the domains of food, money, exploitation, and corruption.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>word</th>
<th>CEC</th>
<th>FLOBFROWN</th>
<th>keyness</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>food</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>230.2</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wealth</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>money</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.001730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fund</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>101.8</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cash</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remuneration</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>payment</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pay</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>255.7</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greed</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>0.000015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exploit</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exploitation</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>153.2</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fraud</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27.7</td>
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<td>fraudulent</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>embezzlement</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>corrupt</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corruption</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>0.000002</td>
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<td>bribe</td>
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<td>12.2</td>
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<td>gift</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>13.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>gratuity</td>
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<td>0.009607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In WordSmith, the computer program we used to exploit the corpora, “a word is said to be ‘key’ if a) it occurs in the text at least as many times as the user has specified as a Minimum Frequency b) its frequency in the text when compared with its frequency in a reference corpus is such that the statistical probability as computed by an appropriate procedure is smaller than or equal to a p value specified by the user” (Scott & Oxford University Press 1998: help menu).

The undeniable salience and omnipresence of the corruption problem led some scholars, both African and non-African, to seek cultural explanations. Corrupt practices are seen as embedded in and even licensed by traditional African cultural logics. In their extreme version, such assumptions would amount to saying that corruption is inherent in African culture. We take no such position and we categorically reject such claims. In particular, we reject any causal deterministic link between the cultural practices (e.g. gift giving, negotiating, and bargaining) we discuss below and corruption. Our intention is to identify cultural schemas, in the sense introduced in section 2.1., that play a role in the conceptualisation of corruption. Metaphoric and metonymic conceptualisations make no ontological claims, i.e. they do not define the substance of their targets. Consider a well-known example from conceptual metaphor literature, the conceptualisation of time. One
deeply entrenched conceptualisation of time, especially in the Western cultural context, is that of an object moving through space (see, e.g., Lakoff & Johnson 1980: ch. 9; Kövecses 2002: 33–34). This metaphoric conceptualisation underlies numerous linguistic expressions, e.g. X-mas is coming; the day passed; as time goes by. Yet few would conclude that we actually believe that time is an object. One has to keep metaphor separate from non-metaphoric ontological inferences.

From a culturalist perspective, a number of well-known African cultural logics have been related to the corruption issue, most prominently the logics of gift-giving and of favouritism (cf. Szefel 2000a: 295, Olivier de Sardan 1999). The latter is, of course, an expression of the strong patrimonialism described in section 3.1. Olivier de Sardan (1999) adds further cultural logics, more specifically the following:

- the logic of solidarity networks
- the logic of bargaining and negotiating
- and the logic of predatory authority

There is nothing exotic nor exclusively African about these cultural logics, and there is no need to call upon some primordial African pre-colonial culture. Rather, they are based on universal patterns of human interaction and are thus present, to varying degrees, in any cultural setting. However, these practices have greater prominence in African culture than they do in Western culture. Furthermore, culture is not static. Current practices represent an amalgamation of traditional cultural elements with elements inherited from the colonial period as well as others produced during the independence era (cf. Olivier de Sardan 1999: 26).

We have argued that the entire complex of corruption and related issues has to be considered from the “actors’ point of view”, as Olivier de Sardan (1999: 25) puts it. Corruption can only be defined from “within”. Consider, for example, favouritism and clientelism. Patrimonial practices are licensed by the eating-and-feeding requirements of the kinship model. They are thus not necessarily perceived as illegitimate in the African context and have to be clearly distinguished from corruption in the African conception, irrespective of the judgement of an outside observer. As Geschiere (1995 online) noted, context is important:

To put it in simple terms: a high-placed civil servant will find it exceedingly difficult to refuse a poor kinsman from the village a favour since he plans to retire to the village and to be buried there. What Westerners will call corruption can be seen also as the penetration of the norms of the “economy of affection” into the heart of the state. (Geschiere 1995 online)

Geschiere’s observation is confirmed by example 46:

(46) But it has to be emphasized that while my Nigerian brother is right about what corruption is, it is important to distinguish corruption from that which entails
the illegal sale of special favour to political patronage, which occurs when public decision makers use their legal margins of discretion to confer favours on their friends and followers without receiving material benefits in return. (WCL: 51)

This is not to be taken as a legitimisation of all clientelistic practices in the African context, as the following statement by the current Nigerian president Obasanjo shows:

It has been suggested that society has a way of corrupting the public office holder because of the excessive demands and expectations that are placed on the resources of the individual and because of the African concept of the *big chief*, the public office holder is expected to have an infinite resource or access to a sufficiently large resource base from which he is expected to dish out freely to all and sundry if only to assist his kith and kin to escape throes of poverty. Again such an argument is only an escape route by corrupt public officers. (Obasanjo cit. in Waliggo n.d. *online*: 9)

This statement makes it explicit that corruption in the form of individual accumulation of wealth by public officials falls outside the moral order of the kinship system.14 Examples 47–48 illustrate that corruption may, in fact, be seen as a violation of the kinship-based community model:

(47) They took bribes from their less fortunate brothers. (CEC)

(48) This excessive concentration of power at the national level has become the breeding ground for the *corrupt fat cats* bent on enriching themselves at the expense of the poor peasants whose resource rich lands are being exploited and confiscated by the government without due compensation. (WCL: 106)

Similar observations can be made with respect to the other cultural logics listed above. Regarding corruption as a manifestation of the cultural logic of gift-giving, for instance, obscures the values underlying this logic:

Others are wont to argue that the African culture of appreciation and hospitality encourages corrupt practices. Again I shudder at how an integral aspect of our culture could be taken as the basis for rationalizing an otherwise despicable behaviour. In the African concept of appreciation and hospitality, the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded, the value is usually in the spirit rather than in the material world. It is usually done in the open and never in secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes an embarrassment and is returned. If anything, corruption has perverted and destroyed this aspect of culture. (Obasanjo cit. in Waliggo n.d. *online*: 9)

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14. As one African scholar notes with respect to traditional African values: “The corrupt and selfish accumulators of wealth were isolated as anti-people, witches and sorcerers.” (Waliggo n.d. *online*: 12).
That corruption is indeed perceived as a violation of the community model is also evidenced by the dominant metaphors in the African anti-corruption discourse. Tellingly, disease metaphors prevail.\(^{15}\) In his inaugural speech, the current Nigerian president Obasanjo, for instance, states the following:

\[(49)\] No society can achieve anything near its full potential if it allows corruption to become the full-blown cancer it has become in Nigeria. (WCL: 61)

Examples 50–54 provide further illustration of the corruption is a disease metaphor:

\[(50)\] This kind and level of compromise by our paid so-called government officials at the passport offices all over the country is deleterious to the health and stability of the country. (WCL: 59)

\[(51)\] The Pandemic of Bribery in Nigeria (WCL: 59)

\[(52)\] Once you cure corruption in Nigeria, the economy would improve automatically. (WCL: 69)

\[(53)\] Corruption is contagious and tends to spread from the top. (WCL: 70)

\[(54)\] Anybody who has been to Sierra Leone will tell you this without batting an eyelid. If there is anything that typifies life in this war-wracked nation, it is the endemic plague that has crippled many West African nations – corruption and kleptocracy. (WCL: 40)

The second salient metaphor is corruption is an eater, as in examples 55–58:

\[(55)\] This long overdue seemingly tall order is readily welcomed wholeheartedly by Nigerians who yearn for a leadership that gives priority to the eradication of corruption which has eaten deep into the fabric of national life. (WCL: 69)

\[(56)\] Corruption has indeed eaten deeply into the economic fabric of this nation to the extent that those things once considered taboos are now being praised and envied. (WCL: 92)

\[(57)\] Violence and fear in the streets and homes abound, and corruption is eating away at our society's moral fibre. (WCL: 64)

\[(58)\] CORRUPTION is slowly eating away the heart of Zimbabwean [sic] society. (Electronic Mail & Guardian 1997 online)

\(^{15}\) We do not claim that disease metaphors of corruption are specifically West African. They are, of course, equally salient in Western varieties of English. To provide just one example: Using the same disease metaphor as Obasanjo, the then World Bank president James Wolfensohn spoke of the ‘cancer of corruption’ in Africa (cit.in Szeftel 2000a: 288). More generally, disease metaphors apply to all kinds of social evils.
Both metaphors show up in communion in example 59:

(59) President Obasanjo himself had talked tough when he came into office. He had vowed to stamp out the cankerworm called corruption from the civil service. (WCL: 69)

4.2 Expressions of Corruption in African English

In the preceding section we argued explicitly against seeing corrupt practices as licensed by African cultural patterns and logics. This does not conflict with our observation that these cultural practices play a crucial role in the conceptualisation of corruption. We take the cultural logics listed above to be rooted in cultural schemas, and we basically argue that these schemas are metaphorically mapped on the concept of corruption. Here, the distinction between metonymy and metaphor is crucial: According to the established view in Cognitive Linguistics, metonymy is a conceptual link within a semantic domain. In metaphor, by contrast, elements and structures from one domain are mapped onto another one, i.e. two distinct domains are involved. Capturing the conceptualisations of corruption as metaphoric rather than metonymic intrinsically makes the domain of corruption distinct from those of gift-giving, negotiating, etc. Assuming a metonymic relationship, however, would ultimately imply that corrupt practices are merely a straightforward extension of the respective cultural practices, that, for instance, a bribe is but a special instance of a gift. Seeing the conceptual link as metaphoric, as we propose, has no such implication.

The salience and entrenchment of this metaphoric mapping in the conceptualisation of corruption is manifest in specific African English expressions. In the following, such expressions are systematically analysed against the background of their underlying conceptualisations.

4.2.1 Gift-Giving Metaphors

Consider first the logic of gift-giving. Gift-giving, of course, has its social functions and place in any culture and is not in itself specific to the African context. However, the specific forms it takes and its overall significance differ. In African cultures, gift-giving is an integral part of numerous and various cultural practices and social interactions. On the side of the giver, it is first of all a moral obligation; on the side of the receiver, it is expected. Such cultural practices include the following (cf. Olivier de Sardan 1999: 38ff. for discussion):
gifts offered to local authorities, as a sign of respect
- gifts offered on the occasion of ceremonies like marriage, name-giving, baptism, and enthroning
- gifts offered to a visitor or host
- gifts offered to the bearer of good news
- gifts offered to a witness of an important transaction
- gifts offered in return for useful services, sometimes given in advance
- gifts brought from the market or from travels

This list could be extended. Often these cultural practices are traditionally linked to specific gifts, e.g. certain types of food like kola (see below) and plantain. However, as Olivier de Sardan (1999: 39) observed, gift-giving nowadays usually involves money. There has been a general monetarisation of everyday African life.

Gift-giving practices are ritualised “cultural scenarios”. We find ample linguistic evidence in African English that these cultural scenarios and their underlying schema of gift-giving are evoked in the conceptualisation of corruption, i.e. that bribery is indeed conceptualised in terms of gift-giving. This mapping is facilitated by the monetarisation of modern African life. The metaphor a bribe is a gift shows up, inter alia, in examples 60–61:

(60) Were they not, sort of, justified in supposing that the loans were some gifts to be taken as chop money? (WCL: 95)

(61) He therefore tells the Chief of Manawhoneybee village that his “… name can only go on the radio if [he] brought something;” and of course, the chief gives him money (kola). (CEC)

The metaphor also appears in expressions like small thing and a little something (meaning ‘a bribe’). Here, the source domain is that of small gifts brought home from travel or the market. The most prominent manifestation of the metaphor a bribe is a gift is, however, the well-known fixed expression to give kola (meaning ‘to bribe’) as in 62 and 63:

(62) They say a man expects to accept kola from him for services rendered. (Muzrai 1986 online)

(63) An unqualified contractor is allowed to bid on a project – in exchange for a little kola and a little dash. (WCL: 128)

17. Olivier de Sardan (1999: 38f.) provides parallel examples from Songhay-zarma (Nilo-Saharan languages spoken in Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria). The item Kalem dene, for instance, (‘the quill of the pen’) which is the traditional preliminary gift given to the marabout, is now applied to a bribe given to a bureaucrat. Again, a particular entrenched cultural practice serves as the source domain of this transfer.
**Kola** ('cola nut') is a traditional food gift presented to guests, especially persons of authority. The practice is common throughout West Africa. Example 64, from a literary source, illustrates the practice:

(64) Presently she returned with kola nut and wine cups [...] By the time Edoro came to the *obi*, the men had gone through the ritual of breaking the kola nut and eating it. (Adimora-Ezeigbo 1999: 12)

In the meaning of 'bribe', *kola* is predominantly used in the administrative context, as illustrated in 65:

(65) When he opens the office door there is a loud, pleased laughter inside, and a voice with a vague familiarity says, 'No. This is only your *kola*. Take it as *kola*.' (Armah 1988: 107)

*Kola* evokes the NURTURE schema in addition to the GIFT-GIVING schema. The combination yields the more specific metaphor **A BRIBE IS A FOOD GIFT**. Figure 5 shows the conceptual processes we assume in the metaphoric mapping:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.** Cognitive processes involved in **A BRIBE IS A FOOD GIFT**.
The involvement of the nurture schema may be seen as encouraged by the salient conceptual link between the domains of money and food discussed in section 3.3. There, examples of the transfer from lexical items from the food domain to that of corruption were given (e.g. soya, mimbo). These examples bear a strong metonymic element, too. For instance, soya (‘fried beef skewers’), is a Cameroon meal that would normally be offered to a person invited to a restaurant. To have eaten soya, meaning ‘to have accepted a bribe’ then metonymically relates to the prototypical scene in which a person is invited to discuss an illicit favour or transaction.

The metaphor a bribe is a food gift also finds expression in a non-linguistic, non-verbal variant as in 66:

(66) The policeman who had spoken raised his right hand and in a slow gesture pointed to his teeth. The man had seen this gesture before, several times. Usually, its makers would add the words, ‘Even kola nuts say “thanks”’ [...]. the driver gave his folder, together with the bribe in it, to the policeman. (Armah 1988: 182)

This adds strength to the argument that metaphor is indeed a conceptual phenomenon rather than a purely linguistic one, as already illustrated by the discussion of the Nigerian cartoon in section 3.2.

4.2.2 The Negotiating and Bargaining Metaphors
Negotiating and bargaining metaphors derive from market culture, where negotiating prices is a crucial element of the selling scene. Negotiating and bargaining cannot, however, be reduced to the context of commercial transactions (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 36f.). They are equally at work in other realms of social life. Examples include the negotiation of marriage, beyond the mere determination of a bride price, and the negotiation of compensations under the various types of law. Furthermore, there is a strong tradition of ‘brokerage’, i.e. transactions and negotiations are transferred to and handled by a hired mediator, who is paid for his services (cf. Olivier de Sardan 1999: 37f.). One may thus speak of a negotiation schema, which is involved in various cultural scenarios. Again, this is mapped onto the domain of corruption. In West African English, for instance, bribing is negotiating is manifest in the specific use of the common core English item to settle (meaning ‘to bribe’) as in 67–70:

18. Note that African countries have inherited several such types of law: forms of common law from the pre-colonial period, indigenous law, colonial law, and post-independence national law (cf. Olivier de Sardan 1999: 37). These forms of law coexist and can be appealed to according to need.
And with the natives pacified, civilised and rid of ignorance, superstition, malaria and paganism, and their leaders duly “settled”, every body [sic] was happy! (WCL: 125)

Some of the roadblocks a prospective traveler would encounter unwilling to ‘settle’ with the corrupt officials is the familiar line from the officials such as, “we are out of passport forms”, or “come back tomorrow”. (WCL: 59)

As a consequence of this kind of practice, anyone with a criminal record or a foreign national can easily obtain Nigerian passport [sic] without adequate clearance provided the individual is quite willing to ‘settle’. (WCL: 59)

Critics insisted that Alamieyeseigha gave over N15 million as bribe to judges to influence the case in his favour. “Even service chiefs were settled,” the petitioners wrote. (WCL: 137)

4.2.3 The Predatory-Authority Metaphor
The previous set of examples illustrates the strong interaction of the logic of negotiating with the logic of predatory authority. One may seek for origins of the latter in pre-colonial times, for instance, in the tributes required by warlords. However, as Olivier de Sardan (1999: 42) argues, the omnipresence of this logic needs to be attributed to the colonial period administration, which brought the all-powerful commandants, administrative chiefs appointed by the colonial government, and their local indigenous auxiliaries. In these post-colonial times, local elites, leaders, bureaucrats and executive forces of the post-colonial time continue to operate along these lines.

This socio-cultural schema, we argue, is mapped on the corruption issue, yielding the conceptualisation A BRIBE IS A TRIBUTE TO PREDATORY AUTHORITY. Linguistically, this conceptualisation finds expression in items like ten percent (Nigeria), commission, and bail, all of them meaning ‘a bribe’, primarily in the context of administration, as in examples 71–72:

It has gotten so bad that his secretary spends much of her time sending out dunning letters to contractors who were awarded contracts but haven’t handed over the requisite ten percent bribe to the Boss. (WCL: 128)

Recently, Tell, a respected weekly came out with a report indicating that journalists are even commissioned with fat pay to write editorial opinions. (WCL: 130)

The conceptual metaphor A BRIBE IS A TRIBUTE TO PREDATORY AUTHORITY is frequently linked to the NEGOTIATION schema. The receiver is often a mediator.
4.2.4 The Solidarity Metaphor

Finally, we turn to the logic of solidarity networks. What is meant here is the entire system of bonds an individual may draw and call upon due to his or her anchoring in various social groups. Solidarity networks are thus a component of the kinship-based community model. They include an obligation of mutual assistance. As Olivier de Sardan (1999) put it:

One cannot refuse a service, a favour, a bit of string pulling or compliance to a relative, neighbour, party comrade or friend. Nor ought one to refuse the same to someone who is ‘sent’ by any of the above. The circle of individuals to whom one feels obliged to render services is thus astonishingly wide. (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 40)

Solidarity networks have materialised in the vast system of NGOs and local development associations. They appear in the numerous associations of better-off urban dwellers which support development projects in their rural communities of origin (see Geschiere 1995 for a discussion). Further examples include local community banks and other forms of local capital accumulation and distribution. These solidarity networks practice mutual assistance to compensate for dysfunctional state supply and the general scarcity of resources. Again, we find linguistic evidence that this logic is drawn upon in the conceptualisation of corruption. The resulting metaphor a bribe is a solidarity surcharge is, for instance, manifest in the Ghanaian English item *extra soli*, e.g.

(73) There is no doubt that this announcement asking all the ex-officials to return the *extra soli* they took to the government chest is going to cause severe wahala [Pidgin English for ‘trouble’] in many houses. (WCL: 147)

(74) In Ghana it [a bribe] is called “Soli” meaning ‘solidarity’ (WCL: 130)

The various African English expressions of corruption analysed in this and the preceding sections thus turn out to be manifestations of the African cultural model of community. The underlying cognitive process, we argued, is a metaphorical mapping, i.e. the domain of corruption is structured in terms of conceptualisations derived from the community model. The function is evidently euphemistic. The underlying metaphors ‘hide’ the illicit nature of the phenomenon by conceptualising it as a gift, as negotiating or a tribute to authority.

Culture-specific conceptualisations as those discussed in this article are of course immediately relevant to the pragmatics of cross-cultural communication. In the following, we will briefly demonstrate how our findings come to bear on two concrete instances of cross-cultural contact.
5. Pragmatic applications

Our first example concerns the kinship for community metonymy. One of the authors of this chapter acted as a supervisor for a Cameroonian PhD-student, who signed his emails to him with “your son”. The PhD-student apparently extended the logics of the African model of community to the academic community, conceptualising a supervisor as father. For somebody who is not familiar with this model, the signature “your son” would be utterly strange, if not offending. Though, given our Western background, we may still find this signature irritating (since it reminds us of the obligations of nurture and care, which, for us, are mostly confined to the realm of the immediate biological family), because of our knowledge of the cultural model involved, we at least can make sense of “your son” and explain it as a particular linguistic realisation of the kinship for community metonymy. The interesting point here is not that some kind of miscommunication occurred which could easily be fixed (by simply exchanging “your son” with the name, for instance) but rather that the language used by one of the participants revealed something of his underlying conceptual system. Significantly, the same Cameroonian refers to the other author of this chapter, his immediate collaborator, as brother, which reveals that the entire local academic community is conceptualised in terms of the kinship-based model. Here, a brief comparative look at Western varieties of English is in order. Metonymic and metaphoric extensions of kinship terms are, of course, traceable in these varieties, too, as the following corpus example, also from the academic context, illustrates:

(75) The father of sociology, Adam Ferguson. (FLOB)

In Western varieties, however, such extension is limited to particular kinship terms only; it is not the entire system which is transferred:19 We may call Freud the father of psychoanalysis and Ferguson the father of sociology, but psychoanalysts or social scientists of the respective persuasion would not address each other as brothers or sisters. These conceptualisations are “isolated” and what they highlight is the origin of a paradigm rather than embeddedness in a community. Thus, the rooting in a fully-fledged model of community as in the African context is virtually absent (see Wolf & Polzenhagen, forthcoming, for a more detailed discussion). Furthermore, they do not entail the notions ‘nurture’ and ‘care’, which are highly salient elements of the African model. In other words, the conceptual networks activated by kinship terms differ in a number of crucial respects across cultural contexts. Since we deem this point to be highly important, we will provide further evidence for it with

19. The application of the full range of kinship terms is confined, in the Western context, to some specific, in particular religious, communities.
findings from the questionnaire survey we conducted among German and Cameroonian university students. The part of the questionnaire we refer to set out to comparatively investigate the conceptual networks linked to the family concept in the two groups of informants (see the appendix for the format of this part of the questionnaire). Specifically, the presence and salience of links between the family concept and a set of related concepts were tested. The informants were presented with 17 keywords and asked to indicate seven of them that they associate most with family. The rationale was to determine which concepts are, relative to others, salient in the networks. A selection of the results is presented in figure 6.

![Figure 6. Concepts associated with family (selection).](image)

The markedly higher salience of items from the broader community domain in the Cameroonian group (i.e. friends, ancestors, society, country) fully supports our general analysis of the African community model. These differences show up even more clearly in the data from the section in which the informants were asked to judge the degree of strength they perceive for the link between family and the 17 individual keywords. Consider, as an illustration, the results for the perceived strength of the link between family and country.
Chapter 8. Culture-specific conceptualisations of corruption in African English

For our present concern with pragmatic issues, the differences in salience of conceptual links, captured in the figures just presented, coupled with differences in conceptualisations themselves, as in the case of kinship terms extensions, are central to the construction of meaning in intercultural communication. Inevitable, they will shade into each intercultural conversation in which related topics are discussed, as they are part of the conceptual background against which the interactants interpret linguistic material (see Wolf & Polzenhagen 2006).

Our second example takes a macroscopic perspective and concerns, more narrowly, the issue of corruption and the potential conflicts it yields in inter-cultural economic relations. Western enterprises that are engaged in regions where gratification practices are wide-spread and where financial “favours” are expected in business transactions are faced with the problem how to position themselves with respect to these local realities. Possible positions range between two extremes. The first would result from a strict relativist vantage point and would speak for the full adaptation to the local practices. Ethical considerations, e.g. on the debatable moral implications of corruption, are bypassed in favour of the tolerance principle and, after all, of economic interests. The other extreme position would claim ethic primacy and universal validity of the Western understanding of corruption and would insist on the strict application of the Western norms. When pursued successfully, this universalist approach, in fact, may be seen as a form of cultural imperialism. When the local balance of power, however, does not permit to push through this position, there is no other alternative than breaking off interaction and withdrawing from the country. From a pragmatic perspective, neither of the two extreme positions is felicitous.
In the recent philosophically oriented literature on the subject (see, e.g., the articles in Steinmann & Scherer 1998a), proposals are made, from both vantage points, that seek to console a context-sensitive approach with ethical and discursive standards and with economic interests. Bausch (1998), for instance, discusses corrupt practices against the background of universal ethic principles. Kyora (1998) and Steinmann & Scherer (1998b) take a culturalist perspective. The authors provide fictitious case studies illustrating the two vantage points and their outcomes with respect to the corruption issue. Important for our concern is that linguistic considerations occupy a prominent place in the discussion represented by the articles in Steinmann & Scherer (1998a). This is due to the fact that possible solutions for inter-cultural conflicts strongly depend on successful communication between the interactants. Here, the dominant emphasis, from both vantage points, is on rules of linguistic behaviour and discourse. The aim of these approaches is to define and develop discourse strategies and conditions that ensure the effective functioning of cross-cultural interaction. Böhler (1998) is a universalistically oriented application of this paradigm to inter-cultural economic interaction, also beyond the specific problem of corruption. Wohlrapp (1998), with a culturalist commitment, stresses the impact of cultural differences on the process and the structure of communication.

In linguistic pragmatics, we find a parallel dominant emphasis on rules and functioning of verbal interaction. This perspective guides the familiar studies on 'face' and 'politeness' (e.g. Brown & Levinson 1998; Scollon & Scollon 2004: ch. 3), on variation in the exercise of speech acts or formulaic routines, on variation in the organisation of discourse (e.g. Scollon & Scollon 2004: ch. 5), on small talk, on terms of address and respect; for an overview and a critical discussion, see, e.g., Clyne (1998: 246–249, 1994: 3–4) and Blommaert (1991). In the context of inter-cultural communication, this yields a focus on the ‘how’ of verbal encounters between cultures.

What is bracketed by this paradigm, however, is another possible linguistic perspective on inter-cultural communication, namely the question in which way different cultural conceptualisations of the interactants bear on cross-cultural discourse (see Wolf & Polzenhagen 2006 for a critical reflection and examples of functionalist shortcomings). This alternative perspective is strongly in line with the culturalist vantage point. An overview of how it can be approached against a cognitive-linguistic background is given by Yu (this volume), with special attention to the L2 learning context, and is discussed in more detail by Wolf & Polzenhagen (2006). This focus is meaning-oriented and foregrounds the aspect of understanding rather than that of mere effective functioning.

So far, however, this possible linguistic perspective is poorly explored, at least with regard to applied issues. With respect to the corruption problem, it may
contribute to an informed cross-cultural interaction in several ways. As we hope to have shown, a cognitive-linguistic analysis may first of all identify and explicate the interactants’ cultural conceptualisations and may thus raise awareness of the cultural models involved. This concerns the other’s model as much as, in a self-reflective process, one’s own model, of which one is rarely conscious. Furthermore, it may help to negotiate some consensus on which practices transgress the respective boundaries of the legitimate and are thus to be rejected. Here, the analysis of underlying cultural models makes explicit that there are sources of legitimacy other than those sanctioned by a particular culture. One does not have to share these sources, but they may still be acceptable or at least need to be considered and respected. Finally, the linguistic analysis of cultural models may add substance to the discussion which instances of gratification are indeed backed by cultural practices (e.g. by the logic of gift-giving to establish and maintain relationships and by the logic of obligations towards one’s kin) and which instances unduly claim cultural rooting in order to hide individual interests and enrichment.

Our view of the possible application of Cultural Linguistics to the study of inter-cultural communication is thus inspired by the key tenet of critical approaches to language. The linguistic analysis may contribute to a greater awareness of how phenomena are conceptualised and, consequently, to a more informed consideration of socio-cultural realities. Speaking above of consensus, however, is not arguing for a homogenous presumably universal ‘third model’. Rather, it is to be read as exploring and defining the scope of action and interaction within and between the two models involved.

6. Conclusions

The cultural linguistics approach may be fruitfully applied to the study of lexical and conceptual peculiarities of language varieties. This approach allows for the transition from a mere descriptive treatment of a variety’s lexicon to an explanatory account based on the underlying cognitive processes. When analysed against the background of cultural models, the specific meaning, salience, and the systematic interrelatedness of lexical items within a domain may be captured and compared across varieties. In this chapter, this has been shown exemplarily for African English. Cultural conceptualisations integrate loan words (e.g. mimbo; soya); they trigger semantic extensions of common core English items (e.g. to settle; to commission); and they yield variety-specific fixed expressions (e.g. to eat money; to give kola).

From a pragmatic perspective, cultural conceptualisations have far-reaching implications for cross-cultural communication. The application of cultural-linguistic methods to the study of varieties of English allows one to examine the
expression of culture in the world’s foremost lingua franca. It is possible to break through the restrictions inherent in functionalist inter-cultural pragmatic theory, which deliberately excludes the semantic dimension of cross-cultural communication. Cultural linguistics can contribute to a better understanding of the cultural background of groups of speakers in question, an aspect which is neglected by the focus on mere effective communicative functioning. This potential can add to an informed way of dealing with inter-cultural conflicts.

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Chapter 8. Culture-specific conceptualisations of corruption in African English


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Appendix

Section on family of the questionnaire survey.

Please draw lines to the 7 items that you relate most with ‘family’

![Diagram showing relationships between items related to family]

Please indicate the strength of the link you perceive between the following items and ‘family’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>No link</th>
<th>Weak link</th>
<th>Medium link</th>
<th>Strong link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dinner</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
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<td>Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>□</td>
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<td>Spirits/Ghosts</td>
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<td>Respect</td>
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<td>Eating</td>
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<td>Obedience</td>
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<td>Relatives</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are there any further items that you strongly associate with ‘family’?

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________
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8. **Plümacher, Martina and Peter Holz (eds.):** Speaking of Colors and Odors. vi, 239 pp. + index. *Expected May 2007*


